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Abstract 
Traditional analyses of popular or everyday culture have been couched in terms of, on the 
one hand, variants of the Frankfurt School view that it distorts or offers a false 
consciousness of an underlying reality, whilst on the other, the response from discourse 
theorists and more traditional forms of social constructionism has been philosophically 
conventionalist in arguing that discourses, definitions and labelling activities directly 
construct meaning. 
The argument of this thesis is that it is possible, via Dummett's reading of Frege, to 
construct a realist account of meaning or, more strictly, sense, which preserves an 
element of rationality in everyday cultural reception without thereby effecting a radical 
relativisation of the notion of what constitutes rational processes and practices. This is 
achieved via Dummett's Context Principle, through which it is argued that the actual 
meaning of an utterance is not given directly by the conventional meaning of its 
constituent terms and phrases, but rather that the object picked out, its reference, depends 
on the context in which the utterance occurs. Hence the terms and phrases offer no more 
than a clue, a route to the reference, not the actuality of the reference. Consequently, 
whilst the sedimented meanings of the elements from which an utterance is composed 
provide a structuring of meaning, the actual constitution of meaning will depend on the 
context. 
The thesis explores the view that meaning or sense has an open-ended, but ontological 
quality by examining a variety of issues and themes including reflexivity, forms of 
conventionalism, conceptions of the everyday, perspectives in phenomenological social 
theory and philosophy, rationality, semiotics, reference, discursivity, spatial and temporal 
locations of sense. It counterposes the emphasis on the contextual structuring of meaning 
as an effect of the subject's everyday appropriation of background routines, to passive 
constructions of subjectivity as offered by the Frankfurt School, and what it sees as 
overly direct constructions of meaning via classification systems in social constructionist 
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Introduction 
Phenomenology and realism are normally seen as intellectually opposed traditions. This 
is because phenomenology is generally linked via Husserl (and prior to that, Hegel) with 
idealism. Dummett's (1981, p. 58) reading of Frege's theory of meaning (principally in 
Frege's Grundlagen, or Foundations of Arithmetic) contests Husserl's view of meanings 
as noema, structures of consciousness, and indicates rather that structures of meaning lie 
in the (shared) contexts of language use. Hence they operate independently of the mind 
(loc. cit. ) and for Dummett are therefore evidence of Frege's realism. 
Hence while both Husserl and Frege distinguish between sense (noema: ) and reference, 





Dummett argues that Husserl's route to reference culminates in transcendental 
idealism whilst for Frege, senses are a kind of real, public intentional `object'. By placing 
senses in the world of public experience, rather than in consciousness Dummett suggests 
that the processes of objectification (reference) they are associated with are likely to 
- 
allowing for mistaken perceptions, memories etc. 
- 
pick out real features of the world. 
Further, although senses are placed in the realm of shared experience, it should be 
evident from what has been said that they are not themselves the objects to which we 
refer 
- 
to which our intentionality is directed 
- 
rather they are shared ways of 
appropriating, objectifying aspects of the world (loc. cit. ). Hence they are quite different 
from individuals' structures of consciousness, and in contrast, are suggestive of collective 
modes of being, as structured by social contexts. The intersubjectivity of communication 
here appears as a socially ontological, not psychological, state of affairs. Dummett claims 
that the continuity of the social reality mapped out by contexts depends on the linking of 
the senses 
- 
the common ways of picking out, working on, features of the world 
- 
of those 
contexts. This is done discursively by incorporating the discursive practice (utterance) of 
one sense into that of whatever aims to succeed or appropriate it. It is also possible that 
such attempts at articulating senses will produce none sense! That is, continuity of 
discursive practices is by no means guaranteed. 
As Dummett's reading of Frege's work on sense and reference can be seen as a realist 
project it stands in contrast to conventionalist accounts of discursivity 
- 
the social 
constructionism of the Foucauldians and earlier constructionists such as Goffman, and 
also the post-pragmatism of Richard Rorty. Whilst we can agree with the postmoderns 
that an absolute distinction between language and the world is unsustainable, the 
consequences of rendering the world discursive are in the present view argued to depend 
more on the presence of the informing intelligibility of the world in discourse and less on 
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the shaping of the world by discourse than the various strains of conventionalism would 
allow. 
It is here that Dummett's conception of senses as embodied in discursive practices rather 
than mental states plays a crucial role in redistributing reason, truth, logic away from 
individual consciousness and in imbricating it in structures of the world. Hence whereas 
for constructionists discourses address individuals directly through linguistic 
conventions, definitions of the situation, codified roles, labelling, and so on, 
communicative practices for Dummett only speak to individuals as they are linked to the 
senses of the discursive practices in which they are inscribed, i. e. they address individuals 
through communicative senses of their activities rather than directly through their 
consciousness. 
On this view conventional accounts do not have a deus ex machina status to effect the 
transformation of individuals but act on or are acted on by individuals only indirectly i. e. 
via the senses of the discursive contexts which those individuals already inhabit. 
Consequently, discourses or ideologies are only socially efficacious in so far as they 
articulate the logic of those situations 
- 
not the logic of individual minds. In this way the 
informing intelligibility of the world acts as a third term between individual subjects and 
their objectifications, fields of reference. 
As noted above the framing phenomenological inspiration for this study is the Frege- 
Dummett account of the contextual nature of meaning. The ontological implications of 
the intersubjective or `senses' in Dummett's account of Frege for analyses of meaning, 
communication, discursive practice etc. act as the source and measure of our 
objectifications (although the institutional consequences of such an ontology for social 
theory have to be sought in say, Merleau Ponty's observations on the ontogenetic 
character of spatial embodiment as a lived- through trajectory, for example). This 
framework is offered as an alternative to social constructionist accounts of meaning in 
discourse and representation. 
For Frege-Dummett meaning arises via the mobilisation of sediments or traces from 
previous linguistic routines to figure and denote states of affairs in present contexts. 
Reference or identity depends on the routine production of meaning 
-'senses' in 
communicative practices whose context enables us to pick out states of affairs in process. 
Hence names (sedimented classifications) achieve a reference not via their conventional 
meanings which only offer a clue, but by the context of the communicative practice. That 
is to say, whilst genealogy of classification remains a determinant its impact is indirect 
and has anyway to be thought of as past discursive practices and their senses rather than 
abstract classificatory systems. 
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We can see from this that Frege produces a radical relativisation of meaning if his 
approach is contrasted with conventional/literal conceptions of the way statements refer. 
In another (ontological) sense, it is less relativistic than conventionalist views of 
language use (e. g. Rortean pragmatism) because of its insistence that the truth conditions 
of statements include the sedimented meanings (as well as the contingent circumstances 
in context) and hence that paradigms of knowledge depend on their grounding in self- 
evidence of contextual sediments or knowledge traditions. The study contains an 
extended treatment of Gadamer's contribution to this area of debate. 
It is argued that actual meanings or senses differ from semiotic conceptions of meaning 
in that representations in semiotics (as well as in literalist views of meaning) contain 
foregrounded meanings whereas in Frege-Dummett communicative practice rather than 
the representation per se conveys the sense of an utterance. Sedimented meanings suggest 
past practices subsumed within current ones rather than the sediment being contained 
within the phrase or term in abstract. Dummett illustrates this point in several ways. He 
points out that if we relied on abstract, conventional meanings to convey senses then it 
would be possible to substitute phrases which literally mean the same without semantic 
loss. Hence on the literal level, `Brutus killed himself' could be replaced by `X killed X', 
without losing the sense of the first expression. However, clearly the sense is not carried 
over into the second expression. Secondly, Dummett (op. cit., pp. 339-41) argues that the 
composition of an utterance as a set of related terms does not guarantee its meaning. He 
identifies the constitution of the utterance as being determined not by the way its terms 
syntagmatically connect but rather in that the senses of its phrases or terms are related by 
the communicative practice in context. Communicants construct the sense from the 
contextualisation rather than from the given contiguities in speech. Hence listeners-in- 
context have no difficulty with quite ungrammatical utterances where subject-predicate 
relations are confused. For example, `Wright kicked the ball, the referee blew his whistle 
and it went wide' presents no problems at all to football fans. There are also utterances 
whose sense depends on ignoring some words as in definitions where what is of interest 
is not the `original' sense of the definiendum, but only its meaning as given by the 
definiens, so the former doesn't play any part in determining the sense of the utterance. 
Hence, more generally, there is a problem of which terms or phrases encapsulate the 
sense, give its constitution, and which serve merely as elaboration i. e. link it to the here 
and now (e. g. `Frank Fearless Free' might refer to the liberation of Frank Fearless or it 
may be the predicate of some missing subject 
-a popular newspaper). Sarcasm or code 
also present problems for conventionalist theories of meaning, and so on. The point here 
then is that the sense's of utterances are not given by the linguistic representations 
themselves. The sense of an utterance, that is its constitution, depends on how the 
communicants reconstitute the literal order using indexical features given only by the 
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context, not the order of representation itself. The reconfiguration of terns and meanings 
is a feature of the conditions of utterance rather than of the given relations of language. 
The recent discussions of representational and non-representational theories of meaning 
in Lash and Urry (1994) and by Thrift (1996) demonstrate the ongoing topicality of the 
issues raised here. 
Despite this qualification over semiotic and conventional views on meaning, the study 
also picks out the affinities between phenomenology and structuralism 
-as perhaps is 
already signalled by Dummett's (loc. cit. ) emphasis on the sense of any utterance as 
being given by the configuration of the senses of its terms rather than by its composition, 
its elaboration of an essential structure in particular circumstances. More generally, he 
notes that meaning is relational. The decentredness of utterances 
- 
as seen above 
- 
and the 
autonomy of their senses from subjects' meanings or readings is fundamental to 
Dummett, as these tropes of meaning are to Althusser or Barthes when figured 
semiotically. 
Dummett's (loc. cit. ) sense of constitution of an utterance parallels Althusser's notions of 
displacement and condensation in that the context of utterance configures the way its 
constituents actually articulate and this displaces the conventional meaning. Further, 
Barthes' distinction between denotation and connotation has affinities with the 
phenomenological view that actual meanings are structured by the indexical features of 
meaning contexts 
- 
its field of `connotations'. Foucault's work on genealogy and 
Derrida's concern with how words work behind our backs parallel the notions of 
background and context. Husserl's writings on self- evidence, the `articulation' of a trace, 
emphasise the structural, systemic nature of sedimented meaning. Writers in the 
hermeneutic tradition, such as Ricoeur, who notes the complementarity of the two 
traditions, are quite at home moving between connotation and `semantic field' for 
instance. Again, Gramsci's theoretical importance can arguably be grasped as the 
intellectual richness of thinking at the conjunction between a proto-structuralism of 
decentered subjectivity and the phenomenology of enacted meanings which reproduce 
and rearticulate a sedimented common sense. The underlying importance of articulation 
in Gramsci's work is noted and elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe, via an Althusserian, 
and later poststructuralist route which takes in Leibniz as well as Foucault and Derrida. 
Articulation also echoes the Spinozist implications of structural causality with its 
phenomenological resonances where constitution of senses is structured by context and 
the `open horizon' thus engendered shows the senses of utterances/terms in the field of 
their conditions of possibility. 
In situating the Frege-Dummett framework in proximity to phenomenological social 
theory its affinities can most clearly be seen via the role of indexicality in the production 
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of meaning and the `subversion' of conventional meaning in the work of Schutz and 
especially Garfinkel. The reflexive or situated nature of `accounts' or descriptions 
characterises both Dummett's interpretive work and overlaps with that of Merleau-Ponty, 
whose Heideggerian influences are felt in the insight that intersubjectivity is active and 
embodied, which in Merleau-Ponty entails creating shared social spaces of conflictual 
collectivity, as in class or other collective struggles. We share the senses or meaning 
structures of those we disagree with- only articulating them differently. This is an idea 
that owes something to his viewing Hegel's master-slave dialectic as an open horizon of 
possibilities. 
Whilst Merleau-Ponty's idea of the social as embodied collective experience, and as 
dialogical, is important for the theorisation of social dynamics, his theory of perception 
does not extend to a theory of praxis or social constitution. It is here that the Frege- 
Dummett conception of social objectification via the senses of discursive practices (sense 
determines reference) is of crucial significance. Again here knowledge is seen as situated 
by the conditions of its production. 
The study uses the framework suggested by this cluster of ideas to address issues in the 
area of social constructionist or conventionalist accounts of meaning and identity, the 
relationship between the discursive and the real, the myth of phenomenological social 
theory as interactionist/micro-sociology, the lifeworld conception of everyday life, the 
indexical features of the everyday as irreducible to discourse and as the measure of its 
actuality. A key element of the discussion is the counterposing of an open-horizonal 
perspective to the suggestion in rationalisation theory that modernity increases the 
fragmentary, individualised character of experience in which individuals chose from a 
multiplicity of alternatives produced by abstract systems. Further, the temporal features 
of the everyday as sedimented patterns which have their own rhythms of development, 
and an impact upon the historical present are examined in relation to Fredric Jameson's 
claims about the irretrievability of the historical past. 
The focus of the study is taken as a response to two sets of interlinked debates. Firstly, 
there are the issues around the role of ideology in cultural analysis, that is, whether a 
certain kind of Marxist analysis, the Frankfurt School critique of popular culture, is 
adequate to the task of grasping the complex formations which comprise popular culture 
and of evaluating their content. Secondly, there are the questions posed by discourse 
theorists against Marxists and others about the role of language and cultural classification 
systems, and their relation to formal institutional discourses and practices. 
In all of these debates the nature of agency, or more concretely, subjectivity, is of 
paramount importance. The role and the wider significance of subjectivity, its world 
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character, or the `objectness' of the subject (Adorno, 1973, p. 164-5,174ff), its claims to 
embody an objective reason, needed to be reassessed. This had to be done in the light 
both of a reductionist, `base-superstructure' perspective operating from within Marxism 
and a pessimist determinism from Foucauldians and others, which had close affinities to 
fatalist readings of Weber's rationalisation thesis. 
How could a response promoting the objectness of the subject be formulated in the 
context of cultural analysis? The notion of sense in Dummett's reading of Frege's theory 
of meaning offered a way forward. This suggests that our ideas about knowledge and 
truth emerge in only a roundabout way and cannot be read off literally from cultural 
artefacts and activities; that is, seen as reflections of economic priorities or conventional 
and dominant definitions of those things, as the Frankfurt School tended to argue. ' On the 
other hand, a `prejudice', or theoretical common sense suggested that classification 
systems predetermine what kinds of things we can talk about or construct subjectivity 
through discursive positions 
- 
in some direct way. ' Hence views about culture tended to 
oscillate between these two overlapping positions. 
As outlined above, Dummett proposes an idea which offers a way of circumnavigating 
these positions to give subjectivity a world dimension. This is encapsulated in Frege's 
claim that sense determines reference. That is, classification processes emerge from 
discursive practices via a trope of grasping the sense of subjects' utterances from the 
meaning context in which they are embedded. In this view `sense' provides the link 
between an active reflexive subjectivity and the wider environment which structures its 
activity. Dummett's point is that effective communication or structured discourse starts 
from a practised context of shared meanings and only on that ontological basis can 
classification take place, that is, make sense to subjects. Hence classification is an 
outcome of communicative practices rather than its starting point. 
It would follow from this that the discursive power of circulated statements depends not 
on classification itself but the capacity to share amongst others the senses embedded in 
cultural practices, to draw them, intersubjectively, towards a discursive project. This 
means that the precise nature of cultural configurations starts not from conventional 
designations but from situated practices through which reference to significant cultural 
objects is the outcome, and this involves negotiation or contestation of the conventional 
meanings. Classification is then always contested (dialogical) and problematic. To 
suggest otherwise, that is, that classification determines the sense we have of things 
See Kraniauskas (1998) for a current example of this, that is, the discounting of a rationality 
situated in the everyday of popular cultural forms. 
Z McNay (1994, pp. 76-7,82) examines the absence of real subjects in Foucault's formulations of 
discourse and suggests the need for analysis of informal, everyday structures, to understand the 
scope of formal institutional arrangements. 
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results, as Russell famously demonstrated, in a paradox. Crudely and simply, this is that 
to name or refer in this way entails that the name pre-exists what it classifies, but, on the 
other hand, it must already have the name in order to be recognised as a thing of that 
particular sort! 
This prejudice about how classification works throws up ambiguities of the sort that 
when we describe something as `biological', say, then `biological' seems to serve both as 
a name and also as the -thing named. For Frege, unease about this would be a 
consequence of a faulty view about what referencing objects means; his response to this 
unease would be that the name and object are not really separate at all, that conceptual 
objects are always situated by some predication and that we fall into this predicament 
because, for instance, we are mislead by the syntax of language into dividing the world 
into subjects and predicates. Rather, objects are precipitated from the contexts of 
linguistic interaction, whose structure they resemble in their own; classification systems 
bear the mark of the contexts in which they arise, expressing the complex articulations of 
sedimented meaning found there. They are situated rather than conventionalised/ 
universal structures. 
The study is structured as a series of interlinked thematic areas through which the central 
concepts intersubjectivity, sense and the everyday, are examined with a view to exploring 
the critical and utopian potential of a phenomenological perspective. This is done mainly 
via a dialogue between various strands of phenomenology and currents within Marxism 
and postmodernism. The chapter-by-chapter development of the argument runs as 
follows. 
Chapter 1 outlines key themes and issues of the study. The contextual nature of meaning 
and reference, the nature of reflexivity for a decentered subjectivity, the conception of 
reference as practice 
- 
as against conventionalist (e. g. bureaucratic) accounts and its 
implications for the Frankfurt School view of cultural reception as hegemonic meanings. 
The chapter also examines the political nature of communication and distinguishes 
understanding from agreement in that agreement requires consensus whilst understanding 
can take place between contesting positions or even traditions. 
Chapter 2 takes up the debates around reflexivity as taken for granted (shared) knowledge 
and also examines the implications this might have for the openness of theoretical 
practice via the implication that shared horizons of third person `knowledge' are 
anchored in social contexts rather than in individual minds. The second part of the 
chapter examines conventionalist accounts of meaning and their treatment of 
metaphorical utterances, and argues that context as metaphorical/indexical meaning is 
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always an accompaniment of conventional language and indeed that the latter's meaning 
depends on this unarticulated content. 
Chapter 3 contains a phenomenological critique of models of rationality based on 
conventionalist understandings of context, and does this via discussion of Skinner, 
Foucault and Gadamer's views on historical understanding. This is prefaced by an 
argument that Rationalisation theory produces an over-conventionalised (bureaucratised) 
view of the social world and is related to structure-agency dichotomies which appear in 
Skinner's work via its omission of intersubjective situational logics. 
Chapter 4 relates back to issues examined at the end of Chapter 2 in its discussion of the 
role of metaphor as inscribed in semiotic and semantic accounts of meaning. A 
comparative study is made of the ability of metaphor to relate both to meaning contexts 
and to reference. It is argued that Dummett's semantic theory, in contrast to Davidson 
and Rorty in Chapter 2, offers the possibility that metaphorical language contains 
reference and that it avoids the tendency of semiotic theory to fix or conventionalise 
meaning. It is argued, following Russell, that the tendency to see classification purely as 
a matter of convention produces a paradox which renders the discursive view of naming 
untenable. The role of context, with its metaphorical undertow of indexical/everyday 
meaning, renders the literal or conventional classification a visible product of a 
metaphorical process. 
Chapter 5 examines different accounts of the everyday. Husserl and Frege-Dummett both 
have versions of the idea that reference/objectivity is founded in everyday modes of 
categorisation. However, the Frege-Dummett account, unlike that of Husserl or 
Habermas, is not purely epistemological, but argues that indexical structures are 
ontologically primordial structures of shared communicative practice, irreducible to 
individual consciousness. Hence the everyday, routine, indexical nature of 
communication can act both to reinforce and to undermine received meaning structures. 
A critique of cultural studies is made on the basis of its omission of this dimension of 
meaning in theories of representation, and the tendency of such theories towards 
reified/overconventionalised conceptions of meaning and forms of subject-object 
dualism. 
Whilst the metaphoricity of meaning goes unrecognised in conventionalist accounts, the 
practice of such natural language, it is argued through Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, 
renders the world visible as it provides the context or semantic field within which 
reference can occur. Hence, as in Chapter 4, metaphoricity is seen as the basis rather than 
the antithesis of reference. 
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Chapter 6 argues that the collapse of contemporary writing on the body into forms of 
dualism is due to a failure to acknowledge the discursive nature of the world. However, 
this is not to claim that reality is discourse, but rather that prediscursive phenomena, e. g. 
the body, as a sensuous ground of discourse, are themselves both spatially extended and 
categorically `prediscursive'. Hence, whether the body is subject to a particular discourse 
or discursive formation or not, it has a categorical structure, and so, following Spinoza, 
its materiality should be seen to come under two attributes as above. 
Dummett's account of Frege's notion of sense is offered as an alternative to 
conventionalism and in which sense is seen as embodying elements of both the spatially 
extended and cognitive/classificatory domains. The problems ensuing when either of 
these elements of meaning is ignored are examined through Shilling's observations on 
Foucault's dematerialisation of the body and Garfinkel's suggestion that sex/gender 
depends on prior common sense categorisations of the body. This is further extended by 
an examination of naming in Butler's theory of gender construction as an example of 
linguistic fetishism which assumes the body as such, i. e. a precategorial body, is the 
subject of naming, rather than seeing names as emerging from metaphorical employment 
of `the body', as argued in the previous chapter. 
Chapter 7 draws together the threads of the everyday in communicative practice. This 
section of the study contains a critical discussion of Jameson's view that the completion 
of modernity in postmodernity effaces the historical past; the argument is that 
modernisation has effaced traces of previous historical stages via the mediatisation of the 
world. Jameson's semiotics of postmodernity is examined in terms of whether semiotic 
systems can achieve completeness via synonymy or whether such systems always rely in 
the end on `invisible' contextualisation. 
It is argued that the `invisible' structures of the everyday interrupt semiotic closure of 
meaning by dislocating the continuity of the historical present. Furthermore, this creates a 
space within which the historical past can be recuperated by the process of reinserting or 
articulating the present within historical consciousness. Benjamin's conception of `now' 
time is used to illustrate this point. This is a point, mythologically speaking, beyond the 
historical process from which history can be recuperated in its articulation with the 
historical present. Some figure or event has the power to transfigure frames of reference, 
uniting us with traditions suppressed by the `cultural dominant'. This process is 
facilitated by the open-horizonal structures of everyday meaning which, once articulated 
via political contestation of the meaning of a time, with the present situation, release a 
flood of associations which have a transformative effect on fields of reference enabling 
new topics to be configured. The utopian potential of this aspect of the everyday is 
explored through Osborne's discussion of Benjamin and Lefebvre. 
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Chapter 1: Making Sense of Social Subjects: Reflexivity, 
Perception, Praxis and the Everyday 
The various threads of argumentation in the following chapters can perhaps be best 
outlined through a fairly brief overview of key issues which illustrate the directions of 
enquiry and their relation to aspects of phenomenological social theory. 
The recent discussions over several volumes in the Culture, Media and Identity series of 
meaning, representation and discursive practice provide a convenient focus and point of 
departure for outlining and bringing together central themes in the field of 
communication. ' 
Making Sense 
Probably the most important question, the question within which other topics are framed, 
concerns the way meaning is produced or constructed socially and it is in the first of the 
series of publications referred to (du Gay et al., 1997) that the process of communication, 
of `making sense' is introduced. This is done via a case study, the development of the 
Sony Walkman. 
Specifically, the problem faced by the supporters of some new idea, as represented here 
by the Walkman, is how to explain or communicate its meaning to the public (ibid., 
pp. 13-14). An early description identified the invention as a `smallish stereo-headphone 
cassette player'. This raises two facets of communication. Firstly, the description means 
something because it taps into existing meanings such as `stereo', `headphone' and 
`cassette player'. Thus it offers a whole genealogy, a historical narrative involving 
listening to radios and record players via headphones, stereophonic records, tape 
recorders, cassette players and so on. Secondly, and more importantly perhaps, the 
description of the Walkman is not a literal account but uses the kind of background 
narrative mentioned to give the artefact a meaning. The Walkman, hence, is not literally a 
smallish stereo-headphone cassette player, but as the authors indicate, the expression 
operates as a metaphor which enables us to grasp what is going on. 
The conventional meanings of the terms involved here are situated within wider semantic 
networks, fields of connotation which convey a precise though non-literal meaning or 
sense of the object depending on the practical purposes in which a conversation about the 
Walkman is embedded. Specific discourses, those of `Japanese-ness', high tech, youth, 
mobility, for example, shay be connoted. As the writers observe, `we constantly draw on 
The volumes of particular relevance are du Gay (1997), du Gay et al. (1997) and Mackay (1997). 
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these wider connotations and discourses to make sense of an object, to expand or specify 
its meaning' (ibid., p. 15). 
Now the idea of the metaphorical character of everyday language, the indexicality of 
natural language utterances, where meaning rests largely on context which provides the 
images through which meaning is communicated, is well known. The metaphor via its 
situational imagery condenses a variety of meanings and enables conversants to `get the 
point'. In its everydayness it runs together the old with the new, the familiar and the 
strange as is seen in the genealogical basis of making sense of the Walkman (the object is 
like a small stereo-headphone cassette-player). 
The homogenising of an object with its background features (it's like this) is a key aspect 
of its everyday reception. The authors emphasise that to understand something it must 
become `part of our cultural universe' and paradoxically in order to belong it must also 
be seen as different. Further, 
[this] means that the Sony has become inscribed in our informal social knowledge 
- 
the `what 
everybody knows' about the world 
- 
without consciously knowing where or when they first 
learned it. This kind of shared, taken-for-granted knowledge is an essential element in what we 
call `culture'... Belonging to a culture provides us with access to such shared frameworks or 
`maps' of meaning which we use to place and understand things... The Walkman is now firmly 
located on those `maps of meaning' which make up our cultural `know-how' (ibid., pp. 9-10). 
Reflexivity 
The everyday mode of making sense by plugging into semantic networks is a kind of 
mirroring which enables us to pick out or give meaning to an item such as the Walkman. 
The account of this given in Moores (1997) stems from Giddens (1991) who argues that 
reflexivity is a kind of self-monitoring, that is, self-examination, through which we can 
adapt our behaviour to situational requirements. Giddens' (Moores, 1997) view of 
reflexivity as a kind of learning and response process has us picking things out and then 
feeding them back into the field of activity concerned. If we take the example of the 
Walkman, this would mean identifying certain semantic networks in which the Walkman 
is found and then relating these to other networks through which we can use the machine. 
For instance, one could use it whilst skating, rollerblading or travelling on the `tube'. The 
machine alludes to other modes of reception via its headphones, cassette and radio 
elements, but then this in turn is tied into our personal appropriation of it as rollerblader, 
etc. Similarly, a musician could pick up on an idea in the discourses of say, rock music 
and feed it back into their next album by making allusions to the background, founding 
influences on their own style. Hence it is often argued ä la Giddens that there is in 
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contemporary life a growing self-conscious relatedness to historical and cultural 
background. 
In a sense this seems right, that is, background ideas help to pick out Walkman features 
or a musical style. However, there is a difficulty in that the musician's project, for 
example, is in this way seen as something separate, that is, something which is come by 
separately, from the background, which, it has been argued, helps to pick it out and 
identify it. On the Giddens view it is as if the musician has ideas about a project first and 
then identifies some historical contextual allusions with which to embellish it. This seems 
to put the cart before the horse as it is the context which enables the project to emerge in 
the first place. The project is able to identify itself only by reference to its background 
features. It is this self-referential nature which delivers the project to us as a possibility, 
that is, it is feasible because it already connects with our existing, taken for granted 
semantic networks. 
In Dummett's (1981, p. 132) world of common linguistic practices, this entails that we are 
already doing or enacting the project, before we can name it. That is, the monitoring is 
incorporated in the project before we come to recognise that we are doing it. Following 
this line of thought, it is appropriate to note Merleau-Ponty's position that we construct 
the rationality of what we are doing rather than referring to `rationality 
... 
given 
beforehand', `we make sense out of our experience from within it' rather than from 
outside it. Thus meanings are received from experience rather than given to it. This 
`being-in-the-world' (following Heidegger) is then the monitoring process, `the activity 
of organizing the world by responding to it from within... ' (Merleau-Ponty, 1971, x-xi). 
The contextual is therefore already embedded in subjectivity and it is then via 
`unconscious' or `informal social knowledge' that the conscious self grasps an object. 
The reader will have noted some tensions in the readings of reflexivity in the Culture, 
Media and Identities series but also the proximity of phenomenological sociology and 
structuralist ideas in positing identification as a process involving oppositions, and in a 
`dethroning' and relegating of the conscious subject to the role of a reader/communicator 
already positioned by semantic networks it inhabits. 
Intersubjectiviiy 
Whilst Thrift (1997, p. 197) refers briefly to the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and 
others as establishing variants of a locale of shared meanings (the place in which we 
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dwell, and so on) as embodiment or lived experience, it is worth turning to Merleau- 
Ponty for an elaborated account. ' 
As mentioned above, the subjectivity or identity of the Walkman user is already 
permeated by the context in which it moves. Merleau-Ponty (1992, pp. 238-9) makes a 
similar point about subjectivity which he sees as both constituting and constituted by its 
object, which is never totally distinct from it. There is, in our parlance, always an element 
of self-referentiality in attempts to distance ourselves from, objectify features of the 
world. Indeed, if `I break with the critical attitude, I live the unity of the subject and the 
intersensory unity of the thing, and do not conceive them after the fashion of analytical 
reflection and science'. 
The bodily character of the subject's perceptions ensures that they are always situated 
perceptions rather than those of a detached observer or `God's eye view'. Hence the 
subject is not, pace Hegel radically distinct from what it observes, `a hole in being', but 
rather `a hollow, a fold, which has been made and which can be unmade' (ibid., p. 215). 
Hence we do not wholly control the field of perception which `we' observe around 
ourselves. Rather we are immersed in it and it always has a generality which escapes 
conscious organisation. As a sentient being experiencing the world, we embody a mode 
of existence which runs through us without our being its author (ibid., p. 216). Kruks 
notes (1990, p. 119) that this is not an embodiment of the collective as in Heidegger's das 
Man (the `they') but rather takes in the trajectory of the self and its projects and the way 
they have become sedimented in its experience. As such, she cites Merleau-Ponty, the 
perceiving subject `is not myself as an autonomous subject, but myself in so far as I have 
a body and am able to "look"' (Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 240). Kruks concludes: `if such 
a self is not a Sartrean for-itself, nether is it a `constituted' self, or an `effect', as for 
example Foucault or Lacan would argue' (loc. cit. ). 
Rather, Merleau-Ponty argues that in its relation to the other (other subjectivities) the 
embodied or intersubjective subject can overlap with other subjectivities which are 
mutually situated in some way and it can also attempt to exclude or negate these 
subjectivities. Both modes are essential to the embodied subject. 
It is important to note here that for Merleau-Ponty conflict arising between individuals is 
not to be interpreted within a paradigm of dyadic interpersonal relations (the `micro- 
level') as is so often the case in the work of phenomenologically-oriented sociologists. 
Rather, the key frame of reference for the intersubjective subject is institution. 
Giddens' (1990) references to the disembeddedness of experience are called into question here. 
Giddens makes an unjustifiable identification between embeddedness and the prevalence of dyadic 
interactions rather than acknowledging interaction as taking place with the intersubjective content 
of a locale itself. 
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Individuals are suffused in the situational particularities associated with different projects 
or interests. There is an autonomous dynamic at work here which links individuals into 
the general and conflictual relations taking place at the level of politics and `public' 
history. 
Conflict itself is not reducible to the institutional arena of class struggle but pervades our 
always institutionally mediated encounters. On the other hand, individuals are born into 
different positions with different commitments and projects. Hence `... the ambiguous 
mediation of social institutions and play of contingency are irreducible aspects of politics 
and of history' (Kruks, op. cit., p. 139). 
For Merleau-Ponty, intersubjectivity is not founded as it is with the Habermasians on 
primordial consensus or reciprocity of interpersonal relations, but rather it contains a 
negativity due to the tendency towards pure subjectivity which characterises the 
individual subject's self-consciousness, as in Hegel's account of the desire for self- 
recognition. For example, our self-understanding may occur through ideologies of 
individualism which become part of the shared language of self-recognition. But for 
Merleau-Ponty this is always institutionally mediated and this introduces not only 
negativity as discussed above but also contingency. The conflictual nature of social 
projects, situations and intersubjectivity results in their contingent quality. We thereby 
conclude as authors of things we never consciously intended, although we may have 
some sense (intimation) of the direction of events (see below). Merleau-Ponty sees this 
`discordant intersubjectivity' not only in class struggle but also as a general feature of 
social relations. 
The situatedness of experience therefore lends itself to negativity or contradictoriness 
within the intersubjective and hence gives a contingent quality to historical events. A 
tradition, a project or line of thought which makes sense can suddenly become non-seas 
(Kruks, op. cit., p. 139). A useful way of illustrating this point might be to think about 
fashions in things, and to take the word `fashion' as generic, emblematic of contingency 
in social life. In economics, the Keynesian, welfarist conception displaces pre-war 
monetarism and is in turn displaced by Thatcherite monetarism. In technology, 
clockwork gives way to electrical power, but then clockwork-powered radios and laptop 
computers appear. In science and its ideologies Darwinism displaces catastrophism, is 
briefly displaced by sociological perspectives on evolution and now (1990s) neo- 
Darwinian explanations are found for almost everything. Art Deco styling achieved a 
new lease of life in the 1980s, as did the (1930s) filofax, and so on. None of this is meant 
to suggest that sociallife is inherently whimsical, rather that the way its semantic 
networks come together to frame new objects is, in any detail, unpredictable. The 
Walkman again serves to illustrate the point: the narratives of radio, walkie-talkie, the 
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cassette player, etc. fuse in an innovative way which, incidentally, highlights the global 
nature of meaning structures, as du Gay et al. (1997, pp. 42-48) note. 
If we understand all this as situation, as the interaction of profoundly disparate 
biographies and situational trajectories, 
intersubjectivity. Under such conditions, 
biographies it is difficult to extricate the two 
then we can grasp the unevenness of 
although situations configure individual 
An individual's decision to leave or enter a 
situation looks contingent but at the same time it is suffused in the generality of social 
life and hence the experience of situatedness, Merleau-Ponty argues (Kruks, op. cit., 
p. 143), exceeds any conscious awareness of it. Therefore, within the dual aspects of 
intersubjectivity, any encounter can be looked at either from the viewpoint of individual 
decisions which precipitate it or as a way of structuring the actions of the individuals 
involved. Sometimes it looks as though society is subsumed in the individual (e. g. 
Mannheim's [1969, pp. 295ffj `historically representative' figure) who impose their will 
upon it, but from another point of view that person's character is configured by the 
transcending circumstances of the situation, e. g. the emergence of Margaret Thatcher as a 
political agent. Althusser's later work (Elliott, 1998, pp. 26-8) on conjunction or 
encounter contained a notion of contingency based on an argument resembling this in the 
important sense of seeing contingency in terms of singular figures or events as 
overdetermined by their broader circumstances. 
Hence we can argue that while agents perceive the world as externality, as alien 
contingency, `out-there', the phenomenological perspective can provide an account of 
how this comes about without theory removing the subject's creativity from the picture. 
Whilst self-interest and individualism might be seen as asocial, Merleau-Ponty's insight 
enables us to capture them as institutional features related to the fragmenting tendencies 
of modern capitalism. Hence, the pure negativity of the self-conscious ego is already 
institutionally mediated. Marx's image of capitalism as driven by its internal conflicts 
('capitalist production begets... its own negation' (Marx, 1974, p. 715) is apposite here: 
the contradictions do not entail the disintegration of social life (although they might bring 
about its transformation) nor render its elements asocial but, on the contrary, constitute 
their very sociality. 
Power, Objectification, Types and Stereotypes 
As Kruks (op. cit., p. 128) notes, in Merleau-Ponty's earlier work the notion of the gaze 
served to represent what was in effect a Hegelian notion of power relations where power 
is expressed in terms of the ability to fix the other's self-perception in terms of the gaze. 
Hence, stereotyping can be seen as the result of an imbalance of power where others 
emerge from a struggle between a putative pure negating subject and the subject which 
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becomes the focus of its superior objectifying powers. More recently, Foucault's (1980) 
work on the operation of institutional power through networks of discourses within which 
subjects are fixed or subjectivised in a discursive gaze has illuminated mechanisms of 
power. 
The work of Jessica Benjamin (1990) has also served to highlight power relations, but 
this time specifically in terms of a critique of Freudianism as a discourse or theoretical 
ideology concentrating on the intrapsychic 
- 
that which has been internalised 
- 
arguably 
at the expense of the on-going dynamic between subjects. She highlights the Freudian 
view of the mother-child relationship in which the mother appears as an object for the 
child (ibid., pp. 23-4). This can be seen as tying into wider networks of discourses which 
serve to fix women as mothers or otherwise into institutional complexes where a male 
gaze operates. 
The hegemonic power of psychological ideologies has become evident through the way 
agency is deemed to internalise its environmental influences such that it appears as an 
effect of the process. The institutional processes thus seem to disappear within the 
individual. In this way networks of psychologically-oriented discourses freeze or suture 
individuals from their institutional context. 3 
Notions of the unconscious within this field of discourse have been able to assimilate all 
manner of heterogeneous material in hegemonic fashion. The `unconscious', as distinct 
from Freudianism proper, has become a repository of forgotten, unrecognised and taken- 
for-granted aspects of the social world which are thus stored away as ready-to-be-utilised 
items rather than unobserved, on-going aspects of a social world which run 
intersubjectively through embodied subjects and whose collective meanings are in 
principle accessible to us all (Kruks, op. cit., pp. 119,130). This psychologising of the 
everyday has the effect of opening up a gap between institution and agency and serves as 
a useful example of the objectifying power of institutional discourses. 
We can give an illustration of this by examining the situatedness of ethnic minorities 
within institutional processes where we find sociologists describing the objectifying 
process, institutional racism. It can be argued that if we grasp the import of the 
phenomenological point just made then it is clear that race is not something that does or 
does not exist as a reality in discrete individuals but should rather be seen as related to an 
institutional process which fixes `race' in individuals. In other words, the discursive gaze 
of institutional networks attempts to assimilate groups by `othering' them. `Race' is then 
By `suture' we mean a kind of connectedness in which subjects are related but at the same time 
appear as external to each other 
- 
as in Benjamin's mother-child relation where the context of 
relationships is seen as intrapsychic rather than also intersubjective. 
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also an objectification of a power relation as the gaze is always contested by those it 
attempts to `other', if we follow Merleau-Ponty's model of `institution'. This is an 
important point in that debates about race often centre on the possibility or non- 
possibility of locating for groups key distinguishing characteristics rather than on the 
institutional power relations of intersubjective communication/conflict through which 
such objectifications are generated. A converse situation arises where groups have the 
power to differentiate themselves within a context where differentiation has previously 
been resisted. 
While it is clear that, perhaps in some sense well captured by Foucault (1980), 
institutional power depends on the ability to circulate meanings, the analysis of this 
process of dissemination of `truths' tends to be conducted in a neo-Weberian style which 
fails to explain how official meanings are produced (D'Amico, 1989). 4 Perhaps most 
importantly this view takes bureaucracies as operating outside the more or less formal 
institutional frameworks of cultural life within which they are situated. The net effect is 
to present bureaucracies as institutions `out-there' with their own inexorable tendencies. 
A graphic example of this is Bauman's account of the Holocaust. 
Bauman's argument seems to be that the formal organisational structures (of modernity), 
once set in motion 
- 
for example, the signing of a document 
- 
produce irresistible trains 
of events (Bauman, 1991, pp. 105-6). On the other hand, Strauss (1964) has argued that 
the actual working of bureaucracies and such like, is a negotiated order which involves 
the interpretation of formal codes against a background of unarticulated savoir faire 
through which they make sense and become operable (Worsley, 1978, pp. 546-8). Hence, 
the neo-Weberian position mistakes ideal type models for the actual workings of 
organisations. Institution as sedimented praxis would therefore seem nearer the mark than 
viewing organisations as following their formal, ideal-typical characteristics in reality. 
The `out-there' character of bureaucracy as having fixed goals, values and conventional 
definitions in neo-Weberian theory of organisations highlighted by Bauman's idea of the 
inexorability of bureaucracy-as-set-in-motion is challenged by Strauss's view that goals 
are always under interpretation in the light of ever-present background assumptions about 
what they actually mean. 
Following the earlier suggestions from Merleau-Ponty, it could also be argued that it 
would be wrong to see the bureaucracy as operating in isolation, but rather as a part of an 
institutional network, the weight of whose meanings bears down on any communicative 
D'Amico (1989, pp. 101,105-6) argues that in Foucault discursive statements are somehow 
objective and prior to subjectivity 
- 
or in our terms, `out-there'. However, without subjects the 
production of meaning remains a mystery. 
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practice within the organisation. This also interacts with the biographical trajectories of 
its agents who are at once suffused in the generality of their institutional situatedness and' 
also uniquely positioned within it. As such, agents become the focus of general 
tendencies but at the same time remain negating subjectivities. This produces a 
conflictual dynamic whose outcome always has an element of contingency and hence 
openness of situation. 
Further, it is possible for agents to grasp the sense or direction of events, although as 
suggested above this may only be at the level of `know-how' rather than knowledge. The 
`seas' is always mediated by the overall historical situation (Kruks, op. cit., pp. 139,142- 
3) and therefore intersubjectivity is complex and contradictory. Merleau-Ponty speaks of 
projects coming to an end and subjects may be operating with senses relating to such past 
projects rather than making a transition to the developing situation (ibid., p. 139). This 
could be exemplified in the transition from welfarism to Thatcherism, where attempts to 
identify what was happening in terms of the old hegemonic political culture simply failed 
to make sense and produced a feeling of disorientation. ' 
Hence if we are to understand subjectivity in, for example, Bauman's `worst case' 
scenario of the Holocaust, it must be possible to see action as oriented by the complex 
mediation of institution in the individual: the historical political juridical status of Jews 
in Germany, the attitude of the Jewish leadership, the everyday racism which overlaps 
and is interstitial with (following Strauss's methodology) every institutional action. It 
must further be acknowledged that although people might sense the new political 
settlement, they might not be able to name it. Thirdly, there is the dimension where actors 
are still trying to read the new situation through the grammar of the previous political 
culture (with its own forms of racism) and are failing to make sense of events, that is, 
grasp its sens. 
Bauman's account of the Holocaust gets rid of agency (after the initial act) and events are 
described in terms of the autonomy of bureaucratic structures, even to the extent of 
producing agents who are detached from the effects of their roles (Bauman, op. cit., 
pp. 115-16). Whilst this might be psychologically true, it would surely be wrong to take 
this for an intersubjective hiatus, a situation where agents no longer interpret their roles. 
In Merleau-Ponty's terms this would be a history without sens. 
If, on the other hand, we employ the latter's approach it is possible to see an intersection 
between agency and institution rather than a reduction of the former to the latter. Roles 
See, for example, Drabble (1979) in Whitehead (1985, pp. 391-2) on middle class angst in the 
unfolding hegemonic crisis of the U. K. in the 1970s. Hines (1981) gives, as Whitehead (loc. cit. ) 
also notes, an account of the development of a culture of `mutual recrimination' in those times, 
confirming the loss of a sens (directedness) to everyday life. 
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may structure actions but on the other hand roles must make sense, that is, be 
interpretable as part of wider structures. Merleau-Ponty (1992, pp. 448-9) notes that as 
history `can never be detached from us to play the role of an alien force using us for its 
own ends, then precisely because it is always history lived through we cannot withhold 
from it at least a fragmentary meaning'. It is therefore possible to discuss the rationality 
of agents (however poisonous), and to see why they did what they did via their 
understanding of situation. 
Rationality and Ideology Critique 
The neo-Weberian analysis refracted through Bauman's lens is also evident in the 
treatment of popular culture found in the writings of the Frankfurt School. ' Whilst the 
contribution of the early Frankfurt School to understanding popular (but not high) culture 
as an industrial process and their characterisation of its production as routinisation and 
standardisation was important in revealing the economic basis of culture, that is as a 
production process, there was a failure to go beyond the formal meanings of cultural 
products, to understand how people made sense of them. The rationality at the heart of 
the everyday was ignored. One strand of Althusser's (1971) work on ideology also 
followed this route through his application of the category of `misrecognition' to certain 
ways of seeing or forms of practice. However, another strand of his thinking suggested 
that as an everyday feature ideology was important for what it did rather than for making 
formal truth claims. This latter ties in with Dummett's (op. cit., p. 132) position that 
everyday, natural language utterances, function as descriptions which are also actions 
rather than direct truth claims; they are ways of relating to, picking out objects rather than 
propositions. They are ways of grasping the sense of a context in which utterances are 
made. The latent propositional content can be rendered explicit via a hermeneutics of the 
context. 
The phenomenological approach therefore offers an alternative characterisation of agency 
to the Bauman and Frankfurt views 
- 
which can loosely be categorised as critiques of 
modernity which echo the pessimism of Weber's rationalisation thesis. 
As with Strauss and the ethnomethodologists, Dummett's (op. cit., p. 44) view is that 
formal linguistic codes and conventions always require interpretation before things 
become manageable, that is, can be negotiated, made sense of. He thus distinguishes 
between the sense of expressions (contextual meaning) and their significance, which 
consists in the coding or conventions used to indicate what is meant, a relatively ossified 
aspect of meaning. 
6 See Adorno and Horkheimer (1989), Adorno (1991) and also Negus (1997, pp. 67-118) for a 
general discussion of rationalisation and the `culture industries'. 
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Dummett's emphasis on sense and context as means of determining the rationality of 
communicative practices echoes Merleau-Ponty's view that 
... 
our errors become truths only once they are recognised, and there remains a difference 
between their revealed and their latent content of truth, between their alleged and their actual 
significance (ibid., p. 398). 
The implication of this for cultural critique is that the Frankfurt assessment of the untruth 
and manipulative character of mass culture needs to be regarded as an explanation of the 
last resort rather than the primary way of dealing with everyday discourse and popular 
culture (which may have no explicit epistemic reference) as it is premised on the view 
that meanings and discourses are to be treated directly according to epistemological 
standards. That is, for the Frankfurt School, meanings are taken to be located in the 
prevailing linguistic conventions of the time rather than in the actuality of the meaning 
context. 
The Gap Between Perception and Practice in Merleau-Ponte 
Kruks (op. cit., pp. 135-6) criticises Merleau-Ponty's failure to adjust an account of 
intersubjectivity based on perception to his later praxis orientation. That is, if 
intersubjective meanings are generated via praxis (socially self-constituting activity) then 
they cannot be the same, or arrived at by the same argument, as meanings derived from 
detached perception of an object. Here Kruks (loc. cit. ) gives the example of two people 
viewing a landscape who have a similar background in art appreciation. By contrast, in 
the praxis version, the intersubjective content of the interaction/ perception would depend 
on the degree to which subjects are situated within common projects, rather than on 
perception alone. And, for Merleau-Ponty, common projects contain, at the same time, 
the conflictual demands of situated egos. This is taken as an integral part of 
communicative practices (ibid., p. 128). 
Whilst the notion of praxis incorporates a dialectic of action and cognition, Merleau- 
Ponty does not theorise the nature of the relationship between them. Dummett's (1981, 
p. 132) account of natural language utterances is helpful here. It suggests that 
communicative understanding 
-which can be taken in a perceptual, everyday way - has a 
cognitive content which is achieved in a practical manner. That is, it is attained through 
common linguistic practices by which we relate to, pick out situations 
-structures, agents, 
states of affairs, events, etc. The relating is active in that it constructs the situations 
within the limits of meaning contexts and at the same time it has cognitive significance in 
that the action of relating to a situation is a way of grasping the sense of it, which is 
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perceptually, in Merleau-Ponty's terms perhaps, an awareness of the world that flows 
through us. 
Hence, the practical activity of relating to situations by conversing leads on to a 
characterising of our sense of the situation by objectifying it or picking out, identifying 
what is going on. Because identifying and relating are part of the same practical process 
for Dummett, the objects we pick out are always self-relating. This self-referentiality of 
our objects is not a form of circularity however, as there are different ways of picking out 
or objectifying the sense of a situation (loc. cit. ). Merleau-Ponty is perhaps more explicit 
about this in his recognition that agents always bring a unique biographical/institutional 
situatedness to an encounter and their negating subjectivities as embodied in differing 
projects will be a consideration. It follows that situations or meaning contexts remain 
open-ended. 
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Chapter 2: The Limits of the Phenomenological Perspective 
In this part of the discussion we shall investigate how intersubjectivity introduces the 
world to us as a factor shaping or limiting our thought processes. In other words, we will 
ask how does the intersubjective aspect of social life avoids being merely subjective, and 
rather, provides a point of reference for individual subjectivity or consciousness from 
outside that individual perspective. 
Hence this chapter will examine some notions of intersubjectivity in the hope of arriving 
at something distinctively intersubjective rather than formulations which reduce to what 
has been termed a sociology (Denzin, 1992, p. 16) or philosophy (Dews, 1987, p. 227) of 
consciousness. The latter is exemplified in the work of G. H. Mead and the symbolic 
interactionists wherein the relationship between an intersubjective `generalised other' and 
individual consciousnesses is one in which the former is transparent to the latter and thus 
undermines the possibility of a non-homogenised or non-normalised, non-consensual, 
non-passive subjectivity. As such, it is at one with the socialisation model of functionalist 
sociology with its emphasis on consensual order rather than emancipation and autonomy. 
Similarly, despite his interest in the latter, Habermas (1991) approaches intersubjectivity 
via the notion of an anthropological tendency towards communicative consensus. In The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas assimilates a pragmatics of 
communication to the work of Frege and Dummett on truth-conditional semantics. 
However, there are significant differences between Habermas and Frege-Dummett 
relevant to the present discussion. Habermas sees meaning as dependent on a consensus 
of communication norms given by the `ideal speech situation' which guides the 
consciousness of communicants. Dummett (op. cit., p. 51), on the other hand, notes that 
for Frege in communicative understanding the senses of truth-bearing sentences exist 
independently of our grasping them mentally; they express a truth or reality directly, that 
is, without the guidance of a regulative ideal. Hence, for Frege and Dummett, the role of 
a judging individual subjectivity is quite distinct from the (non-mental) linguistic activity 
of expressing truths about the world. Wittgenstein (see below) also has argued that 
understanding, using language appropriately, picking out its sense, is not a mental 
process. Dummett (op. cit., pp. 25-6) himself sees intersubjective understanding as an 
independent domain; he stresses its ontological rather than epistemological character. 
Language becomes a bearer (Bedeutung) of thoughts rather than a means of their 
semantic construction. Thoughts are expressed by conversants whose sentential 
productions are given sense by their contextual nature. Consequently, intersubjectivity is 
something performed, 'enacted or made real through utterance rather than being 
consciousness or knowledge itself. 
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Now, following Wittgenstein's point that understanding is not a mental process and yet 
language is used as a `mastery of technique' to sort things, the very way reflexivity is' 
understood as a mirroring of the world in the mind has to be reappraised. That is, the 
world is `mirrored' or picked out in the above accounts but intersubjectively rather than 
as conscious individual knowledge. The notion that the thought expressed by the sense of 
a sentential statement, itself serves as a reference (involves an ontology of meaning) is a 
rebuff to postmodern critics of reference who assume reference means gesturing towards 
a world prior to meaning, a world `out-there'. Dummett (op. cit., p. 367) makes a similar 
point when he notes that, for Frege, objects are grasped only by means of `the senses of 
expressions which could be used to refer to them' and that `Sense determines reference' 
(ibid., p. 157). Reference exists within discourse but is not coincident with agents' 
meanings or objectifications. It exists in the everyday, taken for granted level of 
communication which interacts with agents' meanings to provide the sense or logic of 
situations. Thus reference does not entail subjectivised meanings or a world of objects 
totally constructed in discourse, but rather a framework through which individual agents 
can make sense of the world. 
The first part of the chapter looks at communicative interaction in Mead, Schutz, 
Habermas and Adorno whilst the latter part views linguistic conventionalism in Rorty 
and Davidson through the critical lens of a phenomenology of language. 
Part 1: Communicative Interaction in Social Theory 
G. H. Mead: Formation of the Subject in Consciousness 





involves consciousness of the attributions, definitions, roles which are ascribed to it 
by others, that is to say, these are reflected in consciousness (the `I' phase) and embodied 
in an experiential self which is present to consciousness. Mead refers to consciousness of 
this embodied aspect of selfhood as the `me' phase of self-consciousness. 
The need to grasp the transformative aspect of selfhood as one of conscious organisation 
and incorporation of the other is clearly understood here. The problem remains, as with 
traditional idealism, that one must be present to oneself in these mental operations. 
Although it is recognised by Mead and subsequent interactionist writers that the `I' is of a 
different order of consciousness to and cannot be known in the same way as the self- 
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ascribed contents of empirical self-consciousness they nevertheless proceed as if the `I' is 
a deliberative entity, that it calculates the way roles can be successfully taken on for the 
accomplishment of integration in the social order defined by the other. This is both 
behaviouristic and contradictorily, it would seem, deliberative. Selfhood is defined in 
terms of dramaturgical qualities: social actors take up, rearrange, negotiate and discard 
roles. As Schutz (1967, p. 217) observes, there is no scope here for the purely `inner' 
activities of imagination and calculation which do not directly involve behavioural 
responses, role-taking. Schutz places this perspective within its limits 
- 
those of `the 
insulated stream of consciousness of the single individual'. It is as if transactions take 
place between the `I' and `me' aspects of self where these are completely independent of 
any social nexus. Once internalised (Mead, op. cit., p. 155, f. 8), the other appears to be 
sutured from its origins. Schutz (op. cit., p. 218) observes of the subject as described by 
Mead that it is `as if the wide-awake man with the natural attitude [that is, with his taken 
for granted 
- 
H. F. ] could be thought of as separate from his fellow-men'. 
Clearly, the paradoxical effect of Mead's position is to present selfhood as at once 
passive social product ('me' phase) and transcendental, indeterminate ego (`I' phase). He 
does argue that the `I' is a sedimentation of former `me' states and in doing so implies 
that the `I' is a socially determinate entity but does not theorise its links with the `me', its 
modus operandi. For Mead, this is not an issue of the formation of self-consciousness by 
heterogeneous, that is, non-conscious factors, but rather a function of different levels 
within self-consciousness. Contrary to this, Schutz's view is that Mead's level of 
transcendental ego (`I') is precisely the point of social determination of consciousness 
rather than its ineffability, it is the point at which selfhood interpenetrates with the web of 
taken for granted practices and beliefs which Schutz argues arise through work, that is, 
practical activity, which always requires a framework of operable assumptions, a stock of 
knowledge, accumulated wisdom, recipe, knack. It is through such taken for granted 
structures that conscious thoughts receive their shape. 
The reflexive process, that of `identifying' connections or `thought objects', goes ahead, 
on Schutz's account without identification in the classical sense taking place, that is, 
without the conscious categorisation of data (roles, practices etc. ). For example, a person 
may say `In that situation I would do this' but yet be unable to identify classes of such 
situations or actions. 
Now if reflexivity is not regarded as a process of knowing in this Meadian subject- 
centred sense of identifying actions, roles etc. as being of a certain sort, it is still one 
which nevertheless orders representations by making spontaneous connections between 
them. Hence the crucial function of reflexivity is maintained in this modified version: 
that is, the function of connecting whatever is represented to the self with individual 
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consciousness, cognition. However, unlike the traditional view, here the performance of 
tasks is not dependent on a consciousness of them. This, it is argued, explains how people 
perform competently in social situations despite a lack of knowledge of the processes 
involved. It is not claimed that people cannot become conscious of their taken for granted 
social assumptions, but rather that this involves `unconsciously' replacing the excavated 
set of `natural attitudes' with another `taken for granted'. 
The development of Schutz's views in the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel (1967) 
and others sees the elaboration of the natural attitude in terms of `indexicality' and 
`reflexivity'. These two processes operate together to generate meaning. Indexing or 
referring is a property of language 
- 
one is able to grasp what is referred to even where no 
explicit reference is made; however this only works because of the reflexive ability to 
pick out the relevant situations and correct the indexing where it is inappropriate 
(Garfinkel, op. cit., p. 4). 
Mead (op. cit., pp. 152-6) and other interactionists such as Goffman (1982) write as if 
`taking the role of the other', that is, picking out appropriate actions, situations, etc. were 
a fully conscious, deliberative process of identifying or classifying these and adopting 
them. They are unable to account for the limits to appropriate situational moves which in 
Schutz and ethnomethodology are demarcated by the contents of the taken for granted of 
the natural attitude 
- 
which provides the logic of the situation. This sense of how roles 
should be applied is missing in Meadian internalisation which sees the generalised other 
(loc. cit. ) as an inventory of `right' roles at the back of our consciousness. The 
paradoxical theoretical implication of this individualisation of the generalised other 
would be a solipsistic ignorance of what is appropriate to the other as the materials the 
Meadian subject has to construct its role-playing from are, so to speak, already `all in the 
mind' of the individual subject itself. The suturing of the internalised social nexus misses 
Schutz's point that role-playing, i. e. the practical activity of a collective subjectivity, is 
the context in which we pick out appropriate roles/actions. These are suggested by the 
interaction itself, but not to the individual subject in abstraction from the practical 
situation, although they may be consciously appraised in this way later as a reflection on 
the practice of roles etc. 
Schutz: the Natural Attitude and the Taken for Granted 
Now Schutz's insight of the `natural attitude' prevents such a reduction of the world to 
the contents of an individual consciousness. It helps to explain how it is that agents grasp 
the limits of types of action, `know' when they are moving on from one kind of situation 
to another, and to sense where the current response ceases to be appropriate. This ability 
to negotiate reality cannot be fully explained in terms of a deliberative attitude such as is 
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found in Goffiman's (1968) view that roles serve as masks behind which individuals 
maximised their room for manoeuvre. Rather it makes sense to see it in terms of what 
deliberation is about; what is grasped in consciousness is something irreducibly other 
than consciousness. In Garfinkel's case then, consciousness may or may not grasp the 
situations which the natural attitude reflexively picks out via `knack', `technique', `savoir 
faire'. Hence theoretical understanding implies a division of labour between a reflexive 
picking out of the object, in other words, a spontaneous intersubjective understanding of 
what is required in a situation and giving an account of this situation in propositional 
terms. Conversely, for Garfinkel (op. cit., p. 4), reflexivity stabilises meaning and 
communication and thus provides a framework of common assumptions, a shared world 
of meanings which demarcates the limits of the object of the theoretical account. Hence, 
this taken for granted `background' is the substructure within which knowledge of the 
object can be produced. 
The Everyday World as Already-Constructed Types of Practical Activity 
Following Husserl's notion that the empirical world of the everyday is always already 
categorialised (see Chapter 6), Schutz (op. cit., p. 6) argues that it is the `already- 
constructed' aspect of action/decision which proves fundamental in explaining it. He 
argues that human beings have pre-selected and pre-interpreted the social world via 
a series of common sense constructs of the reality of daily life, and it is these thought objects 
which determine their behaviour, define the goal of their action, and the means... in brief which 
help them to find their bearings within their environment and to come to terms with it. 
Common sense is not only an attribute of popular thinking but also of science; in fact 
every practice has its taken for granted basis (loc. cit. ). Schutz argues that the social 
world itself is structured in terms of constructs which enable us to make sense of it. The 
constructs embody rules which facilitate the process of classifying social action (ibid., 
p. 14). In terms of the received (Cartesian) way of addressing the world there is a 
constitutive ambiguity about Schutzian constructs or thought objects in that they have 
both `mental' and physical aspects; they are ideas which only exist insofar as they are 
performed. This theme will be investigated in Chapter 6. 
Schutz claims that the constructs are necessary to explain how it is that many of the 
things we do are done habitually. We suppress from consciousness, or do not know the 
primary factors in some practice: 
we apply the construction... in following recipes and rules of thumb which have stood the test 
so far and in frequently stringing together means and ends without clear knowledge `about' 
their real connections (ibid., p. 21). 
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Hence, although it is impossible to account for rule-following on the paradigm of rational 
thinking 
... 
we receive reasonable answers to reasonable questions... we perform in factories and 
laboratories and offices highly `rationalised' activities, we play chess together... How is this 
possible? ' (ibid., p. 32). 
In fact, `neither the origin or import' of these rules is rationally understood in common 
sense thinking. Schutz concludes that `rational action' on a common sense level is always 
action within a background of an `unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of 
typicalities' of the situation and its participants (ibid., p. 33). 
Schutz bases the distinction he makes here between different types of understanding on 
William James's division between `knowledge by acquaintance' and `knowledge about' 
(ibid., p. 1). Common sense is like the former. It operates with a system of typifications of 
the sort described above through which private experiences are transformed into a 
communicable content (ibid., p. 12). Schutz notes that the 
typifying medium par excellence... is the vocabulary and the syntax of everyday 
language... The pre-scientific vernacular can be interpreted as a treasure-house of ready-made 
pre-constituted types and characteristics, all socially derived and carrying along an open 
horizon of unexplored content (ibid., p. 10). 
Like Gramsci (see Chapter 3), Schutz argues that the way we ordinarily make sense of 
things is via a culturally sedimented structure of interpretation. The knowledge that 
supersedes the thought objects of private knowledge of the world `has its history, it is a 
part of our "social heritage"... ' (ibid., p. 13). 
Because Schutz's notion of a typified knowledge falls closer to `acquaintance 
knowledge' than `knowledge about' the construct is hence not the same as a fully fledged 
classificatory system. Its open horizon of unexplored content suggests it is not a closed 
(self-identical) conceptual system, but a capacity for multiple interpretations. The fact 
that constructs are not abstractions but wedded to real situations indicates the 
performative quality of this knowledge. 
The 'We-Relationship'; Constructs and Intersubjectivity 
The taken for granted shared rules provide a specific form of consciousness for Schutz, 
`we-consciousness'. `We-consciousness' not only enables subjects to experience a shared 
world but also makes it possible to pick out objects, to entertain the particularity of the 
everyday world. The reflexive quality of situations is denoted in that we can see them as 
part of our biography; we can see ourselves in them. The fact that the world is 
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experienced, following Husserl, in the mode of typicality, does not debar us from 
entertaining the uniqueness of things (ibid., p. 59). 
Schutz argues that our idea of uniqueness is framed by the way various typicalities are 
conjoined. For example, Rover, his Irish setter, is a conjunction of the typicalities `Irish 
Setter', `dog', `mammal', `animal', `organism' or `object of the outer world'. Hence 
Schutz observes, `The unique objects and events given to us in a unique aspect are unique 
within a horizon of typical familiarity' (loc. cit. ). In other words, the individual's horizon 
of constructs structures the way these intersubjective categories come together. For 
example, my view of Rover is given by the way these typicalities are fused in a specific 
biography. Schutz goes on to say that what is considered to be unique is a matter of 
interest, relevance or problem at hand. In other words, the intentionality of our biography, 
our mode of practice, projects and so on, represents a particular conjunction of 
typicalities or forms of action. 
The significance of this point for characterising intersubjectivity is simply that Rover, for 
instance, is not grasped as a series of generic Chinese boxes `Irish Setter', `dog', 
`mammal' etc., that is, not abstractly, but only in relation to my biography. My 
conception of Rover is a situated knowledge; Rover is part of my history, not a feature of 
propositions about dogs in general. 
The crux of our discussion here is Schutz's recognition of the open-endedness of the 
taken for granted structures of thought; the fact that they are based on typicality which 
underlies and confers meaning on the categories employed by the classifying subject. 
The `we-relationship', Schutz notes, is a state of consciousness which is different from 
the self-consciousness of the individual subject. Rather, it is a totalised state of 
consciousness in which the consciousness of all those with some interaction with an 
individual's biography is contained. The contribution of the individual to that 
consciousness is `bracketed' within this, following Husserl. Again, as with Husserl, this 
`we-consciousness' is a kind of transcendental ego or consciousness, and indeed also 
seems to bear some similarity in its regulative capacity to the notion of the internalised 
`generalised other' embodied in Mead's notion of the self. 
Now for Schutz, there is still a problem of what is not embodied in the typical constructs 
of we-consciousness. In other words, there is still a private area of consciousness, the 
terrain of the non-typical. Hence at the level of typical constructs, I cannot fully 
understand what the other means. Consequently, for Schutz, unlike Frege (Dummett, op. 
cit., pp. 58-6) the objective status of meaning is problematic. Schutz (op. cit., p. 57) refers 
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to the lack of interest in and satisfactory solution to the problem of knowledge of other 
minds, and hence of intersubjectivity, as a `scandal of philosophy'. 
One objection that might be made at the outset to Schutz's account is to viewing the 
operation of constructs as a mental process. This means that self and Other have to be 
differentiated as that which belongs to my mind and that which belongs to the Other. It is 
suggested here that a we-consciousness cannot operate on the terrain of selves and 
Others. The reference to Others actually presupposes the task of we-consciousness; that is 
it presumes already formed selves through the work of self-recognition. To say that there 
are selves and Others operating in the domain of the taken for granted is assuming that 




is already accomplished! It follows that the 
idea that we-consciousness involves some kind of transcendence of self-consciousness, 
and the claim that in this process there is some residue of self lost to the public domain, 
are both incoherent. The taken for granted provides an infrastructure for the conscious 
articulation of theories or propositions about everyday life. As such, it would seem to be 
the framework within which recognition of selves as owners of action or motive 
constructs can occur. Hence, to ascribe self-recognition at the level of the social world in 
which selves are being synthesised out of actions and motives seems to be doing violence 
to the grammar of self-ascription. For example, Schutz (op. cit., p. 15) notes: `... in daily 
life I construct types of the Other's field of acquaintance... I assume that he will be guided 
by certain relevant structures... ' etc. 
The issue of how it is that people manage to operate without consciously thinking 
through all their actions and how this impinges on what consciousness is will be 
reviewed later through some comments on Wittgenstein and Dummett. 
Critical Theory and the Circle of Self-Consciousness 
The problem of the formation of self-identity is taken up within critical theory by Adorno 
and Habermas in particular. Adorno attacks the paradoxes mentioned above in terms of 
the notion of a `non-identical self', a self not constrained by consciousness, whose 
content is seen as mediating, and thus preserving the objectivity of the concept formation 
from a position of non-identical subjectivity beyond it. Adorno (1973, pp. 162-6) 
illustrates what it might be like to think in this way. He argues that the theoretical work 
of Marx and Weber might be considered as consisting of ideal types whose contents are 
never fully classified in terms of conceptual hierarchies but rather overlap and work by 
association, the constellation of ideas which surround and is structured by the concept 
rather than being enclosed within it. A similar line of investigation is pursued by the early 
Feuerbach (1986, p. 65) who argued that the world intersects the concept (the conscious 
subject) rather than being encircled by it. 
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As Dews (1987, p. 226) observes, neither of these manoeuvres is fully elaborated as a way 
of showing how conscious thought can mediate truth or objectivity. Habermas (1980), on 
the other hand, in a Kantian turn, makes the regulative structures of communication 
represent the `outside' of conscious thought processes. The characterisation of such 
structures as aiming at ideal speech situations rather than expressing a reality as such, 
means that the objects denoted in this Diskurs are only approximations to those identified 
by the transcending ideal situation. Distortion occurs in the communicative process due 
to its siting within historically determinate kinds of repressive contexts, but, none the 
less, conversants are guided by a transcendental regulative structure occasioned by the 
necessary conditions for communicative competence. These conditions transcend any 
actual content but are linked to the content as they necessarily mediate it and thus provide 
its link with objectivity. 
Now Habermas sacrifices the Husserlian empirical reality of the world of preconstituted 
types but recaptures it via the structures of communication. These prove to be socio- 
historically determinate and hence guarantee the social determination of knowledge. 
They provide a redefinition of the life-world where intersubjectivity includes 
propositionally-oriented communication or Diskurs. Arguably, the abandonment of the 
pre-given world of typifications and its natural language format is a mistake as it 
represents that which is external to consciousness, the sedimentation of the subjective in 
the world, the self-referencing of reality by the description which is inseparable from the 
practice; the utterance as `doing'. As Garfinkel (1967, p. 1) notes, `accounts' in everyday 
life are an 'accomplishment 
... 
and are made to happen as events... that in organising they 
describe'. Garfinkel's point could be illustrated by the examples `I am shopping for... ', 
`Let me show you what I mean', or `You have framed this discussion succinctly'. This is 
further discussed in Chapter 7. 
Habermas (1991, pp. 312-3) takes Frege's truth conditional semantics, which theorises the 
relationship between propositional language and the (intersubjective) world of 
interaction, as a basis for his account of intersubjectivity. Separate assumptions are 
introduced which go against the Fregean position. Intersubjectivity and objectivity are 
seen as separate domains and the intersubjective world entertains knowledge ('validity') 
claims. However, the claims made by subjects about the status of their communications 
are clearly not part of natural language in Dummett's account of Frege. Natural language 
expresses a state of affairs and as such is part of the world, not a comment on it. Its 
reflexivity is spontaneous or natural, rather than calculated. Hence like Husserl, Schutz et 
al., it takes the world to be self-referential, already constituted symbolically. The 
Habermasian knowledge claims undermine the objective status of natural language (as 
expressing a state of affairs) given in the Frege-Dummett view. Consequently, 
Habermas's self-conscious subject is reincorporated into the terrain of the lifeworld 
30 
which in Husserl is supposed to guarantee the objectivity of communication (although 
this can only be expressed propositionally through the work of a transcendental 
consciousness). Thus, `Participants draw from this lifeworld... the background knowledge 
from which propositional contents are fed' (ibid., p. 31). Communication is split into a 
subjective part in which speakers interact and an objective zone pertaining to `objects or 
states of affairs concerning which they seek agreement' (Dews, op. cit., p. 238). In 
contrast, the Frege-Dummett view is that communication expresses states of affairs etc. 
even where sentences are non-propositional. The thoughts expressed in a statement which 
satisfies truth conditions are at the same time real entities. Hence the world is not 
something separate from communication. Gadamer (1981, p. 95) describes Habermas's 
position as one in which 
linguistic understanding [is] interpreted in a very limited way... as a sort of closed circle of the 
movement of ideas, as the cultural heritage of a people divorced from their everyday living. 
Further, Gadamer notes, whilst Habermas acknowledges that labour, domination, ideals 
of liberty and order exist outside language, 
One would want to admit rather that every linguistic experience of the world is experience of 
the world, not experience of language. And is what we articulate in language not an encounter 
with reality? (loc. cit. ). 
Habermas's focus on matching propositions concerning content of utterances with those 
designating agreement about the content (Dews, loc. cit. ) seems to be at the expense of 
engaging the world which propositions formulate and points away from the everyday and 
into a circle of subject-centred reason. 
The consequence is that Habermas has to treat subjectivity and intersubjectivity as 
undifferentiated and cannot account for the natural reflexivity of rule-following which 
acts as a guide to concept formation as in the case of Schutz's Irish Setter. It also drives a 
wedge between language and practice which Schutz's notion of constructs as recipes, 
rules of thumb overcomes through communication as doing. Here the successful practical 
engagement with the world is that of `describing', figuring, its outlines. 
In Schutz's `we-consciousness', as with Habermas, there is a failure to separate out the 
functions of intersubjectivity from those of subjectivity, but, importantly, Schutz 
recognises the preconstituted, open nature of the life world constructs. Now if, as 
Habermas suggests, these are organised as knowledge claims (propositions), then they are 
circumscribed within individual subjectivity as that individual's claim over its own 
mental contents. The nature of the proposition is that it classifies or represents aspects of 
the world in the form `A is a case of B' following the underlying classificatory rule `if 
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there is anything such that it is A then it is a case of B'. The problem with classification 
is that it goes against the world in the sense that it prioritises and also excludes aspects 
for the purposes of its own project. And, ironically, as Adorno (1973, pp. 162-3) notes, it 
is constituted by what it excludes; the concept (classification system) depends for its 
identity on the constellation of ideas it forbids, its mediation by its non-identity. 
Adorno's point that conceptual meanings are determined by associated but excluded 
meanings will be pursued in a different way through linguistics (denotation and 
connotation) in Chapters 4 and 5. The gist of such open meaning can however be 
gathered from the following representation of the contrast between typical construct 
(associative) and conceptual meaning. 
Figure 2.1 suggests how forms of thought can organise ideas without the activity of 
naming, that is, identifying, as described above taking place. ' The openness of typical 
constructs is indicated where there is a possibility that the centrality of one idea might be 
shifted by additional connections which are apprehended later with regard to any of the 
peripheral ideas. 2 However, in Figure 2.2, B, F, E and D are definitionally instances of A, 
and even if the centre of gravity shifts due to A being definitionally subsumed under 
some more general category Z, it still remains true that the other ideas are subsumed 
under A. 
In applying these models to subjectivity, the subsumption of experiences or thoughts 
under a self (A), as required in self-consciousness, necessitates the model in Figure 2.2. 
Yet the notion of typicality represented in 2.1 does not allow for this kind of closure. In 
2.2 however, it is not logically possible that the experiences could be someone else's, nor 
is it possible that I have them without identifying them as mine. Hence the thought or 
experience becomes merely subjective. In Figure 2.1, it is possible that I have them 
without consciously ascribing them to myself; here the self (A) though centrally 
configured, appears as one thought amongst others and hence displaceable by something 
interrelating and reconfiguring all these elements. Hence A appears here as a part of a 
common discourse of thoughts not subject to the privacy of individual ownership and 
therefore not merely subjective. 
The point here is that in the subject-centred view of reason or knowledge the self-conscious subject 
operates like the pure conceptual hierarchy; it contains knowledge as in a series of widening 
Chinese boxes. By contrast, the typical construct view acknowledges self-consciousness or 
consciousness generally as an aspect of reason but argues that the concepts are always situated or 
framed by an environment of practised typical constructs. 
2 Figure 2.1 indicates that the self is displaced as the centre of ideational formation. For example, an 
ideology can link the self into a wider field of connections whose configurational centre is 
elsewhere. The self may be positioned or `subjectivised' by patriarchal or liberal individualist 
discourses, for instance. 
The `construct' character of Figure 2.1 thus clearly demonstrates the affinity between the 
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Figure 2.2: Semantic Closure via Conceptual Classification 
Now the problem for Schutz, and `interactionism' in general, is that the debate about 
connecting, identifying, naming, grasping, sensing, apperceiving etc.; in other words 
reflexive activity of a subject, is its circumscription by the tenet that subjectivity is 
ultimately private. Hence the tensions in the usage of the term `subjectivity', that is, even 
if what the subject takes on board is an objective reflection of the world, it still remains 
somehow subjective and enmeshed with private, purely individual concerns. 
As McDowell (1994, pp. 18-20) has pointed out, the opposite, Wittgensteinian position 
that experience belongs to the public realm, is equally problematic. This is because the 
latter view ignores the particularity of experience and consequently renders it as 
something constructed out of public conventions with no reference point, world-based 
features beyond them. Current discourse theories encounter similar problems in 
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characterising subjectivity (cf. Chapter 6). McDowell's point is that although 
Wittgenstein is right about the publicness of language, our concepts and meanings are 
conditioned by the individually situated nature of our relation to the world. Therefore 
they are not exactly the same as others' concepts, but this is not a problem as meaning 
ultimately rests on ostensive definition, that is, showing, demonstrating to others what we 
mean. This of course brings us back to typicalities because, as Schutz argues, it is by 
understanding the taken for granted typicalities used by others that we can grasp their 
meaning 
The idea of typicality however, goes against the grain of the public-private dichotomy 
examined above and suggests its redundancy. What is typical cannot by definition be the 
property of individual subjects. It seems necessary, therefore, to give up the idea that 
reflexion of the Other takes place within the domain of individual 
consciousness/subjectivity and to seek some alternative formulation of reflexive 
subjectivity? The mechanisms of intersubjectivity encased in Schutz's taken for granted 
seem to do the work of delineating a reflexive social world, but the Schutzian notion of 
subjectivity remains enmired in the logic of self-recognition possessed by the individual 
subject which is associated with subject-centred accounts of reason or knowledge. 
Giddens's Criticisms of Schutz 
Phenomenological social theory, according to Giddens, contains a number of confusions 
and reproduces the traditional dualisms, firstly, between language/thought and action and 
secondly, between the individual and their social environment, which Schutz attempts to 
circumvent. Practical activity is somehow extra discursive, then there is a discursive but 
non-propositional sphere and lastly a propositional sphere, which taken all in all 
reproduce the kind of divisions evident in Habermas's programme of interaction, Diskurs 
and so on. The phenomenological claim that the world is always already typified escapes 
Giddens (1979, p. 73,198, p. 17) who sees everyday speech as subjective, as typifications 
are made purely by individual subjects rather than in intersubjective processes. Giddens's 
own solution to the stocks of knowledge/typifications is that they are stored in the 
unconscious or in people's memory traces. 
This disregards a key component of phenomenological theory which is that this 
knowledge is also doing, a highly public rather than mental matter. As Wittgenstein 
Dialogical interaction necessitates a content or communicative act held in common which is hence 
the property of neither conversant/interactant. It must be emphasised that dialogical relations can be 
understood to cover both micro, interpersonal and macro, institutional situations. In the latter case 
dialogue encompasses one's interactions with adverts, fashion, broadcasts, architecture, the 
temporal structures of representations (see Chapter 7), and so on. 
34 
noted (see below), everyday understanding is not part of the individual's private psyche 
but fully operationalised knowledge. 
Giddens (1973, p. 73) also argues that because everyday knowledge is contextualised 
rather than propositional, it must be localised 
- 
using that term in the sense of small-scale 
interaction. It is clear however that the contexts of phenomenological knowledge could 
be very general. ' Schutz, for example, talks about the taken for granted basis of the most 
generalising activity, scientific practice itself. The `everyday' is not confined to 
commuting or housework. 
However, the points about localisation and individualisation of practical knowledge are 
deployed by Giddens to suggest that markets are a general feature of social life in late 
modernity. Individuals possess tacit knowledge through which they organise their desires 
and preferences. This knowledge is dispersed amongst different localities that 
circumscribe a subject's daily interactions. It follows that any attempt to engage in 
economic planning will come up against the problem of atomised, and therefore socially 
incalculable, preferences. This argument can be seen against the critical points made 
above and it is also worth noting in criticism of Giddens that in the Britain of the 1990s 
preferences have been commonly characterised, that is, in terms of a public mood, which 
is denoted in terms of the absence of a `feelgood factor', rather than atomised desires. 
It is worth turning briefly to Wittgenstein (1989), whose comments on grasping the 
connections or grammar of language offer a model for dealing with the interrelations of 
social life in general. How is it, for example, that we can successfully grasp the sense of 
expressions in different contexts? Wittgenstein's response was that such processes are 
not mental processes although they are forms of understanding (Philosophical 
Investigations, 1,15). For Wittgenstein, to understand a language does not entail that Nye 
know all the moves that can be made in that language in advance of using them. Rather, 
`to understand a language means to be master of a technique' (ibid., 1,199) 
This does not distinguish between situations where one grasps truth conditions of 
linguistic expressions and where one does not and hence lies open to the charge of 
conventionalism, that is, that understanding amounts to no more than grasping linguistic 
conventions rather than a substantive content expressed by them. Consequently, as 
Dummett (1981, p. 6) observes, for realists, this remains an unsatisfactory formulation of 
understanding. The distinctions Dummett wants to make can be illustrated as follows. I 
can converse successfully with others by letting the context pick out the sense of the 
utterance : 'X got out of the wrong side of the bed this morning'. The statement conveys a 
See Grimshaw (1996, p. 22) for a criticism of the assumption that `anything... historically, 
geographically or culturally remote could not be significant'; that it could not `speak' to us. 
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state of affairs whether or not it can be expressed in terms of propositions about the 
psychological predispositions of X. What, in the latter case, is to give the sense expressed 
in it an objective dimension? The only solution, Dummett (op. cit., p. 5) argues, is to 
confer upon the sense of the sentence an objectivity independent of its being grasped in a 
mental act. 
In general, then one can say about the discursivity of social situations that people behave 
appropriately by sensing the meanings of situations; they apply truth conditions (or 
perhaps, more strictly, sense connections or limits in the reality of thought), without 
mentally grasping that this is so. 
Part 2: Linguistic Conventionalism 
and the Frege-Dummett Critique 
Richard Rorty and Self Affirming Edification 
We have already encountered the idea that identities are formed in a closed circle of 
consciousness (individual subjectivity) through the work of Mead on the generalised 
Other and via Habermas's notion of Diskurs. There was no convincing theorisation of 
how the linguistic process itself might be regarded as non-homologous with 
consciousness, that is, as a material force, although the work of Schutz (following 
Husserl) was seminal in raising the point that all conscious activity required a 
substructure of taken for granted activity, or, in Garfinkel's (1967, p. 4) phrase, `essential 
reflexivity'. 
The postmodern pragmatism of Richard Rorty follows in the tradition of Mead in 
discounting any realm which may pose limits to the conversation and hence also falls 
prey to the `hermeneutic circle', namely, that whatever is encountered in conversation is 
also circumscribed by the categories of the knowing subject and hence irremediably 
subjectivised. 
It was argued above that the taken for granted reflexivity or non-cognitive basis of 
practices provided a guarantee of openness and we will turn firstly to look at how 
openness is handled in Rorty's `post-pragmatism' by situating him in relation to the work 
of. Gadamer. 
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Rorty and Gadamer 
Rorty assimilates himself to Gadamer's (1981) theory of understanding in which a person 
gains understanding within a cultural tradition. That is, the experience of the tradition 
(Erlebnis) is a process through which the individual becomes cultured or enlightened 
(Gebildete) as that person's cultural horizons interact with those of other traditions. Such 
interaction produces a fusion of horizons (op. cit., p. 273 ff, p. 337 ff) in which the 
individual's understanding is broadened. The enrichment of perspective depends on a 
suspension of one's own cognitive claims and an opening out to the claims of the other. 
The postulates of the other must be taken at face value in order to fuse with one's own in 
a way which averts closure in the Hegelian manner. Warnke (1987, p. 165) describes this 
as a `deabsolutised... conception of negation' where understanding takes place without 
one position or term of this dialectic superimposing itself on the other. 
Now Rorty's idea of edification similarly suggests a conversation between different 
cultures through which we can `foster an awareness of different possibilities of coping 
with the world, of new life-options and, indeed, of new modes of self-description' (cited 
in Warnke, op. cit., p. 157). However, whilst in Gadamer the function of communication 
is to integrate different perspectives and thus provide greater knowledge and self- 
foundation for the conversants, for Rorty its importance lies not in `the possession of 
truths' but in our own self-development and recognition of the cultural provincialism of 
our own ways of thinking (loc. cit. ). Hence our philosophical examination of theoretical 
activities amounts to no more than a mode of detachment: `of seeing how different ways 
of making things hang together hang together' (ibid., p. 164). 
Whilst this would seem to indicate a stance of openness as detachment, the view from 
Gadamer suggests that openness involves commitment. This is so in the double sense that 
we are committed both to the broadening of knowledge in our understandings and also, 
following Aristotle, to the view that our theoretical activities should reflect practical 
needs. Gadamer follows Husserl's notion that theoretical activity involves `giving an 
account' of the everyday world and is hence guided and limited by the world of practical 
reason. 
Rorty, on the other hand, wants to reject any mode of ordering thoughts in terms of some 
notion of epistemological validity, such as the Husserlian anchorage of truth in the 
everyday world or Gadamer's own insight of the fusion of horizons as a broadening of 
knowledge. 
The Rortean opening onto new experiences characterises the edifying philosopher as one 
who as well as 
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having kept alive the historicist sense of our beliefs also has the relativist sense that the latest 
vocabulary 
... 
may... be just another of the potential infinity of vocabularies in which the world 
can be described (Rorty, 1979, p. 367). 
In other words, Gadamer's logic of synthesis is matched by Rorty's implication of choice 
between discrete multiple vocabularies. The choice one makes precludes rather than fuses 
with or articulates others. Here, subjectivities would be cut off from each other by the 
syntax of choice and its `either-or-ism'. Rorty's liberal pluralism turns out to be one of 
mutually uncomprehending monadic subjects. 
Again, whilst both Rorty and Gadamer stress the anchorage of intellectuals in traditions, 
Rorty (Warnke, op. cit., pp. 195-6) sees the function of trying out new ideas, ways of 
looking at things as a means of defending the tradition rather than a genuine 
transformation indicated by a fusion of horizons via suspension of one's own beliefs. In 
the latter case there is no predetermined outcome, whilst for Rorty the purpose of the 
conversation is manifestly pre-given. 
Rorty (1982, p. 173) sees the position of `Western' intellectuals as determining that truth 
is `whatever emerges from the conversation of Europe'. Rorty admits that this is `frankly 
ethnocentric'. Interestingly enough, Habermas (see below), starting from a priori criteria 
of rationality, ends with a similar position. For Rorty there is no transcendental principle. 
Rather we should embrace the Western liberal intellectual tradition, he suggests with 
some circularity, because it is the best way of coping that we thus far know. Warnke (op. 
cit., p. 153) observes that there is no way of distinguishing this form of allegiance to `the 
West' from a `frankly irrational' and `frankly ethnophobic' view. 
One of the problems issuing from terms such as `Western', `liberal', `Europe', 
`individualism' is the false homogeneity they produce. These terms do not operate 
primarily at a propositional level, even amongst liberal intellectuals although (pace 
Rorty) the polysemic resonances go unheeded. One clear difficulty with homogeneity 
manifestly resides in the pragmatist tradition itself, as exemplified in Mead. Mead's 
fusion of German idealism and American pragmatism subverts, at least at the 
programmatic level, the culture of individualism with which pragmatism coexists. The 
permeability of self and Other in Mead's generalised Other goes against the grain of the 
self-sufficient economic individual. 
In Gadamerian terms, there is a kind of bogus quality to the assertion of Western 
intellectual self-sufficiency, and following Warnke's point about ethnophobia, this also 
applies to the ensuing implicit claim to superiority. Gadamer's methodology suggests the 
possibility of on-going fusions of viewpoint between traditions which would make a 
nonsense of the idea of a purely `Western' worldview. 
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Rorty, Davidson and Reference 
Rorty's eclecticism is illustrated by his claim to allegiance with the perspective of the 
U. S. philosopher of language Donald Davidson. Davidson (1984, pp. 215-26) rejects the 
notion that propositions can be tested directly against the world and concludes that a first 
order view of reference should be abandoned as it is only when propositions have been 
systemically assembled that they can convey a coherent referential meaning. However, as 
Farrell (1994, p. 119) argues, the consequence of this for Davidson is not relativism 
because it leaves in play the intelligibility of communication, which relates to a second 
order type of reference. That is, communication is only predicable on the basis that 
communicants are engaged in some mutually grasped concern; there is a quality of 
aboutness in their interactions. 
However, Rorty (1986, p. 353) is preoccupied with Davidson's reservations about first 
order reference which appear to allow a foothold for linguistic relativism. As Farrell (op. 
cit., p. 120) notes, at this level reference works (the world is identifiable) by means of 
matching descriptions against a canon of scientifically approved propositions in the 
course of practical investigation. This seems to approximate to a conventionalist view of 
scientific research, 
... 
nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and there is no 
way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence, 
observes Rorty (1979, p. 178), and Davidson agrees. ' 
Davidson's view here (and Rorty's) has much in common with the Vienna Circle 
positivists' idea that truth claims were justified by matching them against `protocol 
sentences' produced by scientists, or in Neurath's terms, scientists from one's `culture 
circle' (Russell, 1965a, pp. 139-40). On this view of justification, Russell (op. cit., p. 139) 
observes that if we want to know what Neurath says on p. 364 we need to ask the 
scientists of our culture circle rather than decide what Neurath says via our own 
`perceptive experience'. In other words, when we regard something as true or meaningful 
we imply that it fits the broader cultural descriptions. The reductio ad absurdum of this 
would be that `empirical truth can be determined by the police' (loc. cit. ). Regarding this 
`attempt to make the linguistic world self-sufficient', Russell (op. cit., p. 141) concludes 
in a way that has a contemporary resonance: 
Farrell (1995, p. 27) argues that Davidson takes an Hegelian-style view that reason is imbricated in 
the world and Grayling (1985, Chapter 3) suggests that Davidson sees the senses as providing a 
semantic structure to the world. D'Amico (1989, p. 130) claims that Davidson rejects the external- 
internal formulation of the knowledge-world relation. Given that Davidson is not a Rortian 
coherence theorist, there is still no indication of how semantic depth could work, as Davidson has 
rejected the meaningfulness of natural language. 
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The verbalist theories of some modern philosophers forget the homely practical purposes of 
everyday words... I seem to hear them saying "in the beginning was the Word", not "in the 
beginning was what the word means". 
So, for Davidson and Rorty, sentences placed in context and within the semantic field of 
a comprehensive theory will map out the features of reality. The theory will locate 
features of the world because they are implicit in ordinary descriptions (Farrell, op. cit., 
p. 122). 
Dummett: Semantic Closure Versus Semantic Context 
Now, whilst in Davidson the meaning of everyday language is determined by a semantic 
context, Dummett (op. cit., pp. 459-60) argues that this ignores the role of the relation 
bettiveen items of sentential structure in the production of the sense of the sentence. The 
sense `mediates between the semantic features': between the `structure' and the 
`references of its constituents' on the one hand and `the actual employment of the 
sentence', on the other. The thought expressed by the sentence is therefore dependent on 
an ability to apply the references to some state of affairs. The notion of performance 
implicit here indicates a view of communication as passing beyond a formal or logicist 
comparison of sentences to a conception of language as `doing'. In this way Dummett's 
position breaks out of the closed circle Russell identifies with Neurath. 
The notion of reference cannot be discarded, Dummett (op. cit., p. 461) argues, as `we 
cannot explain what it is to treat a name as standing for an object of a certain kind 
without explaining what it is to identify an object of that kind'. For example, to employ 
the proposition `The Y in the box is of the type X' involves making connections of the 
form `this is an V. All language ultimately falls back on this use of demonstratives or 
indexicals: 
even when the proper name is capable of occurring in recognition statements, the account of 
the relation of reference... involves a description of the use of the most basic layer of language. 
In other words, some context is always implicit if we are to make sense of statements 
including `this', `here', `it', and so on. Hence for Dummett, reference does not work 
according to a crude interpretation of the causal theory of reference where it is a matter of 
discovering whether a `relation obtains between a proper name and an object'. Rather, it 
depends on the `context principle', that is, `what speakers would recognize as settling the 
truth of sentences containing the name'. In other words, reference depends on how they 
agree on applying the name; this will determine what gets picked out by it. 
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There are clear parallels here with the work of Husserl, Schutz and Garfinkel. The role of 
demonstratives is akin to the already mentioned notion of taken for granted reflexivity. 
Speakers can pick out states of affairs using the demonstrative or indexical mode which 
depends on context of utterance. Here, the notion of reference is indissolubly linked to 
that of performative context. Dummett's point is that the generalising capacities of a 
propositional utterance depend finally on this way of recognising examples of a type of 
something. The propositional cannot be divorced from the contextual and indexical. 
Garfinkel (1967, p. 4) has likewise noted the incomplete substitutability of cognitive for 
indexical expressions in any practical activity. The effect of this insight is to undermine 
the linguistic dualism which treats all language as either meaningful and propositional or 
as metaphorical, as action, emotive, `everyday' and unmeaningful. 
Now Rorty (1991, p. 163) follows Davidson (1979, p. 30ff) along this latter route, that is, 
everyday language, language as used, is deemed to be separate from cognitive, that is, 
propositional language. Cognitive language bears meanings whilst metaphorical, natural 
language only produces a cognitive effect, and is not meaningful in itself. It would be 
easy to slip into a debate for or against metaphorical meaning, but Dummett's position 
allows us to see this as a blind alley. For Dummett, metaphoricity (natural speech) is 
always linked at some point to an explicit univocal assertion, that is, propositional 
language which in turn allows unique situations to be picked out unequivocally. Russell 
(1965a, p. 135) makes the same point when he says that although Neurath and Hempel 
want to ground science in public impersonal propositions the result is less than the sum 
of the work of private scientific knowledges. The public science is a construction 
involving use of opinion to pick out what should be included in a public science. In other 
words, the public science is an account of knowledges not in the public domain and 
hence is itself anchored in meanings not derivable from the propositions alone. The 
encyclopaedist of science thus employs taken for granted knowledge of the form `This is 
what public science is'. 
Rorty deploys his emphasis on purely propositional language, a language of conventional 
meanings, against feminists and other radicals whose discourses, he argues (1989, p. 65), 
are not conventional, that is cognitive, but rather, metaphorical and hence literally 
meaningless; their aims are mythic rather than capable of realisation. ' For the reasons 
outlined above this `strategy of marginalisation' is unconvincing. 
In the field of poststructural linguistics, Derrida also has criticised the postulate of a 
conventional language. ' Deconstruction lays bare the metaphorical basis of the concept 
6 See also Rorty (1991,1993) and responses from Fraser (1989) and Wilson (1992). 
Rorty's point that metaphors die and acquire literal meanings ignores Derrida's (op. cit. ) claim that 
the wearing away of metaphor cannot erase its trace, or, in our terms, its irreducible indexicality. It 
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(cognition). However, Derrida's (1974) own position issues from the play of difference 
between conventional terms and is unable to account for the stability of meaning through 
which speakers grasp a state of affairs ä la Frege and Dummett. 
Similarly, it is evident from Foucault's (1971, pp. 9-11) `orders of discourse', that he 
understands `discourse' as a conventional, official kind of language, or, in Garfinkel's 
terms, `objective language'. This notion lacks the phenomenological sense of language as 
practice, where language fulfils a double function of both describing and being what is 
described; of being action and also an account of action which Garfinkel (op. cit., p. 4) 
calls its essential reflexivity. 
This constitutive ambiguity of natural language as meaning and action is evident in 
Frege's characterisation of sense as both cognitive and spatial (Dummett, op. cit., p. 58). 
An interesting discussion of sense is found in Empson (1985, pp. 291,303-5), who notes 
the constitutive tension between sense as in `the senses' (spatial/physical) and the notion 
of sense as cognitive which is mediated by a common sense (demonstrative) 
understanding. Dummett's own understanding of sense privileges the ontological over 
the epistemological aspect of meaning (Carl, 1994, p. 83). Understanding or 
communication between speakers is first of all an ontological matter from which 
cognition emerges, although like Empson, he sees sense as mediated by the semantic 
content of the structure of statements, expressions and sentences (ibid., p. 461). However, 
`To speak of the identification of an object... presupposes a way of picking out the object 
for which no further question of identification arises' (ibid., p. 143). Thus, Dummett 
claims that placing objects within some cognitive grid depends on a prior agreement 
between conversants on how to do this. This agreement indicates a transparency between 
language users in their logic (ibid., p. 134) and hence arguably, a fusion of individual 
subjects as an intersubjective subject. 
Some patterns are discernible from this discussion of communicative interaction. In some 
ways Habermas, Rorty and Davidson line up together; roughly this amounts to a dualistic 
attitude to knowledge, theory, cognition, meaning on the one side which is counterposed 
to interaction, performance, use, causal efficacy. It also represents a dichotomy between 
will, need, desire, the context and action-driven metaphorical expression and the abstract 
contemplation of conventional or propositional meaning. Phenomenologists and 
Dummett on the other hand, line up in various ways against it and arguably, provide a 
way of breaking out of the circle of self-confirming meanings. 
also raises the suspicion that the gap between metaphorical and literal utterances is not the yawning 
chasm presented by Davidson. 
Worn-out metaphor is precisely the kind that interests phenomenology because its meanings are 
taken for granted in the literal statement. It operates, in Ricoeur's (1986, p. 284) terms, `behind our 
backs' and thus emphasises the decentered nature of discourse and subjectivity. 
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Chapter 3: Intersubjectivity and Rationality 
Two themes are central to this discussion of rationality. Firstly, that perceptions, 
judgments and theoretical generalisations are situated rather than absolute. Secondly, that 
all activity carries with it a substratum of unexamined, everyday constructs through 
which it `makes sense'. In this chapter these insights are used to inform the discussion of 
rationalisation, agency, structure, institutional (bureaucratic) discourses, historical action, 
dialogical understanding, modernity, Enlightenment and `other cultures'. 
It is claimed that accounts of social life which ignore the intersubjective dimension 
inevitably both dichotomise and absolutise their subject matter; either the world is 
rendered all-powerful or its subjects appear as its absolute creators. In either case the 
origins of the shaping factor cannot be explained, as Rose (1981, pp. 213-4) argues. 
Notions of unconditioned universal subjects such as the `reasonable audience', ideal 
listener/communicator, and so on, will serve to illustrate the point. ' 
The life-world conception of the taken for granted, everyday features of life is taken as an 
initial example of this abstract way of thinking, in that it represents an at once arbitrary 
and absolute division of the social world where small-scale interaction, i. e. the realm of 
the subject, represents the domain of morality and freedom in contradistinction to the 
world of structural determination and unfreedom. Z This has important consequences for 
the configuration of rationality in its dichotomisation of reason from spontaneity, 
objectivity from feeling, imagination or values from factuality, metaphorical from 
propositional language, theory from practice, representation from reality, common sense 
or popular ideologies from scientific discourse, and so on. 
The Taken For Granted: Aspect or Domain of Meaning? 
The life-world concept as employed by Husserl, Schutz (sometimes), Habermas and the 
current orthodoxy in sociology and cultural studies, functions for each in their own way 
to mark out a domain, a feature in an epistemological geography. Husserl's (1970) 
Galilean orientation drives him to locate ideal forms intuited from the everyday world in 
a separate, transcendental terrain. Schutz refers to transcendental life as that in which 
`we-consciousness' operates, whilst Habermas cordons off the life-world from the social 
system and even separates it from the world of enlightened opinion, the area of Diskurs. 
See Rose (1995, pp. 33-6,213-4) for an account of this in the social theory of Durkheim, Weber and 
Habermas. 
Globalisation theory marks a. welcome shift away from this. See Hall in Rutherford (ed. ) (1990) on 
diasporic identities, for example. 
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The view developed here is that the everyday is not in some sense a separate domain but 
rather the substratum of all activities. To take one example given by Schutz (1967, p. 7): 
the `thought objects of the social sciences [are] founded [upon] common sense constructs 
used... in everyday life'. Hence the world is experienced `within a horizon of familiarity', 
that is, within taken for granted notions of what is `typical' within existing experience: 
the world is apprehended via this `natural attitude' (ibid., pp. 7-8). 
Further, all activities occur in social contexts which give them their unique meaning or 
sense. The idea that meaning is wedded to context, or situated, although identified with 
Schutzian phenomenological social theory, is also found in Dummett's (1981) reading of 
Frege's work on meaning. Here it is argued that all cognitive, propositional type 
utterances depend for their specificity of meaning on the context of utterance. Dummett's 
point is that a context of unexamined notions is always present in natural language 
utterances. This equates in important respects with Schutz's conception of the way the 
natural attitude functions. 
Garfinkel (1967, p. 4) has elaborated this idea by arguing that utterances, however 
propositional, never completely eliminate the indexical aspect of communication 
- 
our 
descriptions of things always depend finally on a level of shared, so to speak, `implicit' 
knowledge which situates the discussion, gives the meaning context and thus enables 
understanding to take place. Russell (1965b, p. 336) argues that even where statements 
have no direct reference to specific contexts or experiences `the problem of interpreting 
the descriptive phrases is exactly the same as if there were. ' To put this another way, the 
use of such expressions implies situating conditions of the form `what does this mean for 
me, here, now etc. ' 
Hence, in these texts the role of the everyday or intersubjective is crucial in picking out 
or identifying situations or other objects of discourse. 
A further characteristic of the everyday order of language is that because it is essentially 
an activity, the epistemic and ontological divisions in thought undergo collapse. The 
notion of language as doing found here means that everyday identifications are `done' 
rather than known, although their potentially explicable nature indicates that they are also 
the point of emergence of propositions about things. 
On this view, the taken for granted, natural aspect of communication is always present in 
the use of abstract language; there is always a context to which it is applied, a situation 
within which it makes sense. This account of the everyday therefore departs radically 
from those of Husserl and Habermas in not compartmentalising the world in order to 
detect its rational features. 
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Having established the specificity of our account of the everyday, it is now possible to 
progress to examine in greater detail some of the problems with its `topographical', that 
is, lifeworld-type readings. 
Reason, Rationalisation and Common Sense 
As Rose (1995, pp. 1-13) notes, the social theory of Durkheim, Weber and, more recently, 
Habermas, has a neo-Kantian structure. It divides the social world into spheres of 
judgmental validity and values; a world of objective, value-free, instrumental reason and 
a world of ultimate goals proposed by free, (absolute) self-constituting egos (ibid., 
p. 214). 
Hence, whilst the Aristotelian view of practical life entailed a coincidence between 
specific human activities and a sense of their ultimate worth, by contrast, in the time of 
modern capitalism, it is commonly argued, this connection has been critically eroded. 
This view is an element of a complex often referred to as the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft 
shift or contrast. In the work of Max Weber, but also that of Emile Durkheim, the 
development of a specialised division of labour leads to a separation between means and 
ends, an instrumentalism encroaching on everyday practices which is imposed on human 
subjectivity from outside as an `iron law' of rationalisation. 
In other words, Weber, Durkheim and Habermas have seen modernity in terms of a 
polarisation between rationalisation/increasing division of labour and a sphere of free 
human agency within which elements of Gemeinschaft can be preserved. These canonical 
writers formulate social life as an opposition between external determination by 
structures or systems and free interpersonal, small-scale, authentic interaction 
- 
with the 
consequent problem of how these spheres could possibly be related! 
It is suggested that Schutz's view of the everyday offers a way out of this impasse in that 
it combines everyday accounts as practices with more structural features of the social 
world. The social world is something which is `done' or achieved. For example, Schutz's 
approach to scientific rationality denies it an `out-there' quality, rather it is something 
continuously in the process of constitution. 
One way in which the rationalisation debate has become focussed is in relation to the 
instrumental reason-values dichotomy as found in the contrasting of science and common 
sense beliefs. Schutz's criticism of this demonstrates his concern with the practical, 
achieved quality of scientific knowledge. Now in social theory common sense is 
generally taken to embody a pre-scientific, pre-rational entwinement of values and 
practices. However, Schutz has argued that this Weberian ideal-type model of science 
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cannot be found anywhere in reality. This is simply because science is not the rehearsal 
of already established knowledge where the experiment/theoretical account shows that an 
event of type A is governed by law B in such and such a way. Rather, it also involves 
judgements about new cases, that is, whether they fall under type A or not (Schutz, 
1970b, p. 109). At this point, the scientist's perspective, sense of relevance, mode of 
problematisation come into play (op. cit., pp. 108-9). These can shift periodically and lead 
to a new centre of interest as a consequence of the way science is recontextualised by its 
practitioners, where contextualisation is the taken for granted basis for paradigmatic 
concerns 
We can illustrate the idea of context by reference to Schutz's point about the application 
of types. Ideal types refer to particular schemes or fields of objects or areas 
problematisation which cover `all the possible types to be used'. In other words, in 
applying ideal types we give an account of the instances to be considered as relevant to 
the application. The account entailed by application cannot itself be derived directly from 
descriptions of, or propositions containing, the types. It is only generated as an account or 
`supplement' to the type through a `principle of relevance', that is, by reference to context 
of application and its cultural assumptions about what is relevant to problematisation. For 
example, through the work of Althusser (1971) which developed the role of ideology in 
the production and reproduction of capital, feminists were able to point to the relevance 
of domestic labour to the reproduction of the social relations of production. In Schutzian 
terms, the `subscripts' or cultural assumptions attached to housework had shifted 
allowing it to be considered as relevant to the reproduction of capital. 
By means of Garfinkelian elaboration we can say that such an account exhibits an 
essential reflexivity in that domestic labour becomes part of the field of relevant types 
because of the practical issue, the shifting `focus of interest' in the problematisation of 
social reproduction of capital. In other words, this is the way 
- 
given the shifting relation 
of cultural assumptions or types to a practice 
- 
theorists now wish to practise 
reproduction theory. The propositional and performative (application) features of science 
overlap at this point. The application of propositional knowledge to situations is, as 
Schutz (loc. cit. ) notes, a way of determining its limits: `The scientific problem [as a 
practice]... determines the limits within which possible propositions become relevant to 
the inquiry'. Thus phenomenology indicates the fundamental openness of so-called 
rationalised practices, institutions, etc. That is, their shifting everyday features tend to 
subvert the `closure' and mystification/reification produced by the objectifying aspect of 
rationalisation (see Chapter 7 for further discussion of this). 
Theories are hence not hermetically sealed conceptual structures `out there' but always 
situated, that is, found in relation to practices where their concepts are linked in an 
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horizon of typical familiarity to the cultural assumptions of their social practising. Schutz 
emphasises that this makes Weberian rationalisation manageable and enables the 
construction of social order. Hence: 
disenchantment [is]... the transformation of an uncontrollable and unintelligible world into an 
organisation we can understand and master, and in the framework of which prediction 
becomes possible... if social science has failed to consider this kind of rationalisation of its 
conceptual framework, each of us human beings, in `just living along' has already performed 
this task, and this without planning to do so... we are guided neither by methodological 
considerations nor by any conceptual scheme of means-ends relations, nor by any idea of 
values we have to realise. Our practical interest alone, as it arises in a certain situation... and as 
it will be modified... is the only relevant principle in the building up of the perspective 
structure in which our social world appears to us in daily life (op. cit., pp. 96-7). 
This view of rationalisation, unlike the more familiar Weberian conception of a world of 
pre-ordained ends and methods is also, as we have seen, the everyday world of scientific 
problematisation. The modem world looks considerably more negotiable through this 
perspective compared with the one encapsulated by the Weberian `iron cage'? 
Schutz's reading of rationalisation has been criticised (O'Neill, 1995, p. 182) on two 
grounds. Firstly, that for Schutz, `scientific conduct is... ruled only by the norms of 
empirically adequate reasoning' and that this ignores the role of `imagination', 
`discovery', `argument' and 'proof' hich set off scientific from other kinds of activity. 
This is a misreading in the sense that Schutz acknowledges the need for a theoretical 
attitude and `conceptual compatibility' but uses a postulate of empirical adequacy in the 
very specific sense of applying or giving an account of the theory. Here he is in the 
company of Popper (1972, pp. 345-6), for example, who notes the use of rule of thumb 
methods in deciding whether a given case supports a theory. 4 
Secondly, O'Neill argues that in the case of social theory the application of norms of 
empirically adequate reasoning would indicate an intervention by instrumental rationality 
through the use of norms of everyday life in theoretical accounts of it. However, 
explicating the `everyday' should here be understood as an account of the `subscripts' or 
relevancies through which theories make sense in the context of application rather than a 
The sociological canon, however, tends to stress only the objectifying side of rationalisation. Whilst 
it is true that Schutz sees the achievement of social order as a relatively unproblematic consensual 
procedure, as Heller (1984, xi-xii) notes, and has no critique of ideology/fetishised social relations 
and the inverted character of representation under commodified social life, his notion of the open 
horizon of typicalities provides a powerful way of understanding how social objectifications are 
undermined in practice. 
° See Chapter 2 for McDowell's (1994) point that agreement about conceptual content and meanings 
is always in the end a matter of ostensive definition: the situatedness of meaning always renders 
one's position open to further explanation viz. `this is what I mean'. 
D'Amico's (1989, p. 131) suggestion that for Popper the `human senses are theoretical hypotheses 
about the world' is interesting in that respect as is Popper's (loc. cit. ) own comment about relevance 
being determined by a `horizon of expectations'. 
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direct intervention by command institutions of state and economy. It signifies 
everydayness as the taken for granted of social science practice, which may be radically 
critical of affairs of state etc. This confusion evidently arises from O'Neill's use of the 
topographical view of the everyday where the latter is separated out from the sphere of 
enlightened opinion, Diskurs. Schutz is also inconsistent on this point. He refers, at one 
point (op. cit., p. 113), for example, to a contrast between daily life and culture. However, 
this does not detract from the plausibility of the non-topographical reading of `everyday' 
as natural attitude. 
O'Neill's stance effectively reproduces the dichotomy highlighted at the outset, between 
an inadequate subjective reason and the scientific or system problem as an `out-there' 
beyond subjectivity. This is also a hallmark of the work of Habermas, to which we now 
turn. 
Habermas, the Life-World and Resisting Rationalisation 
Habermas (1987a, p. 330) divides the social world into (micro) interaction and structure 
and places everyday life in the former. He argues that a domain of linguistic 
agreement/mutual understanding serves as a way of resisting the oppressive and 
distorting effects of rationalisation, viz. the imposition of reified means-ends 
relationships, relationships which are removed from value debates, that entail technical 
rather than substantive questions. However, the increasing colonisation of the lifeworld's 
common sense thinking by the symbolism of mediatised systemic imperatives 
(Habermas, 1978b, p. 196) leads him to suggest that undistorted communication and the 
salvation of the lifeworld is only possible from the sphere of Diskurs, that is, intellectual 
life. The structural/systemic world, by contrast, is the de-linguistified domain of money 
and power, a world beyond the horizon of interpersonal understanding (undistorted 
communication). 
It is worth reiterating here that this is quite different from Schutz's `everyday' which 
includes the world of work and administration. Outside the voluntary institutions where 
spontaneous interaction is possible and regulated by members' normative inclinations, 
the systemic sphere requires `non-normative regulation of individual decisions that 
extends beyond the actors' consciousnesses' (Habermas, 1987b, p. 1 17). Such systems 
regulate members' actions and self-interests by oppressive and distorting legitimations. 
Here `steering media' of economic and state institutions `stabilise the unintended 
interconnections of decisions that have not been subjectively co-ordinated' (loc. cit. ). 
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Whilst this form of analysis is of interest in its own right, it also raises more general 
questions about the relationship between the everyday and subjectivity in the cluster of 
Weberian notions connoted by `rationalisation'. 
For Schutz, there is no impediment to extending action beyond individuals' 
consciousnesses nor indeed a problem with the decisions that have not been `subjectively 
coordinated' and hence with `unintended consequences'. Subjectivity has no intrinsic 
limitation to Micro situations; `unintended consequences' do not represent a general 
problem for social agents. As demonstrated above, Schutz believes that all these issues 
can be handled intersubjectively, in a mode where things are only `occasionally 
propositional'. This is possible because of the accumulation of experience, `stocks of 
knowledge', in short, the biography of the individual. The social world, however global 
its interconnections, is `centred in the self of the person who lives and acts in it' (op. cit., 
p. 97). 5 That is, as Mead suggested, the social world is internal as well as external. 
Therefore, as Gadamer (1981, p. 495) argues on this more global sense of subjectivity, 
there is no reason why the world of labour should not be treated as interactive and not 
extra-linguistic. In fact, the world of work is `the world of our power' 
- 
that we 
experience in mastering techniques of working', this is `a way of research into ourselves'. 
Moreover, 
it is through and in the concrete experiences of our human existence, in domination and in 
work, and only here, that our human understanding of ourselves... our conversation with 
ourselves, find their fulfilment and exercise their critical function. ' 
Further, the structures of state and economy work through social interactions. As Marx 
pointed out, capital is not just money or machinery; it is a social relation, not an abstract 
power. It works through relationships of production, buying and selling. Equally, the 
state, although an apparatus with a logic of its own, is at the same time a process of 
contested relationships. Although Habermasian delinguistified structures have logics, so 
do the everyday `structures', working outside individual consciousness as a taken for 
granted substratum of conscious decision-making. Habermas's (1987b, p. 338) positing of 
two logics 
- 
system and lifeworld 
- 
is arguably an excessive sociological 
compartmentalisation given that intersubjectivity contains aspects of both. 
See Wagner (1973) and Smart (1976) for similar readings of Schutz and the discussion of macro 
situations by Schutz in Chapter 2 of the current work. 
6 For Gadamer (op. cit., pp. 159-66,330), the basic element of conversation is not interpersonal 
interaction but the relation of a questioning subject to a text 
- 
whether this be direct speech, written 
text or by extension of this argument, the mass media 
- 
which would also be understood by 
reconstruction or articulation in the context of its reading. 
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As we have suggested above, however rigid, formal, bureaucratic the codes of economic 
or state life may be, they have to be interpreted to be operationalised. This `opening' 
indicates that the practising of codes relies on some supplement or account of how it 
should be done. In this way values, ideologies permeate the rationalised life, indicating 
what the code `really means'. 
The institutional analyses of Goffman, Strauss et al. show how bureaucratic rules and 
regimens are in fact negotiated via interpretation. Usually one remembers the code, 
though how it gets practised is less clear but no less important to the outcome. The idea 
of a `negotiated order' (Strauss, 1968) depends then on the accounting procedures or 
interpretational actions of parties involved. The common sense logics of the situation are 
drawn upon to implement `the rules'. 
This raises a number of issues about Weberian rationalisation. Firstly, if rationalisation 
is, as a reality, a practised reality in the manner just described, then structure, as 
designated by formal codes, and interaction are coterminous. The dualistic 
characterisation of the social world is otiose. We can say that some structures are more 
central, powerful, dynamic than others, but that does not get round the point that they are 
practised. Secondly, the dualism of the Weberian perspective relies on a concept of 
action limited by the horizon of individual consciousness. Schutz and Mead, on the other 
hand, posit modes of we-relation and joint action through which group members create 
intersubjective structures, implicit or indexical ways of picking out realities which extend 
far beyond ideas that can be articulated propositionally. Thirdly, far from being 
concerned purely with technical mean-ends relations, the regulation of structures entails 
the structuring and practice of regulations through everyday, common sense notions. 
Of course, for Habermas, the language of interpretation involves not only words but the 
capacities to distort and to dominate. However, as Wellmer (1985) has argued (Dews, 
1987, pp. 226-7), this does not quite grasp the way language functions in that official 
meanings are often supplemented by unofficial ones, as people interpret dominant 
articulations in their own situations. An example of this would be the way people `read 
between the lines' of pronouncements in oppressive regimes. This is none the less a form 
of reading/communication. The ability of power to stifle communication is probably also 
somewhat overplayed with respect to sending messages. As Dummett (op. cit., Chapters 
6 and 19 passim) has argued, the `context principle' enables indexical, metaphorical use 
(oratio obliqua) to convey meaning. This is not to deny that people are often misled by 
the information they are presented with. In these cases we would say that they do not 
grasp the context. For example, some messages divert attention from others which 
connote our subjectivities, `speak to us' more fully in a broader communicative context. 
Here the preferred meanings encoded in communication practices obscure subordinate 
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but more personally relevant readings. The notion of ideology as diversionary is 
appropriate here. 
The use of types in the process of interpretation has been noted by Schutz (1967, p. 3ff). 
However, here they generally function not to make knowledge claims but in the practical 
application of corrigible utterances to situations. Hence we can say that stereotypes, as 
exemplifying ideology, are an aspect of a practised oppressive reality rather than false 
statements about it. For instance, institutional racism works on the basis of applying 
types, hidden presuppositions about the size of ethnic minority families, desired areas of 
residence and so on. Here the types are seen as part and parcel of institutional practices 
rather than theoretical ideology/knowledge claims about ethnic minorities. 
However, the Habermasian pessimism expressed in the notion of a lifeworld colonised by 
the dominant ideology can be seen as unwarranted for quite other reasons which are to do 
with the nature of social control. That is, there are many non-ideological factors 
contributing to domination which are ignored in Habermas's (1987a, p. 330) equation of 
ideological colonisation of the lifeworld with social control in liberal democracies. Fear, 
insecurity, loss of morale and self-confidence, the sheer physical and mental exhaustion 
of daily life at the end of the twentieth century arguably all contribute to the engineering 
of consent. One is reminded here of Dennis Wrong's (1961) view that social theorists can 
overplay the power of socialisation in getting people to do things. 
It seems fair to conclude that Habermas underestimates the potentiality for resistance to 
rationalisation tendencies within the scope of the everyday, common sense or natural 
attitude (further discussed in Chapter 7), partly because of the restricted (lifeworld) 
notion of the everyday he uses, and that this will have implications of a mandarin sort. 
The focus on Diskurs as a space in which forms of domination can be contested suggests 
a `leave it to the intellectuals' mode of practice. 
Gramsci, Common Sense and the Articulation of Formal Discourses 
Habermas's concern with a lifeworld micro-sphere of normative practice divorced from 
cognitive-instrumental knowledge finds an echo in Lockwood's view of rationalisation. 
In his critique of Lockwood (1981), Benton (1984, pp. 217-8) has examined the 
technicisation claims made about knowledge by rationalisation theory. He notes that 
Lockwood not only `sees cognitive and normative... constraints on action 
[as]... analytically distinct' but also holds that they form `the basis of a typology of 
action', that is, Lockwood sees people as actually differentiating their actions in this way. 
Benton counters this view with Gramsci's work on ideology and knowledge which 
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recognises the inseparable interweaving of cognitive, sentimental and moral aspects of 
social action and that in contemporary circumstances these are not incompatible with 
theorising the system consequences of the rationality of capitalist class-actors. 
It is important to understand the role of common sense in this `inseparable interweaving'. 
For Gramsci (1971, p. 377), the everyday accounting for, or appropriation of, 
bureaucratic-capitalistic goals or any other set of propositional-type claims, or 
programmatic sets of ideas occurs in cultural practices. Common sense is a substratum of 
such practices; it is the deposits of all previous knowledge; it is present as a sediment or 
`trace' in linguistic practices; it is `episodic' rather than logically consistent; it enables us 
to do things `unconsciously', it can be enlivened, mobilised in ideologies; as such it 
`create[s] the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggle' (loc. cit. ). Here common sense is intersubjective in Merleau-Ponty's sense of 
constituting understanding across contested positions and these encompass not merely the 
interpersonal but all the institutions of the `integral state', that is, of society itself. 
Educational practice illustrates Gramsci's (op. cit., pp. 37 & 39) conception of 
intersubjectively-based understanding. He writes of the pupil with a traditional Italian 
curriculum that via Latin and Greek they are: 
plunged into history and acquired an historicising understanding of the world and life, which 
becomes a second 
- 
nearly spontaneous 
-nature... logical, artistic, psychological experience 
were gained unawares, without a continual self-consciousness... The end seemed disinterested 
because the real aim was the... formation of the personality by means of absorption and 
assimilation of the whole cultural past of modem European civilisation. 
[They learned Latin and Greek] in order to know at first hand... a civilisation that was a 
necessary precondition of our modem civilisation: in other words 
... 
in order to know 
themselves consciously. [Further, ] it is the whole cultural tradition... which in a given 
ambience [teaching skilled at making the connections with contemporary life] produces such 
results. 
Gramsci's point is that practically-oriented education makes conscious what is done 
anyway by reflex; that this knowledge is already part of us as we practice it daily. 
Education consists in bringing to the pupil's attention `what they already know' so to 
speak. The cultural past is imbricated in language and these sediments can be articulated 
with the pupil's everyday experience. The passage also nicely delineates Gramsci's views 
on subjectivity: there are two aspects, the `unconscious' (intersubjective) self and the 
conscious individual self, which exist in an interactive relationship. 
In his analysis of ideology Gramsci (op. cit., p. 331) points to the way systems of ideas 
('philosophies') can be articulated, via a political moment, with the common sense views 
of the people. This serves to mobilise common sense, and creates a terrain in which 
people come to recognise themselves and their social position (see Gramsci's 
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observations cited above). Hence the account which ideology renders of common sense 
in their practical life, gives people not just ideational but material grounding, the 
institutional terrain of society is formed in this way. The term `material' is apposite in 
that common-sense or practically-based ideologies exist beyond consciousness and shape 
it through the process of `becoming aware'. Now the sense that people are caught up in 
and formed through practical ('organic') ideologies and their institutional terrains leads to 
the conclusion that linguistically, the objects or matters of our conversations connect us 
as conscious individuals to debates, understandings which we are historically predisposed 
to entertain through the connections between socio-cultural background and the tradition 
in which we are situated. There is an organic connection between personal biography and 
the wider cultural context. In a sense then we are formed by those debates themselves and 
our intersubjective understanding of them (see also the section on Gadamer below). At 
any particular point, the (linguistic) lines of argument could be said to be constitutive of 
subjectivity. Subjects are formed and receive their identities through the practices in 
which these debates are inscribed. 
In contrast to Schutz, Gramsci (op. cit., p. 195) sees the construction of daily practice as 
contested. People draw on aspects of traditions which are congenial to their own 
situations, but the force fields of the contemporary issues and debates are decisive in 
shaping where the lines are drawn, how the sides line up ideologically, the 
`differentiation and change in the relative weight of the elements' (cited in Mouffe, 1979, 
p. 191). Gramsci's historicism clearly indicates that the cultural traditions are always 
available to us intersubjectively. In this, he goes against more recent claims (see Chapter 
7) that cultural changes have made historical memory impossible. Such claims arguably 
mistakenly rest on the view that the sedimented culture does not continue to be 
articulated with current ideology, that is, enacted linguistically. Rather it must somehow 
be recuperated mechanically from education 
- 
be `inculcated pedantically', in Gramsci's 
phrase. 
Gramsci's work is poised strategically between the phenomenological and structuralist 
traditions and thus demonstrates the possibility of a productive conversation between 
them. These intellectual formations prompt their own 
- 
but none the less complementary- 
questions about the rationality of communicative activities. ' 
Quentin Skinner: Text as Action and Contestation 
In view of what has been said about the absolutisation of agency as free consciousness 
and whether, alternatively, there is a sense to action which is not coincident with the 
On the affinities between structuralism and phenomenology see, for example, Silverman (1987). 
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agent's meanings, it is worth examining the debates around Skinner's (1988) account of 
historical action. 
The exchanges between Skinner and his critics help to bring into relief issues about the 
rationality of historical agents and how we should view their beliefs. Skinner (op. cit., 
pp. 260-2) argues that the beliefs of historical agents should be seen not primarily as truth 
claims but rather as forms of action. Their utterances should be seen, following Austin 
(1980), as first and foremost, having an illocutionary force. That is, their meaning derives 
from what they do, what the writer intends to bring about by them, rather than from a 
conventional or literal grasp of their meaning. Hence, in assessing their rationality we 
must concern ourselves not with their overt epistemic implications but with how 
successful they are in expressing or bringing about a given state of affairs or event. 
Agents, Skinner (op. cit., p. 246) argues, may be deemed to be rational to the extent that 
they perform effectively according to the criteria of efficacy of a given time and place. 
The embracing of Protestantism by capitalists, for example, provided motivation by 
legitimation and must therefore be seen as rational to the extent that this enabled them to 
fulfil their pre-existing pecuniary goals (ibid., p. 113). 
Skinner's use of the notion of legitimation suggests the operationalising of beliefs 
requires a use of language 
- 
an account of the beliefs 
- 
which persuades: `X fits this 
outlook', `Y is appropriate here', `Z is illuminating', etc. This metaphorical use of 
language is also noted by Empson (1985, chapter 1, passim) and Heller (1984, p. 162). It 
is a usage that reaches out to us, invites sympathy, is associative or connotes our own 
circumstances, invites action. To sum up this point: Skinner is arguing that even where 
language is couched in these ideological terms, when considered as successful action it is, 
none the less, rational. 
Skinner (loc. cit. ) builds on his idea of persuasive language to offer a picture not only of 
beliefs as action but as contestation. Different factions move history on by subverting 
existing meaning structures towards their own ideological programme and goals. 
Meanings are neutralised, inverted, extended, reduced and so on. Factions build on 
existing ideologies rather than starting from scratch (see also Gramsci, 1971, p. 195) by 
contesting and rearranging elements of their meanings. 
Taylor (1988, p. 237) has, in criticism, raised the question of truth claims in relation to 
such beliefs; that there must be some relation between the efficacy of beliefs and their 
truth content. Through Dummett's work, we have posed this differently: what are the 
objective meanings (senses) expressed by such indexical (ideological) references? This is 
because we have argued that everyday beliefs work only indirectly or metaphorically 
rather than literally asserting that such and such a state of affairs pertains. 
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Taylor's point is important because it raises the matter of rationality in a wider sense than 
Skinner's behaviour-leading-to-satisfaction-of-intended-goals. That is, if `contesting 
programmes of beliefs' is a viable description of historical action then the subject matter 
must have an underlying coherence which entails an ability to pose the question `what is 
it that they are arguing about? ' 
Now Gramsci's (op. cit., pp. 330-31) work on ideology offers a formulation which 
includes these necessary elements via a notion of the contested articulation of sedimented 
common sense meanings to ideologies. That is, there is a political struggle over which 
articulation of common sense gives the best account of a formal ideological claim. Here 
`common sense' is used in the non-topographical sense of the taken for granted basis of 
truth claims. `Articulation' refers to the way abstract statements get operationalised and 
thereby become practical, convincing `knowledge'. 
How one decides which is the best articulation or appropriation of historical texts was, of 
course, for Gramsci and Skinner seen through the efficacy of `text as action in context'. 
Barnes (1974) and Winch (cited ibid., p. 243), on the other hand, believe that as such a 
judgement requires one to stand on different ground, to be external to the context. It 
involves imposing other standards and leads to ethnocentrism. This issue is discussed 
below in relation to Gadamer's insights on dialogue and a fusion of horizons. 
It can be seen from the discussion of Skinner and Gramsci that historical action and 
understanding are inescapably political. None the less, these processes are also 
conversational or dialogical. Moreover, whilst writers in the classical Marxist tradition of 
ideology have identified ideological processes as manipulative and distortional, Gramsci 
and Skinner have both emphasised their dependence on elements of rationality, that they 
make sense in terms of efficacy and existing cultural frameworks; also that they limit 
possible meanings in the sense that they rearrange ideologies, some ideas are displaced or 
become secondary to others from which they then derive their primary meanings. 
Gramsci's account of ideology is fuller in the sense that he distinguishes the practical, 
`organic' realm of ideology from the idealistic, programmatic dimension. This means that 
whatever actors' ostensible beliefs, their practical lives follow ideology-as-common- 
sense. Their `collective' or intersubjective existence is the basis for the meaning of the 
account they give of political theory, that is, of formal party programmes. Hence the 
meanings that agents attribute to actions, contexts and so on, might be different from the 
sedimented logic or meaning of such `texts' themselves. For Gramsci (op. cit., p. 324) the 
key problem of historical understanding is precisely `knowing thyself', how the `infinity 
of traces without an inventory' (cultural sediments) impinge on particular political 
contexts and identities. Therefore, unlike Skinner, Gramsci relies on a historicist notion 
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of the common sense grounding of beliefs and cultural frameworks to make sense of 
actions and contexts. 
For Gramsci (op. cit., pp. 330-31) the success of one position in the contested dialogue 
involves its 'becoming popular', grasping the practical lives of a large enough 
constituency in such a way that those lives are positively addressed ('articulated') within 
the new programme and further, that alternative ways of addressing them have failed. On 
the other hand, Skinner's (op. cit., pp. 274-5) reliance on the pursuit of successful plans or 
programmes as a sufficient explanation of historical action follows Collingwood's model. 
For example, Collingwood reasons that because Nelson's plan for the Battle of Trafalgar 
was successful all we have to do to understand the situation is to grasp Nelson's strategy. 
However, `Ideas', as Gramsci (op. cit. p. 192) argues, `are not "spontaneously" born in 
each individual brain: they have a centre of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of 
persuasion... '. They are `structural and epistemological' rather than psychological 
(Gramsci, 1975, cited in Mouffe, op. cit., p. 191). This is to reiterate in a different way his 
point that the historico-cultural environment is something within which we act and, so to 
speak, `live through', and whilst embodied in our discursive practices, it does not belong 
to any individual agent ('individuated consciousness'). Hence the problem for Skinner is 
that whilst the meaning of action is contextualised, this is never seen as a precondition 
which shapes agents' understandings but only as the way the agent brings things about. 
As Keane (1988, p. 210) notes in his response to Skinner (1988): `Interpreters [of actions] 
always already stand within this field of intersubjectively shared conventions and 
"preunderstandings"'. Therefore, understanding the effectivity or the rationality of action 
in context depends on recognising its intersubjective content as well as its meaning for 
individual agents and the extent to which the two coincide. In the case of the Battle of 
Trafalgar, this means we have to recognise that Nelson's victory was but one 
instantiation of a set of possibilities presented by the context of action. Further, this 
context is not reducible to what Nelson actually did. If it were, as with Collingwood, then 
Nelson's actions represent an absolutised subjectivity; it becomes impossible to ask why 
Nelson read the context the way he did, for Nelson's plans are taken as sufficient reason 
for what happened. 
That is, it is not merely (as in Austin) that individual agents get language to do things, but 
that language is a medium which 
- 
as practised 
-generates its own collective meanings, 
common sense. Dummett (op. cit., p. 361) makes a similar point in relation to Davidson's 
claim that the meaning of utterances is conferred by their propositional content. For 
Dummett, this fails to distinguish between the significance (convention for indicating 
meaning) and the sense of the utterance, which he argues, exists independently of its 
conventional meaning. Utterances do things independently of whether we grasp them as 
doing so. 
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To summarise: using the philosophy of language we can say that dialogue works when 
both parties pick out the same states of affairs. The failure of `conversations' in this 
respect may result in a shift in political allegiances. Hence, the success of ideologies 
depends on the practical, intersubjective skills of political actors. Grasping the logic of 
the situation however requires a hermeneutics of, for example (as Gramsci points out), 
aspects of modem European history. It also signifies the historically determinate nature 
or limits to the linguistic meanings that agents can operate with. The absence of this 
frame of meaning in Skinner places him closer to Foucault's sense of historical 
contingency and irrationalism than Gramsci's historicism (Rosa, 1996, p. 23). 
On one important point Skinner and Gramsci are in agreement. This is that ideologies are 
not to be treated epistemically but rather as action in context. For Gramsci, this is 
because they are intersubjectively valid practical articulations of propositional language, 
that is, of programmatic ideologies. Consequently we can place his work on the 
functioning of ideas within the environs of a phenomenological philosophy of language. 
Gadamer, Dialogical Understanding and the Problem of General Meanings 
Gadamer (1981) follows the pattern of understanding via conversation or dialogue which 
we have seen in Skinner and Gramsci to the extent that there are two key interrelated 
issues raised by Gadamer which have a resonance with the other writers. These are `how 
far is it possible to generalise one's own position' to which Skinner and Gramsci both 
answer in terms of the contestation of meaning and manipulation of language and 
secondly, `from what cognitive position is criticism possible 
- 
universalism or overlap of 
perspectives'. Habermas (1980), who has figured prominently in the debates over 
Gadamer's hermeneutics, has argued in the style of positivistic philosophy of science that 
norms of discourse must be universally valid and, as such, approximate to an ideal speech 
situation. 
Grimshaw (1996) has addressed this tendency in the work of Le Doeuff (1991), who 
whilst acknowledging the situatedness of the writer suggests that in the domain of 
philosophy, with its universalistic claims, the writer's audience should be universal. Now 
Grimshaw (op. cit., p. 22) agrees with the claim that, for example, feminists do not only 
speak to other feminists or those who share all aspects of the writer's social location, they 
may even appeal in totally unexpected ways as discourses always carry an excess of 
meaning beyond their conventional reception. However, Grimshawv (op. cit., pp. 24-5) 
argues, in an important sense Le Doeuff's conception of philosophical universalism is not 
`universal' enough. Its use of the regulative idea of an appeal to the `abstractly reasonable 
listener' does not recognise the Western and masculinist voice of much philosophical 
discourse. Grimshaw's (op. cit., p. 22) dialogical alternative to the abstract listener 
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suggests that there are points at which our experiences overlap 
- 
as seen most clearly by 
the suggestion that we occupy multiple interconnected social locations which promote 
questions of common human concern (gender issues themselves provide an example). 
Hence dialogue is to be achieved by seeking out those points at which the traditions or 
perspectives concerned intermingle, `speak to one', or, in Gadamer's (op. cit., pp. 272-3, 
337) parlance, the points at which both parties are seeking answers to the same questions. 
For example, socialism and feminism can be seen as meeting in the context where 
patriarchal familial relations are argued to maintain production relations. As noted in 
Chapter 2, Gadamer describes such points as `a fusion of horizons'! 
Using this notion, Grimshaw (op. cit., pp. 25-6) argues that feminists and others cannot 
and should not eschew the position from which they speak as the successful conversation 
preserves the particular perspective within the general. Hence, for feminist 
perspectivalism, this does not inevitably issue in a hermetic particularism of non- 





produces, we can argue, something akin to the Gramscian process of 
articulation described above: the taken for granted features of a situation enable both 
parties to communicate through it and broaden their respective collective experiences 
whilst acknowledging the validity of their differences. The advantage of this view is that 
it avoids the pitfalls of abstract universals in the Hegelian style, where one position must 
win out in an absolute negation and supersession of the other's cognitive reach. For 
Hegel, this does not mean that this superseded content is lost. However, following 
Feuerbach (1986, pp. 32-33) and Adorno (1973, p. 163), there is a problem about 
accessing this content in that it is alienated from us and we must break the spell of the 
concept if we are to reveal the situatedness of identities or classification systems in 
relation to their real, material conditions of possibility. This opportunity is seen as 
blocked by the abstract/formal, arguably fetishised appearance of the `concept', in that it 
is perceived in isolation from any situating conditions. 
On the other hand, there are difficulties arising from Gadamer's own characterisation of 
situatedness. For Gadamer, the dialogical character of speech is founded on the cultural 
and intellectual tradition within which the speaker resides. Whilst, therefore, this 
provides a framework within which communication can take place, and hence avoids 
relativism in that it fixes the terms of the exchange between speakers, it is none the less 
still vulnerable to a charge of irrationalism 
- 
an absolutism of the structures of tradition 
- 
on the grounds that the tradition of a speaker might not be relevant to the issues and 
context in which they attempt to engender understanding. Gadamer has dealt with this 
$ Arguably here the result is a new theoretical object rather than merely a contradiction between pre- 
existing accounts of socialism and feminism. Grimshaw (op. cit., pp. 21-2) makes a similar point 
about how feminism and philosophy reconstitute each other as `feminist philosophy' rather than 
`feminism plus philosophy'. 
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objection, as noted in Chapter 2, by declaring the possibility of openness to meanings 
which go against the tradition as it stands. However, if this is so, then it is difficult to see 
how one is situated rather than free-floating with regard to intellectual influences. How 
can one be capable of seeing the truth of ideas extraneous to one's own tradition? Warnke 
(1987, p. 106) notes that Gadamer fails to distinguish clearly two senses in which 
speakers or positions might be in agreement. The tradition is firstly `an integral part of 
our own self-understanding', we share its cultural assumptions whether we support its 
more programmatic aspects or not; secondly, we may undergo a `critical and reflective 
integration' into it. Gadamer's elision of tradition as a condition of understanding with 
the more conservative position through which, as Warnke (loc. cit. ) notes ' we are not 
only members of a tradition but also its ideological supporters' fails to recognise this 
distinction. The reaction of Habermas (1977) to this irrationalism is, however, as shown 
above, only capable of reinstating the individual as a unified unsituated consciousness, 
and hence, offers no solution to the question of how we can understand each other and 
yet disagree. As was suggested in the section on Skinner and Gramsci, the more plausible 
scenario (also argued strongly by Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 362, following Hegel), is that 
dialogue depends on a measure of disagreement; speakers contest and modify each 
other's positions. Albrecht Wellmer (1986), writing in the tradition of critical theory, has 
also rejected the link between consensus and communication, favouring instead a 
constitutive plurality of sign users and identifying the idea of an ideal (consensual) 
communication community with stasis and `a cancellation of the linguistic-historical life- 
form of human beings' (cited in Dews, op. cit., p. 323). 
Whilst Gadamer appears to confuse the prejudice/common sense and critical reflection 
aspects of communication in his discussion of a fusion of horizons, Dummett (1981) 
arguably presents a way out of this difficulty. The comparable distinction in Dummett is 
between natural language utterances, their taken for granted meanings, and the senses 
which statements in such language come to express and which can react back on 
speakers' usage and their grasp of the state of affairs discussed. Senses are expressed 
through the application of intersubjectively held truth conditions (which cannot be 
exhaustively specified) to statements. X can see what Y is getting at even where they 
disagree about how the truth conditions should be applied, that is, whether a particular 
case is relevant to the type of situation under discussion. Hence, intersubjective reflection 
and agreement are separate features of communication practices. Within Dummett's (op. 
cit., p. 134) reading of Frege speakers' meanings are not consensually fixed, rather the 
senses of communicative practices are open to different readings and in shifting contexts 
can generate new propositions as existing ones take on the role of the everyday or taken 
for granted, that is, become background or context for new thoughts (see Chapter 5). 
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Gadamer (op. cit., pp. 333-5) is well aware of the distinction between agents' meanings 
and the logic of a situation, as is clear from his criticism of the Collingwood (and, a 
fortiori, Skinner) view of meaning. In effect, however, he does not allow for theoretical 
meanings, explicit self-understanding as opposed to taken for granted meanings of the 
tradition. Language is a store of meaning, a means of expressing truths rather than 
identifying them. Dummett's (op. cit., pp. 162-3) position, on the other hand, suggests 
that a process of identification is always at work within communication: speakers pick 
things out, even if only indexically (where identification is deferred from one utterance or 
expression to others within that communicative context). ' This enables us to talk 
intelligibly about, for example, the nature of a tradition even though our meanings 
remain incomplete. By contrast, Gadamer's conflation of situatedness and self- 
understanding leaves the question of identifying the limits of a tradition unanswered. 
Tradition is absolutised and historical agents fixed within it. 
Some Consequences of Dialogical Method 
One of the merits of the preceding discussion for social theory is that it enables us to 
recast the problem of ideology in primarily ontological terms. Ideology is seen variously 
in terms of natural language utterances, acts, practices rather than clear cognitive 
assertions although the latter are reflected in these doings. As Gadamer (1977, p. 38) 
notes, the intellectual impact of the tradition `is inevitably more being (Sein) than 
consciousness (Bewusstsein)', it is `effective history'. Hence beliefs should not be 
sociologically assessed in the language of distortion and reflection but rather as evidence 
of changes in the composition of society. If such changes lead to heightened 
contradictions, as did, arguably, those during the Thatcher-Reagan period, then the 
solution to those conflicts lies not in critiquing market economics in an abstract way but 
in examining the effects of its practical applications, its situated realities. As Gadamer 
(1982, pp. 338-9) points out, the intellectual habit (stemming from Kantianism) of 
regarding problems in the abstract, that is, as having one for-all-time formulation 
disregards their continual historical reconstitution. Gramsci makes an in some ways 
similar point when he observes that the hegemonic powers in new historical conjunctures 
produce a rearticulation of key problems, they reassemble the ideological inventory to 
suit their own practical needs. The 1980s move towards addressing economic issues in 
monetarist rather than Keynesian terms illustrates this insight. None of this precludes 
rational judgement and this is given illustration in Gramsci (op. cit., p. 333) when he 
claims that the worker's situated, organic or `spontaneous' and practical consciousness 
Even in indexical communication conceptual identities play a part. The point for Dummett (loc. cit. ) 
though is that such identities are not self-sufficient but always situationally related and therefore the 
meanings of natural language expressions remain incomplete (open-ended). The communicative 
content of natural language is not amenable to conventional reading/closure. See also McDowell in 
Note 4 above on the permeability of concepts to situational meaning. 
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represents reality and often contradicts the programmatic formulations of the professional 
ideologists. 
The theme of ideology as dialogical practice which has ontological implications can be 
related to Gadamer's (op. cit., p. 341) elaboration of conversation as a situating, 
transformative process. The linguistically positioned object of a conversation `is not a 
possession at the disposal of one or other of the interlocutors' rather the conversation and 
its object 'presupposes 
... 
or creates a common language'. Further, the conversants do not 
`adapt themselves to one another, but rather, in the successful conversation they both 
come under the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound into a new 
community. ' And, contra Rorty's idea of self-development, the eventuation of 
an understanding... in a dialogue is not merely a matter of total self-expression and the 
successful assertion of one's own point of view, but a transformation into a communion, in 
which we do not remain what we were. 
The transformative, open character of dialogue is also emphasised by Gadamer (op. cit., 
pp. 388-9) in his critique of Enlightenment methodology. He argues that the 
Enlightenment approach to problems is to see them as entirely subsumed under trans- 
historical typologies. System concepts are seen as `generic' rather than modifiable by 
changed historical circumstances 
- 
this includes references by the Enlightenment to its 
own validity (ibid., p. 239ff). This criticism has a very real relevance to `enlightened 
opinion' today in that commentators on the world situation refer to issues precisely in 
such terms: `the West', `the former Soviet Union', Islamicism, feminism, the 
`industrialised world' and so on. 
The reifying influence of the cover concepts makes it difficult to think beyond them. 
However, the significance in doing so is perhaps decisive for the plausibility Of 
Gadamer's notion of tradition. In reality there are no traditions in the hermetic sense. 
Historical movements of population with their linguistic influences, the colonial period, 
industrialisation, globalised trade and media 
- 
even international conflict 
- 
produce 
understanding in the sense outlined above and in doing so help to explode the myth of 
localised limits to effective communication. 
The fusion of horizons can accommodate `outside' influences because in some sense they 
are already there, inside. Hence, it is not a question of attempting to understand 
something completely different. It is perhaps also worth mentioning here Davidson's 
(1986) comment (cited in Farrell, 1994, pp. 174-80) that in entertaining the idea of `the 
other' we are already characterising an entity as a part of our own rational world, which 
is, consequently, for Davidson the rational world. Hence the (confused) logic in the 
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posing of the `rationality and other cultures' question 
- 
it has already delineated what 
otherness is; it is familiar with what it does not know! 
In the context of such considerations providing the grounds for a fusion of horizons, 
Maclntyre (1985), as Warnke (op. cit., p. 172) notes, has addressed the conditions under 
which explicit borrowings from other traditions are made. Maclntyre argues that a fusion 
occurs when a tradition has a problem that it cannot solve in its own intellectual terms. 
Hence, again, it is presupposed that canons of rationality are shared with other traditions 
and are, arguably, in Davidson's terms, features of the world, real but also discursive 
properties 
Rationality, Modernity and Situatedness 
Grimshaw's (op. cit., p. 26) comments on the significance of a fusion of horizons for an 
understanding of the growth of knowledge point to cognitive perspectivalism and a 
deabsolutised conception of intellectual progress. The inference here is to the problematic 
nature of an Hegelian conception of knowledge in which substantial progress transcends 
existing intellectual achievement and frameworks to the extent of denying them any 
independent validity (see p. 58 above). By contrast, a fusion of horizons preserves and 
broadens existing insights, in this way it is in Warnke's (op. cit., p. 165) view a form of 
`deabsolutised' negation. 
Now the importance of this point should not be lost in investigating intellectual and 
cultural formations of modernity. One way of putting this is to address Western 
modernity in terms of its others 
- 
the formations that are a part of Western development 
and yet denied recognition as such. Third World nationalisms, the phenomenon of 
underdevelopment, `world music', exemplify this point. 
Within European social thought itself `other' conceptions of the world including 
socialism, feminism, ecologisms, literary Romanticism, communitarianism, fascism, 
national and familial ideologies and discourses clearly figure, but only as a kind of 
backdrop, a taken for granted although alternative, contesting framework for `modern' 
modernity. There is therefore a counter-modernity which grounds or situates the talked 
about, dominant themes of Western values, rationalised markets and production, 
technicised objectives and so on. 
Further, whilst the debates about community (Gemeinschaft) and association 
(Gesellschaft) in social theory are conducted not only as if Gemeinschaft were only 
proper to the traditional world and exists now only as a residue but also take social 
science to have superseded the Gemeinschaft organicist worldview, this ignores the fact 
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that the theorists themselves employ the Gemeinschaft framework as a means of 
validating modernity! As Nisbet (1972, p. 17) observes, sociology is heavily indebted to' 
this premodern perspective in `concept', `symbol' and `attitude'. There were `deep 
currents of conservatism' in the work of Simmel, Weber and Durkheim. 
There is, none the less, a tendency to equate intellectual modernity with the 
Enlightenment. Consequently, sociology has fallen into the Enlightenment trap of 
thinking that because it is modem it is historically unconditioned and unaffected by 
Gemeinschaft culture, that the latter's concepts have no constitutive role for modernity 
and that, by implication, sociological debates are not situated. 
This neo-Kantian aspect of the Enlightenment has been criticised (Rose 1981, pp. 211-14) 
in the sociological methodology of Weber and Durkheim. In the one case society is an 
absolute foundation for the individual (Durkheim) and vice versa in the other. There is no 
conception of mediating transformative practice or situating and situated subjectivity and 
hence the individual and society appear as absolute opposites rather than products of 
historically-situated activity. 
The `abstract' or `generic' tendency at work here to equate the thought of modernity with 
the Enlightenment is also fundamental to postmodernist critiques of the modern, for 
example, Lyotard (1984). The irony of using Enlightenment methods against the 
Enlightenment should not escape us here! 
Gadamer's (op. cit., p. 194) observation that the 16"' and 17th centuries contained a 
nominalist tendency later culminating in Kantianism supports this view of the 
Enlightenment. However, Farrell's (op. cit., pp. 16-17) comment that Hegel saw reason as 
embodied in nature together with Marx's realism (Keat and Urry, 1975, Chapter 5) and 
tendency to denounce abstract thinking, in, for example, his `Theses on Feuerbach', 
suggest a different angle. This is that although nominalism, conventionalism, or in 
Adorno's parlance, `identity thinking' were perhaps the cultural dominant of the 
Enlightenment, reflecting the instrumentalist orientation of capitalism and its 
administration, Illuminism was nevertheless a contested tradition. 
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Chapter 4: From Structuralism to Phenomenology: 
Connotation, Denotation and Meaning Context 
We turn here to examine semiotic and context perspectives of meaning in the light of the 
question of how it is that coherence is achieved in systems of signs, even where they are, 
as in ideologies, clearly contradictory. The connotative power of metaphorical language 
is seen as a key factor in integrating signs into discourse and also in understanding the 
materiality or real-world dimension of language. 
Connotation and the Coherence of Discourse: the Legacy of Althusser 
The coming-to-be of metaphor, Beardsley (1958, pp. 138-47) has argued, depends on the 
outweighing of the sense of overwhelming contradictoriness in contrasted terms by the 
meaningfulness of such contradictoriness. A key element of this is the sense of cohesion 
between the terms in question. This section looks at the way such a cohesion factor is 
handled in the structuralist tradition of social theory. 
Althusser, and following him, Laclau, offer a theory of the unity of ideological 
formations; that is, they give an account of how it is that various ideological elements 
cohere to produce a belief system. Central to this theory is the idea that different bits or 
elements of a belief system cohere because they have an affinity for each other; they 
connote one another. Following the line of argument taken in this thesis this is important 
because symbolic systems are a moment of social reality, inseparable from the social 
practices they represent, and indeed, which they express. Hence, to understand the 
coherence of symbols is also to grasp the unity of social practices in any given milieu. As 
Hall (1986a) argues, the more general the congruence or harmony between the symbolic 
elements of a social formation, the stronger is the system itself. Where, however, the 
connoting power rests on a central symbol almost entirely, it is clear that alternative 
connotations constantly threaten to undermine this symbolic predominance. In other 
words, in such cases, the connotative force that holds between the elements of the system 
is not akin to that which holds between the central symbolic element and the rest. Hall 
(loc. cit. ) cites Thatcherism as an example of this. Because of the lack of connotative 
cohesion between its non-central elements, Hall argues that Thatcherism is a highly 
contested ideology. 
In the Althusserian paradigm, effective ideological discourses manage to displace and 
neutralise the contradictory images which are present in their elements, but this 
suppression of alternative meanings is always provisional and dependent on specific 
historical circumstances. 
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Central to Hall's analysis of the discourses of Thatcherism is Althusser's use of the 
language of psychoanalysis to convey the contradictory nature of social processes. Laclau 
and Mouffe (1989, pp. 97-98) point out that although psychoanalysis uses a language of 
the symbolic, in Althusser this does not denote a separate concern with the examination 
of discursive features of the social but is rather a novel way of talking about social 
relations and structures themselves. Indeed, for Althusser, it is argued, `the social 
constitutes itself as a symbolic order'. This is exemplified in the process of condensation 
where a number of images/relations are compressed into one. Closely related to this is the 
notion of overdetermination where one image/relation is privileged as that into which 
others are condensed, or displaced. Displacement and condensation are complementary 
processes, that is, condensations generally function to displace contradictions. The 
operation of displacement involves the transference of psychic energy from one image to 
another. In Althusser displacement functions to neutralise social contradictions by 
shifting the attention from one image/relation to another; this displaces the contradictions 
emerging in the subjectivity (identity) of individuals. Althusser (1977, p. 206, f. 46) says 
of the notion of overdetermination: `it is borrowed from two existing disciplines: 
specifically from linguistics and psychoanalysis' whose character is sufficiently 




Further, Laclau (1987, p. 93), in analysing the cohesion of ideological formations, cites 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1967) on the Freudian notion of condensation as showing it to 
have both psychological and linguistic relations. In dream imagery: 
A single representation represents... many associative chains at the intersection of which it is 
situated.. 
. 
it is then invested with energies which, attached to those different chains, add to it... 
Moreover, condensation is not like `a resume', condensed symbols are not like concepts, 
which have a definite ordering and ranking of their contents, rather symbols can draw on 
or accentuate any of the different latent meanings (connotations) which are present in all 
of the manifest meanings. 
If this Freudian-linguistic model is translated, as with Althusser and Laclau, into the 
realm of ideology as it impinges on the individual subject then we can talk of systems of 
symbolic representations becoming articulated with an individual's own symbolic 
inventory. Laclau (1987, p. 100ff), following Althusser (1971) describes this as a process 
of Interpellation of the individual within an ideological discourse. This means that the 
individuals come to recognise themselves within the discursive resources conveyed by 
the. ideology. Such a discursive identification of the individual entails, following the 
account of condensation above, a relation to the ideology which accentuates the sense of 
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subjectivity already present in the individual's symbolic resources. The chains of 
symbolic associations present in the ideology will connote or condense already existing 
images of self. 
Laclau (op. cit., p. 102) further elaborates this notion: `Different types of interpellations 
(political, religious, familial, etc. ) [can] coexist whilst being articulated within an 
ideological discourse in a relative unity'. This is not a logical ordering of ideas, but rather 
a connotative unity of ideological elements. For example, if a wife and mother (familial 
element) is a good housekeeper/consumer (connotes economic life), a `working mother' 
(connotes a work relation) and a family member who votes with her husband (connotes 
politics) then the familial element is overdetermined by a cluster of other elements which 
thereby render it more meaningful, that is, connect it to a reinforcing system of ideas. 
When social systems succeed in conferring such identities on their individual subjects, 
the contradictions implicit in these identities are said to have been displaced or 
neutralised. In this way the assumptions behind the ideology remain taken for granted 
knowledge. An example of displacement would be the associative chain of connotations 
around the idea `freedom'. `Freedom-equality-liberty-licence-everyone for themselves' is 
a possible associative chain here. Some of the elements get displaced in the free market 
ideology of liberalism 
- 
`licence' and `everyone for themselves', for example. It could be 
argued that they are consequent upon the practice of the other elements, and contradict 
the notion of liberty, but that such a contradiction gets displaced in the practice of the 
ideology. This means that as the ideology creates identities for individuals, the elements 
of individuals' self-conceptions which get overdetermined will rearticulate those which 
echo the anarchic-egoistic elements so that they lose their contradictory character. In this 
way, for Laclau, the ideological moment of social practices involves the recombination 
and displacement of their elements. 
Althusser, Spinoza and the Discursivity of the Real 
The Laclau-Althusser formulations of the relationship between symbolic and social 
processes suggests the productivity of a Spinozist reading of Althusser. The Spinozism of 
Althusser (Collier, 1991, p. 89) needs to be spelled out if the theoretically revolutionary 
import of the notion of overdetermination for a discursive account of the real is to be 
appreciated. 
Spinoza departs radically from the various forms of mind-body dualism prevalent in the 
ideas of modernity. Firstly, for Spinoza, ideas are equally material with the spatial- 
physical aspects of the world. Secondly, the relationship between individual parts and the 
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whole of a system is such that the whole is expressed in the individual parts. Hence, the 
whole can be affected by itself, non-paradoxically, as expressed ('displaced') in the parts. 
The radicalism of this approach in its bearing on the symbolic is captured appropriately 
in the linguistic trope of metaphor. Metaphor. (see below) embodies both the 
`condensation' or part 
- 
whole function of language, and also through the notion that the 
usage of metaphorical language does something 
- 
brings about a state of affairs that it 
expresses. This is reminiscent of Garfinkel's (op. cit., p. 4) statement that natural language 
has a duality of functions, it both describes and in describing organises a state of affairs. 
It is language as action. 
To grasp the idea that the symbolic and the real are inextricably intertwined, it is worth 
returning to Laclau's (1979, pp. 97-8) account of Althusser (1971): the symbolic aspects 
of overdetermination are not to be seen as secondary: `there are not two planes, one of 
essences and the other of appearances'. The social is not a primary, literal level which 
fixes the meanings of the symbols in ideology; there can be no such a priori relationship 
between symbols and social structures. Social relations just are, at one and the same time 
(overdetermined) symbols and structures. (One can agree with this account without 
following Laclau's leap in considering that because the literal is non-primary this effects 
its complete abolition 
- 
see below for discussion of the role of `the literal' as linguistic 
codifers/formulae. ) 
Now, from a Spinozist perspective, the elision of symbols and structures can be 
expressed as follows. Crucially for Spinoza, the mind is the idea of the body. This can be 
interpreted as meaning simply that ideas and brain processes are identical. However, as 
Collier (op. cit., pp. 77-9) argues, a more plausible interpretation is that whilst there is an 
identity between the ideational and spatially extended human spheres, there is also an 
implication that an individual's bodily relationship with its environment is mirrored in 
the configured complexity of its ideas. The configured complexity of the ideas varies 
according to the concomitant complexity of the body's relations with its environment. 
Now, whilst Spinoza considered only the relationship between a body and its physical 
environment, Collier (op. cit., pp. 82-3) argues that there is no good reason for not 
extending the theory to cover other human beings as well. On Collier's extended version, 
the spatial configuration of an individual's relation to others also exists under the 
ideational/symbolic attribute. Hence ideas/symbols have an objective, material import. 
They are not subjective entities, but exist independently of their appropriation by 
particular individuals. 
In the same way, we can consider ideology in Aithusser as a material entity. An 
important aspect of the materiality of complex bodies (e. g. society) or ideas (e. g. 
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ideology) is the way they cohere. For Spinoza (Collier, op. cit., p75) there is a binding 
force or conatus which accounts for their continued existence. We can straight away see 
from this that there is a non-arbitrary relationship between Spinozism and the linguistic- 
psychoanalytic apparatus in Althusser. 
If we follow through the notion of coherence-as-connotation in Althusser and Laclau, 
then connotation is the force through which ideological formations and their conferral of 
subjectivities (identities) continue to exist. As Althusser (1971, p. 160) observes in the 
`paradoxical' style we noted above, `The category of the subject is constitutive of all 
ideology', but only `insofar as all ideology has the function [which defines it] of 
"constituting" concrete individuals as subjects'. Hence concrete individuals are the 
condition of possibility of ideology because it takes a configuration of individuals to 
provide the notion of a subject; a matrix of partial interpellations which can then feed 
back into those individuals in ways which connote their specific characteristics, that is, 
constitute them as particular socially overdetermined subjects (see Laclau above on 
interpellation). 
A similar reciprocation would be apparent if we were to look at the way individual 
structures within a social formation were overdetermined, that is, in terms of the 
processes of condensation and displacement which facilitated the coherence of the 
formation. For example, the structure in dominance (capitalist mode of production) 
appears as a particular aspect of the formation but at the same time it is constituted out of 
the interconnections between all the institutions, and as such is the structure of structures. 
In another case, whilst ideologies are one of the conditions of the reproduction of 
capitalist social relations, they are also taken as aspects of the relations of production, the 
way they are lived. 
The foregoing formulation of overdetermination has interesting consequences for realism 
in that there is no hidden essence determining a priori the relations, structures of social 
formations (Keat and Urry, 1975, p. 135). ' A similar comment applies to the use of 
overdetermination in language as it appears in the structure of metaphor (see discussion 
of Ricoeur below). 
Ideology as Lived Experience 
The similarities between structuralism and phenomenology should not be underestimated. 
The Althusserian notion of discursive practice has its echo in Garfinkel's action (as 
agents giving an account) that is also a description or Dummett's natural language 
utterances. Indeed, Althusser's claim that theoretical practice is itself a party to the world 
In this, the notion of realism here differs from transcendental accounts of realism. 
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has its counterpart in Dummett's claim that speakers' utterances express a reality in 
successful communication (the sense of the utterance). 
Althusser notes that a particularly significant feature of ideology is that its (interpellated) 
subjects experience themselves as concrete, free beings outside ideological 
determination. In phenomenology, the experience of the everyday is the common sense, 
taken for granted understanding of the world in which agents do not consciously consider 
their situatedness. Further, whilst Schutz (1974, p. 104f1) distinguishes the taken for 
granted as typical construct or thought object of common-sense understanding from 
ordinary consciousness, Althusser (1977, p. 233) notes of ideology: 
[it] is indeed a system of representations, but in the majority of cases these representations 
have nothing to do with `consciousness': they are usually images and occasionally concepts, 
but it is above all as structures that they impose themselves on the vast majority. 
In Lenin and Philosophy, the Gramscian legacy is apparent in Althusser's siting of 
ideology in everyday institutional practices and rituals, a further accentuation of its pre- 
given, natural, obvious, everyday character. 
However, it should be clear that Althusser does not offer a theorisation of the everyday as 
a necessary component of discursive practices in the manner in which Garfinkel, 
Dummett or Russell (see below) identify the inevitable natural language base or 
indexicality of all propositional (theoretical, for example) utterances. 
Althusser does offer a theory of the subject, but this is based in Lacan's psychoanalytic 
notion that the subjectification process is grounded in transcendental archetypes of, for 
example, the mother or father and that whilst the unconscious is a symbolic order, the 
symbols `the name of the father', and so on, are not intersubjectively generated, as Dews 
(1987, pp. 240-i) notes, but come from an eternal symbolic inventory beyond the screen 
of the unconscious. 
Now, whilst Althusser bases the crucial concept of overdetermination in the 
psychoanalytic and linguistic traditions of structuralism, we will pursue it through the 
idea of connotation and the structure of metaphor. Connotation will be examined both 
within the structuralist/semiotic and semantic/dialogic traditions and an attempt will be 
made to discover its relation to these. We will query whether it is completely tied to 
structuralism or if there is a phenomenological contribution to its operation. 
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Semiotic Theories of Meaning and the Context Issue 
Current theories of meaning are heavily influenced by structuralist (Saussure, Barthes) 
and poststructuralist (Derrida, Foucault) ideas. One of the key ideas from the work of 
Saussure (1966) is that terms themselves are not the bearers of meaning. Rather, it is the 
difference between two terms that generates meaning. In other words, terms are related 
by their difference. Difference seems to precede or structure terms themselves. It 
becomes a metaphysical principle. 
Whilst it is a truism to say that every term is different from every other term, there is a 
sense in which some differences do not really matter. For example, in common usage the 
difference between `elephant' and `rhubarb' or `drawing pin' seems arbitrary and 
meaningless. In other words, in the Saussurian sense of difference not all differences 
seem to count; they are not all meaningful. Saussure argues that this is so because of the 
nature of the relations between terms. That is, differences between terms take 
paradigmatic or syntagmatic forms: they exclude relation or exhibit combinatory 
potential respectively. This formal demarcation does not of itself get us any closer to 
understanding why it is in a particular circumstance that terms do or do not combine, etc. 
Consequently, it can be argued against Saussure that difference on its own is not 
sufficient to account for the production of meaning; that the merely arbitrary deployment 
of the difference principle 
- 
for this is what it must be without other guiding principles 
- 
cannot guarantee the production of meaning. 
It can be argued that meaningful differences are ones where the terms to be differentiated 
also have some association. For example, `left' and `right' are different but also relational 
in the sense that they have an extra discursive reference, that is, they occur in a common 
context. Hence it can be further argued that these terms have an element of resemblance 
as well as difference because they both connote the same type of context 
- 
that of spatial 
location. They both summon up the same kinds of issues, those concerning orientation in 
space. Differentiation is therefore, it would seem, dependent upon that which is being 
distinguished having a resembling or relationally unifying quality with its contrast. 
The fact that meaning seems to be produced within a complex of resemblance and 
difference suggests that these functions exist in an irreducible unity; that each term owes 
a debt to that which it is differentiated from and can therefore never be fully 
differentiated or semantically independent from it. In structuralism this means, in effect, 
that the process of naming 
- 
which seeks to suppress context by paradigmatically 
excluding other names in order to classify its syntagma 
- 
requires complementation by a 
moment of `naming-in-context' if the reality of what is named is to be preserved in the 
meaning generated. Further, if the names which are excluded or displaced are brought 
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back then no extra meaning is obtained in this semiotic framework as the meaning of a 
term is its difference from what it excluded. `Difference theories' of the structuralist and 
poststructuralist type suggest such a reductive view of meaning because they elevate 
differentiation or the substitution of names into a first principle and contextual 
resembling meanings such as those given by the discursive context of an utterance add 
nothing. 
The argument that differences always occur in contexts and that the key to understanding 
meaning is to be found in a context-based view of connotation and metaphor, will be 
taken up again later in the chapter. 
From Connotation to Sedimented Meaning: Laclau, Jameson, Schutz 
The suggestion made above that meanings relate to contexts of utterance, that they must 
have a quality of `aboutness' as well as relating to other meanings, leads us into an 
examination of a second key notion of Saussurian theory. This is that it follows from the 
rejection of the idea that terms are bearers of meaning that objects themselves are also 
bereft of any intrinsic meaning. Taking an object (in the symbolic sense) as a term, then 
its meaning is generated by its juxtaposition to another object/term. The gap between the 
signifier, the tangible representation of meaning and the unit of meaning itself, the 
signified, can never be closed; neither can their relationality be theorised. Signification is 
arbitrary with respect to its meaning content. 
Signifiers and signifieds form lateral series both of which have their own logic and 
therefore there are limits to what can be effectively represented by any particular semiotic 
structure, in that it must have a logic which parallels that of the meaning structure. This 
argument is made well enough by Levi-Strauss (1964, p. 89) in his work on the Nuer 
where he observes that the Nuer use the symbolism of birds to explain inter-familial 
relations because it is `good to think with'. That is to say the symbolism has a parallel 
logic to familial relations; it makes the distinctions required for the grasping of family 
structure. 
However, in poststructural theories, semiotic structures are infinitely plastic with regard 
to meaning. There are no limits to the semantic repertoire produced by the play of 
difference because semiotics posits no internal (sedimented) and specific relationship 
between terms and meanings. A given representation (symbol) can represent anything. 
Poststructural theories of ideology, for example, Laclau (1987, p. 111) suggests that the 
terms of say, fascist ideologies, could be used as a grid for proletarian identity, and hence 
that the subjectivity of the working class as represented in popular ideologies could be 
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made amenable to assimilation within the fascist project. There are no limits to the 
representational logic of fascist discourse. 
Schwarz (1986, p. 185), however, has criticised this type of approach. He argues that the 
limits of ideological discourse lie not only in the imaginative inventiveness of ideologues 
but also in the historical specificity of their cultural resources, `the weight of tradition' 
and its language. That is, a connotative resonance between say, a political discourse and 
its cultural environment, will depend on the symbolic resources which that situation has 
to offer. The implication here is that meaning is sedimented in the cultural resources, 
rather than autonomously generated by chains of signifiers. It would be of little avail, for 
example, to propound economic liberalism in a society where ideas on distribution are 
based on reciprocity rather than market forces. 
Callinicos (1982, p. 29) remarks that the effect of Saussure's work is to lift language off 
reality. It has been argued in this chapter (see also Chapter 6) that such a separation need 
not be entertained precisely because language, as discursive practice, is itself an attribute 
of the material world. On this view it is not possible to prise apart language and the 
world. 
The signifier-signified split, absolutised by the absence of a context of meaning utterance 
entails that semiotics, taken on its own, relativises and subjectivises meaning. This view 
can be contrasted with Frege's (Dummett, op. cit., p. 132) assertion that meaning, as the 
sense of an utterance, is a characteristic of the world rather than being subjective in the 
way of referring purely to how people interpret or make cognitive associations between 
things. 
The phenomenological significance of connotation resides in its `background' quality. It 
is what is communicated without actually being put in the form of definition; its terms 
are meaningful, and yet they remain undefined (see sections on Ricoeur and Russell). As 
a taken for granted basis ofjudgements/actions, connotation operates in the way of a fund 
of cultural presuppositions which over-determine or articulate the symbols and signs in 
communication processes. This can be illustrated by showing how forms of signification, 
such as those in advertising, which claim to stand in their own right, are in fact dependent 
for their meanings on a cultural `undertow'. 
The use of irony in contemporary advertising evokes a sense or posture of detachment, a 
kind of knowingness. Postmodern irony is a kind of `blank' irony, which is to irony what 
pastiche is to parody 
- 
it substitutes nostalgia for critical reflexivity (Jameson, 1991, 
p. 17). This postmodern form of sensibility relies on what Jameson (op. cit., p. 20), 
following Barthes (1975), has referred to as intertextuality. The advert does not refer in 
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the first place to an order of reality but to another text. The contemporaneous use of 
images of women to sell cars refers to the text of women-as-car-sales-prop in the fifties 
and sixties. However, what makes the ironic point here is not the suggested difference 
between the two texts, although there is a difference, but rather the covert appeal to the 
`what we all know' of the cultural background. In other words, without the sexist 
connotations embedded in the advert's contextualisation, it would have no point. The 
base line of the connotative context here is that it is o. k. to use women to sell cars, and 
this is accomplished by mobilising a whole chain of connotations from the cultural 
background about female representation and role which reinforce and complexify this 
point. 
An image that appears to hinge on difference and ironic detachment in fact relies on 
resemblance with the taken for granted to get the contrast in its images going. This 
suggests that the meaning of signs goes beyond those differentially related signifying 
structures themselves. 
The implication here for cultural background, the intersubjective dimension of social life, 
is that it is anything but `background'. The fact that the intertextual comment is 
structured by this taken for granted suggests it has a far more active and `extratextual' 
symbolic character (indicating the way the text is `done', received) than is traditionally 
allowed by, for example, the Schutzian model of the taken for granted as `we-ness'. This 




that can be drawn upon in guiding the 
construction of social order (Schutz, op. cit., p. 7ff). In this discussion, the taken for 
granted is seen not so much as a bank of disembodied cultural constructs, but rather as 
embodied in social relations, structures or systems through which individuals act and are 
constituted. That is, intersubjectivity is embodied because the culture is always practised. 
The connotative, symbolic character of the taken for granted is extratextual in this sense 
of active embodiment. 
Ricoeur and Semiotics: From Metaphor to Metaphysics 
So far, connotation has been discussed in relation to its systematising function and, via 
metaphor, as a means of characterising the production of meaning coherence in the social 
world. The discussion now turns to examine the linguistic processes through which 
connotation functions within the metaphorical image. Needless to say, it will be argued 
that the mechanisms of language involved here are not purely linguistic in some abstract 
sense but have a materialist side too. Hence, understanding the working of metaphor will 
also serve to illuminate the brief account of Laclau's views on the symbolic constitution 
of social formations via connotation. 
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However, Laclau's typification of discourse in terms of a syntagmatic combination and 
paradigmatic displacement is challenged by Ricoeur's suggestion (see below) that these 
are not the separate processes indicated in Saussure and Jakobson. Rather, Ricoeur 
suggests, displacement involves combination; when one terms stands for another, it does 
so only by taking on the meaning given to the first term by its language context, not the 
meaning due to one free-standing sign/signification replacing another. On this view, the 
resultant is a displacement made possible through the acknowledgement that the limits of 
its role are determined by the meaning context, the context of utterance. 
In his analysis of language, Riceour (1986, p. 4) crucially distinguishes between (a) a 
semiotics, where the word as it stands in isolation is treated as being governed by lexical 
codes for its connotative value, for example, the connotative codes given in `ordinary 
usage'; (b) a semantics, where the sentence is taken to be the bearer of the minimum unit 
of complete meaning. Ricoeur argues that a problem with structural and poststructural 
linguistics is that it does not distinguish between semiotics and semantics, or more 
precisely, it considers such a distinction to be improper and reductively pursues a 
`monism of the sign' (ibid., pp. 101-2,124). 
Ricoeur (op. cit., p. 66) further suggests that different theories of metaphor parallel the 
semiotic and semantic approaches to meaning referred to above. These are respectively 
the substitution and interaction theories. In an interactive view of metaphor, meaning 
depends on an interaction between proper and figurative meaning. Ricoeur argues that 
this is relevant at the level of discourse because at this level of language denotation or 
reference to objects takes place. The substitution approach, on the other hand, operates at 
the level of the movement or displacement of meaning within words. The substitution 
theory is valid, it is argued, because isolated words do remain effective carriers of 
meaning, that is, they have a rhetorical effect [power of sedimented meanings]. 
However, the significance of semiotic theories of meaning is limited to this. Semiotic 
meaning proves to be a kind of shorthand for other meaning-generating processes. 
Ricoeur (op. cit., p. 217) argues that a more productive approach is to look at the function 
which a statement as a whole carries in relation to producing meaning in the individual 
word. 
A further move in this argument is to oppose the suggestion found in Derridean 
linguistics that all language is figurative; that the distinction between figurative and 
proper meaning in language use is illegitimate and therefore that reference has no 
stability. The criticism here is that Derrida's (1974, p. 31) argument that proper or literal 
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meaning is really `dead metaphor' and hence smuggles in something unsaid, invisible, 
mistakes the role of the proper. ' 
In denotation, following the Frege-Dummett perspective, for a moment, the literal or 
proper does not itself denote, but rather provides a linguistic formulation, a convention 
through which meaning can be framed within the context in which a conversation occurs. 
Hence, what is denoted depends on the context of utterance, rather than literal 
description. The literal, descriptive phrase as convention, sedimented meaning is already 
articulated in the context of utterance, and hence predicated. 
The crucial break with tradition here is that the subject and its predicate do not exist in 
linguistic practice as separate entities 
- 
there is no proper per se. Their separation is a 
consequence of our abstractional abilities. Consequently, there is nothing invisible about 
the dead metaphor, it takes its meaning from the context of utterance, not in platonic 
isolation. Why the literal as convention is seen as separate is a question of reification and 
as such falls amongst many others. In sum, semiotics, as the treatment of terms in 
isolation from context of use, ignores the interdependence of conventional and 
metaphorical meaning. 
As against the reductiveness of the semiotic account of meaning, Ricoeur (op. cit., p. 34) 
cites Aristotle's view that metaphor represents a process of actualisation, the coming to 
be of a genus, not a transcendental reality. The contrast here is between language as an 
autonomous sign system 
- 
which must itself raise questions about invisible moving forces 
-and language as discursive practice, language as activity which goes beyond language 
itself to express a coming-into-being; here metaphor is both mimesis and (poetic- 
creative) phusis (ibid., pp. 42-3). 
Following this brief summary of Ricoeur's views on metaphor, it will pay to examine 
some of his arguments around connotation more closely. 
Ricoeur and Substitution: Jakobson, Laclau, Mouffe 
Ricoeur (op. cit., p. 177) notes that the post-Saussurian Jakobson's (1971) work splits 
types of linguistic process into an opposition between metonymy and metaphor. His work 
on the language disorder area of aphasia showed that these processes could function 
independently. In one aphasic disorder, people found difficulty in showing that one kind 
of thing was like another. In another sort of aphasia, substituting terms for each other 
could be achieved but the trope of continuity in speech, the successful linking of 
Derrida, following Heidegger, holds that metaphor, and hence all language, is metaphysical being 
motivated by an invisible transcendental signified (Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 34). 
75 
thoughts, disappeared. Jakobson (op. cit., p. 243) concluded that the metonymic processes 
of association in the unfolding of a speech act were independent of those processes 
related to use of simile. Ricoeur argues that although it may be true that these tropes of 
language operate independently, it does not follow that the logical structure of the two 
processes is completely different. 
Ricoeur notes that whilst Jakobson uses a traditional definition of metaphor as 
substitution of one term by another with which it is connected by similarity, a parallel 
structure could be discerned in metonymic processes such as the association of words, 
sentences or parts of a sentence. This could be described as `a substitution of names' 
(ibid., p. 179). An example of this would be Jakobson's own illustration of metonymy 
taken from Tolstoy's War and Peace, where the term `bare shoulders' comes to stand for 
`women at a ball'. 
On the other hand, quoting Jakobson on the essence of metaphor as presenting `an idea 
under the sign of another idea that is more striking or better known', Ricoeur argues that 
this `procedure consist[s] as much in combining as in substituting' (ibid., p. 180). Hence, 
it is not clear that the substituting function of language can be isolated from the 
combinative (metonymic) function. It is unsatisfactory to accept Jacobson's view that 
`the meaning of a sign is the sign it can be translated into'; that, in sum, meaning is 
obtained when `we substitute signs'. However, Saussure'c notion of paradigm offers a 
link with Ricoeur's position here in that the paradigmatic level of language illustrates 
how combination works in a structural linguistics 
- 
the possible combinations of terms 
under a conceptual sign. 
Ricoeur (op. cit., pp. 129-31) goes on to argue, following Benveniste (1971), that meaning 
occurs in a context, that words acquire meaning via discourse, work, institutionalisation. 
This reduces the polysemy or play of meaning and enables speakers to have semantic 
compatibility, to share a common meaning and hence pick out, identify, refer to, things. 
The idea of a discursive context suggests that meaning occurs where something is said 
about something else and that meaning cannot be reduced beyond this to the level of 
signs standing on their own. In other words, meaning always requires a subject and a 
predicate, as follows: `The sky [subject] is blue' [predicate]. This is not simply a 
combination of names because there is a connotative force between `sky' and `blue'. 
Whilst the connotation is clear in this sentence, in others it may not be. For example, 
there is no such meaning overlap in `The key was left at the house on the corner, ' taken 
as such. Now, if the structuralist, semiotic approach were taken in this instance, the 
sentence or its elements would be seen in isolation and the connections would appear to 
be purely metonymic/contingent. However, a way round this would be to view the 
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sentence as part of a text or discourse where its elements can take on resonant meanings. 
If the house on the corner is occupied by a friend of the person who has left the key and 
picking up the key is an accepted practice as a means of access to another house for 
people who have been informed of the statement, then `key' and `house on the corner' 
have some meaning overlap. Hence, within the context of a bundle of other statements, 
there is a connotative overdetermination of the first statement which consequently 
functions metaphorically. 
From this contextualisation of a statement it would seem that language in general 
functions metaphorically. That is, apart from its conventional sense, any statement must 
also be seen as semantically overdetermined by a field of connotations. Hence, according 
to the Frege-Dummett view (Dummett, op. cit., p. 177), the sentential context constitutes 
a field of reference and by over-determining the conventional meaning of its subject 
(name) the sentence picks out a state of affairs, a reality. The tendency to identify literal 
or proper meaning with the denotative reference, is, notes Frege, a mistake (ibid., p. 57). 
This goes some way towards the semiotic rejection of reference. However, Frege's point 
is not that reference cannot reach beyond language but that to describe or pick out a state 
of affairs requires the overdetermination of conventional meaning of the subject/name by 
sentential sense, the plurality of nuances present in the context of utterance. 
Hence, the work of Benveniste and Frege might amplify the point made by Ricoeur that 
the determination of meaning works ultimately at the level of text or discourse. 
To summarise: whatever the interaction between different processes in language, it can 
be said for the sentence, as for the semiotic juxtaposition of terms, that a metaphorical 
relation exists between the elements. In other words, one element stands for, displaces, 
the other, but does not exhaust its meaning. In both cases the metaphorical force owes 
something to a wider context of signs and statements, that is, they comprise a field of 
connotation vis-ä-vis the metaphor. 
If we move on to the question of reference raised by Frege we find that whilst the account 
of discursivity in Laclau (1987) and Laclau and Mouffe (1989) at the beginning seems to 
be an advance on previous accounts of the coherence of ideologies or discourses, it also 
suffers the weaknesses of Foucauldian, and post-Saussurian structuralism in that it cannot 
move beyond names and meaning conventions. The consequence of this semiotic 
perspective is that any denotative function of language is collapsed into the metaphorical- 
connoting function; there is no discursive context of metaphor within which the latter can 
refer, no distinction ä la Frege (1952, pp. 57-8), between sense and reference. It is 
therefore now appropriate to examine how these two functions may be distinguished in 
language. That is, Ricoeur's argument that the metaphoricity of language does not 
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preclude a denoting, identifying function will be pursued through a classic statement of 
the compatibility of non-literal and denotative functions. 
The Theory of Descriptions 
Russell's (1973) Theory of Descriptions indicates two types of non-contradictory 
function in a sentence, the metaphorical functioning of language and the denotative or 
identifying function. This contrasts with Laclau's semiotic approach where metaphorical 
evocation of meaning is the key element and the possibility of reference or aboutness of 
discourse is undermined by the lack of a meaning context showing how language is used. 
By contrast, in following Russell, it is possible to delineate a classifying, denoting 
function within the sentential structure without loss of metaphoricity in the context of 
utterance. 
Russell looks at the way descriptive phrases (names) work within a statement to refer or 
denote. He argues that if we accept the traditional idea of denotation, that first there is a 
conceptual object which we then subject to classification, then the result is a kind of 
Platonism or nominalism, where we subordinate reality to our concepts. As we have 
suggested, semiotic meanings, fixed within binary oppositions come to exemplify this 
both in their structuralist and poststructuralist variants (see Chapter 6). To support his 
criticism of nominalism, Russell looks at the paradoxes which arise if we assume the 
traditional position that referring is the straightforward business described above, that is, 
subject and predicate are firstly separate and then brought together in an act of 
predication. The paradoxes can be illustrated as follows. Suppose we are set the task of 
deriving as many words as possible from the formulation `Chinese New Year', then 
someone might suggest adding `Chinese New Year' to the list. If Chinese New Year is 
taken as one of the permutations in the class of words derivable then it contains all the 
other permutations, so it cannot be one of the permutations. On the other hand, if Chinese 
New Year is not a permutation of itself then it contains all the permutations, which 
includes itself. Therefore it is a member of itselff? 
For Russell, the solution to such paradoxes lies in the nature of descriptive (denoting) 
phrases. Descriptions like `Chinese New Year' or `the author of Waverley', Russell 
(1973, pp. 105,108 f. 2) argues, `never have any meaning in themselves'. They do not 
designate an individual (entity) directly. They carry a meaning only by virtue of the 
symbolic (propositional) context. Hence, the descriptive phrases like `the round square' 
or `the golden mountain', although metaphorical, do not involve a contradiction between, 
This illustration is inspired by Monk's account of the `class of all classes' paradox which taxed 
Russell over a period of years and to which the Theory of Descriptions offered a solution (Monk, 
1996, pp. 182-3). 
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for example, `mountain' (separate subject) and `golden' (separate predicate) because the 
subject-predicate relationship does not comprise two separate entities. Frege (Carl, 1994, 
pp. 63-6), on whom Russell is relying here for the denotation-meaning distinction, 
remarked that we mistake the syntax of subject-predicate for the more liberal way 
subjects are actually formed. Concepts are not separate objects. Rather there is one entity, 
that which is identified, denoted by the sentential context of the statement. Hence 
concepts used in utterances are situated by the context and in referring via the sentence 
do not have a conventional or abstract meaning. 
Russell (op. cit., p. 105) argues that ultimately statements depend for their ability to 
denote something on definite descriptions, e. g. `the author of Waverley' which in 
conjunction with a proper name, e. g. `Scott', identify an individual. Here, the meaning of 
the proper name `Scott' is not determined by the words of the statement `Scott is the 
author of Waverley' itself, but by knowing to whom the name is applied. The meaning of 
the utterance depends on our being acquainted directly with its basic, implicit claims, for 
example, who Scott is. Therefore in the Theory of Descriptions, Russell had come to 
acknowledge that descriptions on their own were not logical entities which denoted, but 
only became meaningful in terms of the sentential context of their use (Monk, 1996, 
p. 182). 4 This included forms of taken for granted knowledge, `knowledge by 
acquaintance', or what phenomenologists might refer to as background assumptions. ' 
Denotation, Connotation and the Place of Contradiction 
Now as we have seen, the Theory of Descriptions suggests that it is possible to have both 
denotative and connotative functions in discourse without engendering some kind of 
contradiction and incoherence in reference itself 
- 
although we can maintain a place for 
contradiction, nevertheless. Dummett's (op. cit., p. 177) elaboration of this Fregean 
tradition suggests that there are two forms of reference in the sentential utterance: that the 
sentence expresses a state of affairs, and hence we might suppose, with all its 
contradictions; it also denotes or picks out an object, event, etc., that is, has referential 
capacity. 
4 Russell is thought to owe this insight to the U. S. mathematician Maxime Böcher, who wrote to him 
`I cannot admit that a class is in itself an entity 
... 
the "class as one [class itself" is merely a symbol, 
a name which we may choose at pleasure' (Monk, op. cit., p. 183). 
5 As he took Frege's `sense' to be a kind of object, Russell rejected that aspect (sense determines 
reference) of Frege's argument about denotation, believing it would lead to a form of idealism. He 
substituted knowledge by acquaintance, direct, uncogitated knowing, as a way of grounding abstract 
knowledge in direct apprehension of things (Dummett, op. cit., pp. 130-132). It is possible to 
interpret this as a kind of phenomenological position where what is `bracketed' or taken for granted 
knowledge provides a context for denotation. 
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Language is the site of contradiction, in that the sense of an utterance 
- 
the state of affairs 
expressed 
- 
can be articulated in different ways (Russell, op. cit., p. 108), and so come to 
be embodied in different statements which contest its referential import by picking out 
different objects. Any one statement has itself, however, a clear (non-contradictory) 
denotative potential (loc. cit. ). This obviously has consequences for how we view the 
rationality of everyday life and its discourses, as these discourses will consequently not 
just include myth, stereotypes, ossified practice but will contain denotative potential. 
Hence, our sense of the epistemological status of everyday language will have to be 
revised. 
The valorisation of overtly metaphorical language as a site of contestation over reference 
enables us to see metaphor as the condensation of different fields of reference, and hence 
connotation, and therefore to incorporate the semiotic concerns around contradiction 
(condensation/ displacement). However, the state of affairs expressed in metaphorical 
language is expressed via the situated use of language, and this takes us further than 
semiotics can travel on its own. This is because the meaningfulness (coherence) of 
language rests on a capacity to pick out states of affairs rather than on a sign user's 
substitution of signs according to predetermined meaning conventions; the meaning of 
`Scott' in `Scott is the author of Waverley' rested not on the words of the statement itself, 
but on the sense given by context, which tells us to whom the name is applied. It is this 
anchoring of reference in the meaning context of signification which can, in Frege's 
(Carl, op. cit., p. 53) terms, break the power of words. 
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Chapter 5: Sense and Reference: the Everyday as Basis and 
Critique of Classification Systems 
The aim of this chapter is to examine a variety of notions of sense and reference, ranging 
from Husserl's phenomenology through to recent views on representation in cultural 
studies. The implications of these positions for establishing an account of 
intersubjectivity are investigated. 
Husserl and the Life-world 
For Husserl, the activities of everyday life are characterised as the domain of the life- 
world (Lebenswelt). This is seen as a realm of pre-theoretical life out of which science is 
constructed by abstraction from everyday beliefs. The life-world is revealed to us by a 
process of bracketing (epoche) of our taken for granted beliefs about the world ('natural 
attitude') (Husserl, 1970, p. 135). As with Frege (see below), an attempt is made to isolate 
noema or pure meanings, however, Frege locates the objectivity of meaning in actual 
language structures (Dummett, op. cit., p. 54) whilst Husserl lapses into 
transcendentalising the real and hence making it accessible only via psychologistic means 
(ibid., p. 59). 
Hence for Husserl (op. cit., p. 50), the life-world is the original ground of all theoretical 
and practical life 
- 
the immediately intuited world; it is the world actually given through 
perception. Hence it is a pre-cognitive domain (`of things unknown'), it is open-ended 
unlike the self-referencing, `closed' abstractions and idealities of theory (loc. cit., f. 9d). 
In the world of theory, on the other hand, Husserl follows Galileo's mathematical 
methodology, which produces idealisations from empirical knowledge, implies the 
perfection of knowledge, and so departs from empirical reality (ibid., p. 121). 
The Cartesian pre-given ego is the starting point for Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity. 
The world is given in experience to the individual subject who then transforms it via the 
categories of logic and language into an intersubjective form. The problem this raises for 
Husserl is how consciousness can recognise the reality conveyed by pure experience. The 
implication here is that language structures are already given for the individual subject 
and therefore that experience itself already takes the form of a categorial intuition (ibid., 
No. vi, Chapter 8). Now the present argument is that whilst Husserl is right to suggest 
that experience, and hence the Lebensivelt, is a categori alised,. discursive entity, he fails 




subject. Husserl also seems 
correct in characterising experience as bivalent: on the one hand it is private and unique 
in the sense that it is given to individuals, but at the same time it embodies social 
categories such as language and logic. Hence, a dual moment of connection or 
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intersubjectivity and individualisation of social beings would seem to be required. The 
sticking point for Husserl here would be the requirement for non-individual' 
intersubjective location of ideas. This goes against his insistence on the primacy of 
individual consciousness. The necessity of the latter claim for Husserl resides in his 
establishment of consciousness itself as the ground of intersubjectivity. It follows that 
intersubjectivity must be located within individual consciousness (Husserl, 1960, p. 104). 
Thus the individual appears to be both the substance/content and ground of knowledge 
-a 
move which guarantees the unity of the individual subject, but at the expense of ignoring 
the fragmentary, decentered character of experience. 
Hence Husserl faces the same problems that bedevilled Descartes, that is, the pitfalls of 
mind-body dualism. Husserl's reply to the question `How can one know the other? ' is 
that this can only occur by analogy. One can only know the other by drawing parallels 
with one's own bodily states. The fact that the subject itself requires an already 
categorialised experience which forms the basis of linguistic practices and hence 
knowledge/individual consciousness, is passed over in the attempt to preserve the 
integrity of the subject. 
The unity of the subject is effected transcendentally, that is, in the realm of pure 
experience (and transcendental phenomenology). Consequently, Husserl sacrifices the 
whole of material nature; he refuses to accept the structure of reality as it is given in 
experience prior to epoche as intersubjectively valid and thereby loses a point of 
reference in the real world. However, as Habermas (1970, p. 40) notes, the importance of 
Husserl for the development of a theory of intersubjectivity lies in his identification of 
the life-world as the basis of theoretical knowledge: 
the possible objects of scientific knowledge have already constituted themselves beforehand in 
the phenomena which our common-sense world [Lebensivelt] takes for granted 
... 
Thus Husserl 
wishes to show that this active subjectivity is lost sight of under the cover of an objectivist 
taking-things-for granted... 
albeit that Husserl wishes to reinstate this contemplative posture at the level of pure 
experience! The important point then is that Husserl has broken with reflection or 
correspondence theories of knowledge (and reference) at the empirical level. That is to 
say, if his position here is followed through, it entails giving up the traditional or classical 
view of knowledge and reference wherein ideas are a copy of an external reality. The 
theme of reference will be expanded later in the section on language and classification. 
The work of Alfred Schutz (cf. The Phenomenology of the Social World, and Chapter 2 
of this work, for instance) takes up Husserl's view that in the empirical world theoretical 
knowledge is intersubjectively founded. Schutz's writing develops the application of 
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Husserl's ideas to the social world, but whereas Husserl was concerned with theorising 
the possibility of pure experience and the bracketing (epoche) of the taken-for-granted 
everyday world, Schutz (1970a) brackets the concern with pure experience and 
concentrates on the characteristics of the everyday world. 
Unfortunately, Schutz reproduces Husserl's Cartesian view of the empirical world, where 
he divides the Other into knowable object (for me) and unknowable subject. 
My unknown neighbour in the subway is defined by my knowing him as being in New York, 
travelling in such and such a direction, reading his newspaper... the objectified Other 
is.. 
. 
determined by the total organisation of my world, of which he is an autonomous but intra- 
mundane center. This distinguishes the Other as an object from the Other as a subject. Only 
the former can be known to me as a co-extensive totality within the world. The latter can never 
be an object of any kind of knowledge, and the objects of the world do not refer to him; he 
transcends the world... ' (Schutz, 1967, p. 190). 
The major difficulty with this perspective is that it assumes a pre-given `me', a centre in 
terms of which `the world' is then organised but for whose pre-existing unity there is no 
explanation. 
Habermas 
Another application of the Husserlian life-world perspective is found in the work of 
Jurgen Habermas. However, whilst Husserl links objectivity with transcendental 
consciousness, Habermas sees intersubjectivity as operating through the structures of 
language and communication after the manner of Husserl's categorial intuition of pure 
experience. In Habermas the categories of communication provide the deep (ideal) 
structures of objective knowledge, whilst for Husserl such categorial intuitions are non- 
objective because they belong to the experiential life-world (out of which ideal structures 
of knowledge must somehow be created). 
Habermas (1970, p. 48) rejects the ontology implicit in the Husserlian project and argues 
that objectivity can be situated in an elucidation of the conditions under which 
communication can be effective, that is, the `free dialogue of all with all' is the condition 
of `a mutually formed self-identity'. However, all knowledge claims are interest-based, 
and intersubjectivity replaces subjectivity in a dualism of objective world v. knowledge 
as Komesaroff (1986, p. 363) argues. Habermas's emphasis on the ability of individuals 
to apply intersubjective `depth grammar' in their interactions illustrates the extent to 
which the life-world in Habermas is accessible to individual consciousness, and 
therefore, as with Husserl, appears as an extension of the latter rather than something 
qualitatively different. In a similar vein (and category mistake), the validity claims made 
in communication belong at the same time to the worlds of individual consciousness and 
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intersubjectivity as they are geared to intersubjective recognition (my emphasis 
- 
H. F. ) if 
their rationality is to be upheld (Habermas, 1991, p. 314). 
Furthermore, speakers' utterances relate to `something in the objective world, something 
in a common social world and something in his [sic] own subjective world' (ibid., 
pp. 313-4). Hence, intersubjectivity is still counterposed to an ideal or objective domain 
beyond it. These illustrations bear out the suggestion above, that for Habermas 
intersubjectivity and subjectivity seem to be functionally interchangeable, whilst it has 
been the case of the present author that the intersubjective world is the social world. 
As with Husserl, Habermas's argument assumes that the subject predates or anticipates 
the world of which it must be an interactive and therefore mutually constitutive element. 
The conditions of its possibility can only be given in interaction and yet it somehow 
already knows the interactive process. 
Everyday Objects: The Irredeemably Contextual Nature of Reference 
Now Frege's approach to meaning is implicitly a theory of intersubjectivity, that is, its 
`context principle' illuminates the issue of shared meaning as a basis for the 
communicability of statements. ' In contrast to the earlier Husserl who located meaning 
ultimately in the transcendental consciousness of individual minds by a process of 
bracketing out the background cultural aspects, Frege locates meaning via the context 
principle in his discussion of fixing the references of numerical terms in the Gnindlagen 
(Dummett, op. cit., pp. 424-5). He rejects the idea that the sense of utterances about 
numerical terms must reflect fixed references for numbers, in favour of only arriving at a 
reference for numbers as an outcome of sentential context. Hence sentential utterances 
only work via an understanding of their constituent meanings/senses, how they are 
articulated within the utterance and how the whole of that relates to the present context, 
that within which the utterance takes place (ibid., p. 444). Hence meaning is something 
irredeemably shared. He reinforces this point by stressing that the senses of utterances are 
not events in individual consciousnesses, that is not mental contents. Rather they are 
objective entities, which in Dummett's reading arise in the process of picking out objects 
in our utterances, that is, the sense of an utterance is given by the manner in which or, the 
practice of, identifying its object (ibid., pp. 444-5). The idea that reference can be fixed a 
priori, that is, that a name stands for an object without reference to context of shared 
meanings is to invoke a vicious circularity where the question of what an utterance picks 
out becomes undecidable. 
It is important to note that Dummett's use of the term `intersubjectivity' is quite different from the 
present meaning. Rather than a world of (shared) senses, for Dummett it implies a disembodied 
world of shared meanings or experiences as in Lotze's view (op. cit., pp. 393-4). 
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The emphasis in Dummett's interpretation of Frege is on linguistic practice, rather than 
the (rhetorical) effects of names or language per se. 
[Frege's] context principle expressly denies that there can be any grasp of the reference of a 
name antecedently to an ability to understand or use sentences containing it: it is only in the 
context of a sentence that a name even has a reference (ibid., p. 347). 
Dummett (op. cit., p. 461) points out that even in cases of what appear to be a 
straightforward referral to objects, the empirical `this is one of those' type of statement, 
reference is still a hermeneutic event. Such a reference 
involves a description of the most basic layer of language, that in which demonstratives play 
an essential role, which... is a complex matter; we cannot explain what it is to treat a name as 
standing for an object of a certain kind without explaining what it is to identify an object of 
that kind. 
This grasping the sense of an utterance is accomplished in the manner described above 
and involves, in Dummett's view, the distribution of a mental act beyond the individual 
mind to encompass the context, thus demonstrating its objectivity (loc. cit. ). 
Dummett's notion of objectivity here is tied into the way context informs `the most basic 
layer of language' and this returns us to Husserl's theme that knowledge is founded in the 
everyday. The indexical nature of the basic layer of language contains all those routinised 
events and processes, the everyday dimension of communication which can operate more 
or less independently of explicit knowledge claims. Dummett (op. cit., pp. 445-6) shows 
via Wittgenstein's examples that people can function communicatively by grasping the 
sense of affairs under discussion 
- 
language use itself is a prime case of this. They may or 
may not be able to make explicit reference to the processes in hand. Denotative reference 
therefore follows from grasping the sense of events, but not vice versa. The explicit 
identification of objects 
- 
empirical or otherwise 
- 
depends in the first place on the most 
basic level of language, the sphere where routinisation renders reference opaque. The 
point here is that the denotative, propositional expression of reference remains tied to the 
sentential context where it arises as it shares the same sense. ' The descriptive phrases or 
names of the utterance are articulated within this context and their explicit or 
conventionalised content is therefore determined by the shared contextual knowledge 
implicit within the sentence. 
The (propositional) definition of an indexical expression contains the sense of the latter. This is, 
Dummett (op. cit., p. 340) argues, because we arrive at its truth in the same way as we do for the 
expression itself. The overall sense of the propositional utterance will be different from that of the 
expression it defines, however, because the latter is only a component of the utterance, which by 
containing it, employs it in a particular way, situates it in a new context. The key point here though 
is that the sense of the indexical expression is preserved, not reduced to its reformulation. This 
guarantees the primacy of meaning context over epistemic assimilation in the Hegelian manner. 
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The conception of knowledge development entailed here differs sharply from Hegel's 
aufhebung or positive negation in that for Hegel, a new more developed expression of 
consciousness encompasses previous stages and they cease to exist independently, there 
is no remainder in this process. The pivotal role played by senses between context and 
denotative reference ensures that past references are not subsumed or reinscribed in this 
way but become sedimented within present utterances as articulations within their overall 
structure. 
Attempts to `free' non-empirical references from their `everyday' senses because they do 
not refer in any obvious way to an object, but rather something less tangible or coherent 
(Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 221ff) are doomed to fail, as Dummett argues even for the case of 
arithmetical numbers. Ricoeur's (op. cit., p. 230) suggestion that in such cases reference is 
incoherent confuses the aspects of how reference is achieved (giving sense) with the 
incoherence of the object referred to (reference). Literary or other manifestly 
metaphorical topics would constitute abstract objects (and none the less real for that, if 
they `made sense') whose nature could be described via a hermenutics of the context, 
which would elucidate their everyday articulations with explicit content. Giving abstract 
objects a separate sense from that of context would merely serve to perpetuate a circular 
process where conversants could not appeal to a common context. 
The question of everyday as critique is a culmination of the foregoing considerations in 
that everyday functioning involves grasping senses of topics if not their objectified 
forms. It involves (actively) making sense. We turn now to examine this trope of 
communication. 
A Critique of Discursive Classification in Laclau and Mouffe 
The stress of discourse-orientated approaches, such as that of Foucault, is on the 
employment of language as a tool of subjection, and both its theoretical and reflexive 
characteristics are ignored. Cultural commentators including Foucault, Laclau and 
Mouffe emphasise only the instrumental capacity of language as a form of power. The 
possibility of subjects acting as conscious rational agents is neglected. However, this 
latter point is also levelled against earlier phenomenological commentators such as 
Schutz, in their use of the concept `everyday life' (cf. Heller, 1984, xi-xii). 
Whilst the rationality of individuals goes unrecognised, discourse theorists nevertheless 
examine the patterned features of discourses and their articulation. Laclau (1989, 
p. 105ff), for example, sees discourses as constituted out of an articulation of elements, 
the different spheres of social practice 
- 
familial, educational, economic, etc. The 
articulation represents a `moment', a degree of fixity, in which the elements are 
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configured or patterned such that the configuration has an overall logic of its own in 
which the elements connote each other to the exclusion of other symbolic entities, those 
not configured within the symbolic formation of, for example, a particular ideology. 
Now, arguably, such discursive formations constitute particulars in the classical 
Leibnizian sense of `active principles of unity' (Hacking, 1970, p. 146ff). They represent 
a bundle of predicates unified by a common logic, and as such constitute a material form 
of force. 
However, whilst such discursive-material entities populate the social world, they 
themselves contain other material entities, Laclau argues. He gives the example of the 
process of building. The linguistic practices involved are as material as are the bricks 
themselves: discourse consists of `diverse material elements' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989, 
p. 108). He notes that there is a `prejudice' about the `mental character of discourse' and 
wishes to `affirm the material character of every discursive structure'. Further, `What 
constitutes a differential position [within a discourse] and therefore a relational identity, 
is not the idea of building stone or slab, but the building stone or slab as such' (loc. cit. ). 
Hence Laclau's use of `ideas' does not carry the weight of being materially discursive 
which is suggested by his comments on the materiality of articulations of discursive 
practices, and in fact it reproduces the mind-body problem within discourse. The 
difficulty lies in the assimilating of physically extended things such as slabs, to a world 
of discursive or ideational features, because in doing so the writers make an elision 
between physically extended things and `the material'. Now Collier (1991, pp. 89-90) has 
argued that ideas and physically extended attributes of things are not to be treated as 
separate entities, but as attributes of the same thing. The brick, for example, already has a 
sedimented meaning as, for example, building block/unit, prior to articulation within a 
specific discourse. Further, the physically extended attribute and the idea, of the brick, for 
example, are not assimilated to the same causal situations because they represent 
different attributes of matter and such an assimilation would involve a category mistake. 
For example, we cannot drop an idea on our toes, although we can appreciate or wrestle 
with it. 
With this in mind let us return to Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse. The function 
of `idea' in the building process example is as a reflection of the real thing, the slab, 
which is seen as a non-discursive content of discourse! Hence ideas revert to their 
traditional function as separate from and, as in correspondence theories, constituting 
mental reflections of matter. The re-emergence of dualism in Laclau and Mouffe's 
discourse theory is not accidental to their project, because they fail to accept that 
materiality of ideas gives them an `independent', that is, non-subjectivised existence and 
this leads them to treat physical entities as non-discursive because a discursive existence 
would subjectivise them! 
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In sum, the theory is too parsimonious and fails to account for the reality of sedimented 
meanings. In terms of Dummett's context principle, the theory attributes names directly 
to objects without consideration of the mediating sense in the meaning context, which, in 
the Frege-Dummett approach, has its own material efficacy. 
Language or Communicative Practice?: A Constitutive Ambiguity in 
Cultural Commentary 
The role of meaning in contemporary cultural analysis tends to oscillate between a 
semiotic, pre-given structure of signification and a more phenomenological, negotiated, 
contextual, layered conception. The influence of Laclau and Mouffe is substantial in Hall 
(ed. ) (1997) and du Gay (ed. ) (1997), but the counterpoint to this is some context 
- 
technological tradition, diasporic sedimentation, etc. Du Gay's (1997) study of the 
origins and uses of the Walkman is a classic illustration of the importance of a particular 
tradition to the process of `making sense'. Hall's (Rutherford ed., 1990; Woodward ed., 
1997)) account of language transmission through diaspora is likewise seminal. 
On the other hand, the semiotics of language tend, themselves, to get decontextualised. In 
this mode, language inclines to take off on its own. For example, in arguing for a 
Foucauldian perspective, Hall (1997, p. 44) notes: 
By discourse Foucault meant a group of statements which provide a language for talking about 
-a way of representing the knowledge about -a particular topic at a particular historical 
moment... Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language... 
Discourse tends to be about `language', `classification', construction of objects, writing 
- 
or the inscription of discourse on bodies. In Foucault, for example, `the body' is 
`radically historicized', 
a sort of surface on which different regimes of power/knowledge write their meanings and 
effects. It thinks of the body as totally imprinted by history (Hall, in Hall ed., 1997, p. 51). 
Here language is already sedimented meaning, never the moment at which meaning 
comes to be via language use. As Hall further notes, for Derrida `writing always leads to 
more writing' (ibid., p. 42), that is an on-going process of the dissemination of meaning. 
In Derrida's terms, meaning is always retreating from us, always already sedimented, a 
transcendental signified, rather than seen as incarnated in the moment of its actualisation. 
Again, Hall presenting Foucault's account of madness: 
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[it was] constituted by all that was said, in all the statements that named it, divided it up, 
described it, explained it, traced its development, indicated its various correlations, judged it, 
and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its 
own (Foucault, 1972, in Hall, op. cit., p. 46). 
Finally, following Lacau and Mouffe (1990. pp. 102-3), Hall (op. cit., p. 47) argues that a 
stone may be a projectile or a piece of sculpture, depending on the type of discourse it 
enters, and that it has no meaning beyond its positioning within discourse. Now Dummett 
has argued that the constituents of utterances carry their own senses given by previous 
context of utterance, sedimented within the present utterance. Hence the objects or topics 
referred to in previous enunciation are incorporated in current communication. In this 
crucial respect, although the parsimony of representation theory disallows it, meaning 
certainly exists outside discourse. That is, the names given to objects in discourse 
theories supposedly refer directly and not via the context, as there is no term to represent 
contextual meaning over and against conventional meaning. 
Now, as argued above and in Chapter 4, theories of direct referencing (via conventional 
meanings) produce insuperable difficulties for establishing the meaning of objects. As 
above, establishing the name of the object involves an infinite regress of appeal via 
reference to other objects in a chain of definition or substitution of terms as there is no 
shared meaning context to arbitrate what the object is, referentially. 
Further, Russell's (1973, p. 109) Paradox establishes that to consider names and objects, 
as per subject and predicate, to be separate entities results in a contradiction. That is, in 
order to be named, an object must already be recognised as coming under the name and 
conversely, if the object already has the name then it cannot come under the name. This 
demonstrated to Russell and others (cf. Monk, 1996) that the traditional view of naming 
was seriously flawed, or in our view, too parsimonious. 
The Everyday as Interruption and Transfiguration 
Whilst the consideration of meaning as conventional meaning in Foucault and Derrida 
(see above), that is, as something sutured from the act of utterance conveys a particular 
impression of sedimentation, that is, as routine and repetition, it is important to see how 
such `dead' meaning is reconfigured. That is, the invisible context can be brought to 
illuminate and revivify `dead' names, etc. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 61ff), from the point 
of view of a theory of perception, describes a kind of Gestalt process through which 
mundane objects take on new meanings. This is the moment of object-in-context, the 
moment in which we see how everything comes together. 
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Hence, although names and phrases can be routinely articulated in a kind of repetitive 
praxis (Heller, 1984), sometimes such conventional meanings can be dramatically 
transfigured by articulation with another context and sense. This represents a conjunction 
of different routines. A useful example in `everyday' culture is the graffiti commentator 
who modifies adverts. In one such case on the London Underground, a poster advertising 
the performance-boosting properties of a vitamin potion had the addendum `It gets you 
working' which transforms the connotative field from that of individual unlimited 
performance, with its associations of health and fitness, to that of an employee producing 
more work output for an organisational superior. All this is achieved by rearticulating the 
name `performance' to a different meaning context. 
Hence the peculiar nature of the everyday is that one routine series of events can convey 
a new understanding by its insertion into a different context of routines. ' The essential 
point here is that the articulation constitutes an interruption of routine or convention in 
which we are able to see the routine event in context, i. e. to grasp the sense of a new 
context of utterance which connects and makes visible the context of the 
conventionalised advertising phrase via its rearticulation. This moment of the mediation 
of reference via sense rather than other atomistic terms alone is missing from the semiotic 
and subsequent poststructuralist account of meaning and representation. 
Representation and the Emergence of Reference 
As argued above, the traditional reflectionist theories of reference or naming suggested 
that objects corresponded to, or were constructed by, their names. ' The alternative picture 
from within a phenomenological view is that the emergence of entities and names is 
coincident, that to have a name is also to have an object, real or imaginary, empirical or 
abstract (Dummett, op. cit., pp. 368-9). 
The fact that the types of discourse theory examined here relapse into the difficulties 
around referencing their objects which we have examined above should not, however, 
detract from the importance of their substantive cultural claims about, for example, the 
reorganisation of work in recent years. There are clearly institutional discourses bearing 
on the way subjects act and these are in turn located within wider networks or discursive 
Hence particular names or phrases can switch between background and foreground mode, 
suggesting novel meanings. Heidegger notes this peculiarity in Being and Tinte, when he describes 
everyday life both in terms of the routine sameness of events and `diversification' (cited in 
Osborne, 1995, p. 194). It is this quality of surprise implied by the latter that marks the revelatory 
quality of interruption. The everyday is then seen as the point of break or rupture in the 
everydayness of routine (Lefebvre, 1971, in Osborne, 1995, loc. cit. ). 
The view taken here is that objects only have names by means of denotative reference and that this 
depends on the meaning context of the utterances. Hence, the linguistic conventions/names in a 
sentence only become meaningful via the hermeneutics of denotative reference. 
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formations, which have the power to determine the way we think. ' The problem arises 
when we ask how this determination operates. The crux is: are names references 
- 
whether in the form of semiotic binary terms or otherwise? The difficulty discourse 
theorists have experienced in formulating a view as to resistance and contestation of 
meanings is symptomatic of the problem posed above. For reasons investigated here, a 
basis for resistance could only evolve from some ground which was not itself reducible to 
a definition of a term and yet the theorists have not identified such a discursive space. 
Dummett (op. cit., p. 157) poses an answer succinctly when he notes that sense 
determines reference. The shared contexts of meaning in which we operate with their 
shared ways of validating discursive claims are always that: they are shared 
understandings which are not reducible to the way individuals interpret conversational 
meaning, not coincident with any elaboration, definition, proposition about the 
conversational content. In his interpretation of social conflict, Merleau-Ponty similarly 
notes that it is of necessity based upon a communication of meaning; each understands 
the other 
- 
they are bound together intersubjectively in their encounter. ' 
The openness of sense to different, situated readings allows a terrain for the emergence of 
genuinely novel meanings and their objects. These are meanings marked by their 
conditions of production, the context of senses within which they arise. Thus, as 
Garfinkel notes, the context of enunciation is incorporated into what is said, objectified: 
In short, recognisable sense, or fact or methodic character, or impersonality, or objectivity of 
accounts are not independent of the socially organised occasion of their use. Their rational 
features consist of what members do with, what they make of the accounts... (op. cit., pp. 3-4). 
In other words, knowledge here has an irreducibly practical basis. In that case, one is left 
to account for the fetishistic conception of meaning entailed in the idea of naming 
discussed before and perhaps to situate it in the reformalisation or bureaucratisation of 
social practices consequent on the defeat of a way of doing things associated with the 
post-1945 settlement. Here the sheer power of discursively formulated information and 
its sedimentation leaves us with a wall of invisibility surrounding its articulated 
meanings. 
S Du Gay's (1997) discussion of Foucault's notion of governmentality is useful here, particularly in 
its references to self-regulation and its contemporary relation to discursive figures of `the 
entrepreneur'. 
6 Merleau-Ponty's (1992, p. 361) view is of a common (somewhat Heideggerian) ontological basis of 
subjects intersubjectively related by some form of contestation. This again, as otherwise in the F-D 
formulation, suggests an opening out of discursive structures to different interpretations of some 
common form of `being' or sense, which prevents a monopolisation of power/knowledge. 
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Nonetheless, we can see new meanings as referenced in communicative practices, that is, 
as actualised, made visible through these practices. As Dummett (op. cit., p. 461) notes, 
regarding the context principle, objects are picked out by a process in which we see how 
the senses of the constituent phrases of an utterance, its sedimented meanings, are 
articulated and interact with its conventionalised meaning which is transformed in this 
process. This is somewhat reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's Gestalt which reveals the 
object over and against its field or contextual articulations and which is thus transfigured 
towards a new reference. 
Ricoeur (op. cit., p. 299), in noting the self-referentiality of this process of realisation, has 
observed that when the customary mode of reference fails, 
... 
the semantic aim has recourse to a network of predicates that already function in [the] 
familiar field of reference. This already constituted meaning is raised from its anchorage in an 
initial field of reference and cast into a new referential field which it will then work to 
delineate. But this transfer... presupposes that the latter field is already present in a still 
unarticulated manner, and that it exerts an attraction on the already constituted sense in order 
to tear it away from its initial haven... this would not be possible if meaning were a stable form. 
Hence the stasis which Hall (Hall (ed. ), 1997, p. 46) criticises in semiotics, and which we 
have argued is perpetuated in types of discourse theory, results from seeing the process of 
referencing (and in that sense, naming) as prior to meaning. We have argued that, on the 
contrary, reference or `naming' is not prior to but part of the process of actualisation of 
objects in which reference is shifted as the sense of a context is rendered visible; that 
objects emerge from communicative practices rather than signs determining their 
character beforehand. 
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Chanter 6: Discursive Realism: Self-Referentiality 
and the `Depth' of Meaning 
Whilst realism has come under attack from the social constructionists of both modern and 
postmodern types, the realist response has been to defend a world `out there'. It will be 
argued here that the only credible defence of realism lies in firstly accepting that the 
`discursive turn' has undermined the world `out there' position; that there is nothing to 
which we refer which is not already apart of a system of referencing; and secondly, that 
this in itself does not necessarily entail a relativism about `underlying' structures and 
processes, closure or a self-confirming quality. It will be suggested that the ironic 
mirroring of our own thoughts, the creation of a world in our own theoretical image, is 
not the only way of understanding self-referentiality; that the term can equally support a 
non-mirroring, non-ironic reading which is based on the non-equivalence of referencing 
categories embedded in the world with those of our own theoretical ideas. Consequently, 
it is suggested that to accept self-referentiality does not necessitate the abandonment of 
complexity and depth in communication. 
The first part of this chapter looks at some difficulties faced by social constructionist 
positions in establishing a coherent account of discursivity. Some suggestions will be 
made as to how these difficulties might be remedied via recognition of a constitutive 
ambiguity in the structure of a referring discourse. This decisive point is illustrated by 
means of Dummett's truth conditional semantics, which, it is argued, can serve as a 
theoretical expression of the alternative account of discursivity, because it distinguishes 
and theorises a relationship between formal, propositional aspects of discourse on the one 
hand, and its situatedness in underlying `everyday' contextual factors of communication, 
on the other. It recognises that theoretical knowledge is inflected or situated by the 
manner in which it is arrived at. It is at once both knowledge and discursive practice. 
Part 1: The Problem of Embodiment 
Mind-Body Dualism: A Contested Characteristic of Contemporary Thought 
The position taken here is that ideas are as much a part of the world as physical-spatial 
structures. As Pivcevic argues, our observations should not be treated as merely 
reflections on/of the world but as part of the world itself. That is, it is an error to take 
`speaking about' (Pivcevic, 1986, p. 275) as something separate from the sphere of things 
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being spoken about. The world speaks about itself. Arguably, categories such as 
`biological', `social', `natural' are illustrations of such a self-referential world in 
operation. ' They appear at one and the same time to be both a description and the thing 
that is being described. 
Amongst other writers holding variants of this view, Farrell (1995, p. 21) notes that for 
Hegel understanding requires that: 
our fundamental concepts must capture the world as it is, and even more, must be an explicit 
actualising of logical patterns that are in some sense present in things and institutions 
themselves. 
Again, for Hegel, the logical relations abstracted from the world `are not just features of 
how we look at the world, but are in some sense present in a more primitive form in the 
very way in which things articulate and exhibit themselves as having a determinate 
character' (ibid., p. 22). We could say, for example, that the structuredness of things has 
about it a sense of `how it all fits together', and as such, things themselves contain a 
`logic'. 2 
Farrell (op. cit., pp. 79-82) goes on to argue that Davidson's radical critique of Quine's 
relativism 
- 
Quine insists that we can put whatever meaning construction we like on 
aspects of the world 
- 
has here in crucial respects a similar outcome. Davidson (1984, 
pp. 227-41) argues that if reference to a world `out there' truly cannot succeed in 
identifying things, as Quine (1969, pp. 26-68) claims, then such a notion of reference 
should be abandoned altogether. However, we cannot give up the idea of reference per se 
because even Quine's account of plural worlds requires some grasp of `what is being 
referred to'. 
For Davidson (op. cit., xix), the consequence of the collapse of `out there' referencing is 
not that we abandon the classificatory ideas which count as references to things, but 
rather that we see them as part of the world. Hence, as Farrell (op. cit., p. 90) claims, this 
is a radically different kind of world from the one Quine demolishes. It is a world in 
which referencing entails that what is referenced in some sense already has the logical 
structure of the referring discourse. 
The `world out there' view of reference with its privileging of physicalist notions of 
structures and processes, or again, a material base reflected in ideational superstructures, 
Hence the Hegelian or, more strictly, Spinozist view, that ideas, categories are a feature of things is 
followed in this discussion. 
2 Rather than subjectivising the world, Farrell (op. cit., pp. 221-2) argues that patterns or logics 
discerned in it are part of a process of self-relating in which we discover the objectivity of reason. 
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nevertheless remains influential. This broadly `base-superstructure' model covers not 
only variants of Marxism but is more generally current in social theory and has become 
paradigmatic of the way `speaking about' has been split off from the world. Hence we 
tend to see cultural and theoretical structures as reflections of the world. It will be in 
order to dwell for a moment on the problems posed by base and superstructure and how 
theorists have attempted to deal with those difficulties. 
In Marxism, a tradition was built up of which a core feature was the idea that social being 
determines consciousness. Now whilst, as Rose (1995, p. 215) notes, Marx argued for a 
unity of theory and practice, the net effect was to disregard the practice of theory and thus 
maintain the `Kantian or Fichtean opposition between theory and practice'. Social life 
was thus divided into material and ideational factors along the lines of base and 
superstructure. This mechanical Marxism was later countered by a cultural materialism 
- 
Gramsci (1971) and Althusser (1971) for example 
- 
which recognised the efficacy of 
cultural factors such as ideology. The notion that practices were the site of social 
determination replaced the view of 2nd International Marxism that forces of production 
or economic laws (technological and economic determinism) were key explanatory 
factors. 
The problem of how to theorise the relationship between practices and ideas nevertheless 
remained either `glossed' or unaddressed. Ideas were said to be embodied in institutional 
practices, the latter were seen as symbolically overdetermined and human agents were 
seen as the bearers of ideas. Thus the conception of embodiment remained ad hoc and 
bore some similarity to the way in which a currant bun could be said to be the bearer or 
embodiment of currants. ' That is, ideas were still seen as discrete entities somehow stuck 
onto practices rather than practices having an intrinsically ideational quality! (As the 
examination of Althusser in Chapter 4 suggests, rejection of the base-superstructure 
metaphor has no necessary consequences for the relative weight of economic influences. ) 
This problem is again highlighted in the interactionist tradition, where the labelling 
metaphor is used to explain the self-fulfilling nature of institutional definitions of 
individuals. The metaphor reproduces the split between the cognitive (label) and bodily 
elements of agents. Thus, in both the cultural Marxist and the interactionist case, the 
practice or interaction or individual is seen as a substructure to the ideational/symbolic 
3 The `currant bun' metaphor can be seen to carry over into discourse theory too, where subjects 
become `bearers' of discursive positions. As McNay (1994, pp. 76-7) points out, Foucault's subject 
positions fail to engage with the actuality of individual subjectivity, for example, how prediscursive 
identities like `woman' affect an individual's ability to occupy a discursive subject position. 
° Bodily posture or `body language' can be used to illustrate the claim that an ideational supplement 
exists in our sense of the physical. 
95 
properties. In this way the base-superstructure metaphor maintains a grip on the 
theorisation of agency, structure and practice. 
The Constitutive Ambiguity of Embodiment 
The formulation of ideational embodiment proposed in this discussion is rather different 
and depends on the argument that laws, structures, logics, relations, plots, narratives, 
roles 
- 
in a word the basic entities through which the world is made sense of 
- 
have a dual 
aspect nature; they exhibit an irreducible ambiguity between being treated as 
physical/spatial entities and ideational entities. Now, whilst the currant bun figure 
suggests heterogeneity between physical/spatial and ideational components, the dual 
aspect notion suggests a gestalt figure where one aspect melts into the other and the two 
are never entirely separable. Imagine, for example, a line drawing of a cube which 
reverses itself or an alternating `two faces/candlestick' diagram. Here, one cannot 
contemplate one aspect without the other being drawn in, unlike the currants which can 
easily be conceived in separation from the bun. 
Moving on from the cube metaphor, the point can be illustrated by a number of 
examples. For instance, in a simple `real world' example, a ball may be said to make or 
describe an arc or other trajectory. Here, `describe' etc. refers both to the physical 
trajectory and to the definition of the shape so `described'. The shape of its movement, 
which is understood definitionally or in terms of an ideal type, means that the ball has, in 
turn, definite physical consequences for a goalkeeper or netball player. The descriptive 
statement `The ball made an arc' offers both a description of an event and an account of 
how it was brought about. According to Garfinkel (op. cit., pp. 7-9), all natural language 
utterances have this `reflexive', doing/describing character. The one trope is entailed in 
the other and yet one refers to the `subjective'/cognitive describing aspect and the other 
to the `real world' action aspect if we follow the mind-body dualist perspective. The fact 
that a description can serve as a comment on how it was brought about was also noted by 
Spinoza (1986, p. 258), when he claimed that defining descriptions always included some 
reference to how the states of affairs described were brought about, that is, their 
immediate cause. `This is a good way of solving Pythagoras' Theorem' would be another 
example. These two implications of the trajectory or theorem solving 
- 
action and 
description, world and subjectivity 
- 
seem indissolubly but puzzlingly linked together. 
`Puzzlingly' because the paradigm from which such phenomena are viewed is generally a 
dualist one, that is, a view in which ideas and bodies or `the world' are kept in separate 
compartments. 
Farrell (op. cit., p. 289) argues from his Hegel and Davidson cases that it is wrong to see 
thought or reason as placed on one side of a world-subject duality; rather thought should 
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be seen as distributed in both compartments. The idea that thought is solely a 
characteristic of subjects is, he argues (ibid., p. 15), a feature of the `divinisation' of 
subjectivity which occurs with the onset of modernity where the subject interprets the 
world through thoughts which are its own property. Some further illustrations will help to 
demonstrate the ambiguous nature of thought with regard to the world-subject duality. 
The ambiguity can, for example, be seen at work in the comment on a building as being 
`in the Art Deco style'. Now the building has a definite physical shape but this cannot be 
fully comprehended without the notion `Art Deco style'. 
Hence this notion is not something added in to give a fuller account but an idea without 
which the physical nature of the building cannot be grasped. Hence the physical and 
ideational features of the building are interdependent, one aspect cannot be taken in 
without the aid of the other. The patterns or style which comprise Art Deco can be seen 
as its `logic' whilst the shapes of Art Deco buildings can be seen as the extended form of 
these patterns/logics. 
As Godelier (1988, p. 169) argues in a similar vein regarding family structure, this cannot 
be understood unless we see it as entailing mental categories as well as spatial relations. 
Every social relation... exists both in thought and outside of it... The mental part of a social 
relation consists first of all in the set of representations, principles and rules which must be 
`acted upon' to engender that relation between individuals and groups... One cannot imagine 
individuals marrying each other without knowing what marriage is, or whilst being unaware of 
the kind of marriage rules operative in their society 
... 
without being acquainted with the rules 
of descent. 
A like interdependence of the ideational and spatial occurs in the expression `the logic of 
capital'. We can see this both as an immanent set of rules, the way that capital works, its 
rationale, and as a structure with different spaces where different processes occur (e. g. 
production and consumption). Both aspects seem crucial and inseparable in gaining a 
grasp of the characteristics of capital. Further, as with the logic of capital, `laws of 
nature', combine two seemingly disparate categories 
- 
nature and logic 
- 
the one falling 
on the side of subjectivity and the other in the natural world. The implication of running 
them together, to take Farrell's point, is that thought can come to us from the outside 
rather than being solely a product of the subject-as-divinized-interpreters Finally, we can 
take Weber's notion of ideal types as consisting in a fusion of the nomothetic (logical) 
and idiographic (picturing-spatial) aspects of the social world and hence as suggesting 
The idea of understanding emphasised in this Chapter and throughout is that of a practical 
accomplishment and is akin to that mentioned by Wittgenstein (cited in Chapter 2) in the sense that 
processes of understanding are seen as taking place in the public, spatially-extended world rather 
than in the mind, conceived as the private realm of thoughts. 
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that analysis of social life depends on recognising that its entities have this dual aspect 
nature. 
Dualism at Work: Physicalist and Cognitivist Contradictions in Foucault and 
Goffman 
In order to gauge the plausibility of the dual aspect perspective, it will be instructive to 
look at the role of consciousness in explanations of agency. 
Consciousness tends to either occupy a central position as with symbolic interactionists 
and other interpretivists, existentialist and humanist Marxists, or to be reduced to 
marginal status as with Foucault's view that discursive norms operate first and foremost 
on the body, or Butler's claim that identity is achieved via performance. 
Further, sometimes a position is held (interactionist sociology, for instance) where the 
common sense view that ideas have influence on their own account is taken on board. 
This is the case with the taken for granted efficacy of labelling or stigmatising. Mind- 
body/subject-world dualisms however dictate that ideas belong not to the spatial world of 
causality and their social efficacy is rationalised along the lines that beliefs `are real in 
their effects' but not real themselves. This leads to the conclusion that the effects are 
produced ex nihilo! 
It will therefore be in order to examine some of the difficulties which rise from the 
polarised distribution of subjectivity across the subject-world divide. For example, 
Goffman's (1982) interactionism, although concentrating on agency as the source of 
social determinations, relies on an idea of the body as a pre-discursive given which 
connects personal and social identity through role play, impression management, 
institutionalisation, and so on. 
Now, as Shilling (1997, pp. 80-81) notes, despite its importance to individual identity, 
we are left wondering how far the body is an integral part of human agency and not just 
something we are stuck with managing according to the societal norms of `body 
language'... As with Foucault, the mind and how we think about the body become sites in 
which the meaning of the body is inscribed. 
That is, societal norms (the world) are taken as the source influence of the 
construction/presentation of the body. 
Social constructionism in the work of Foucault starts out from the opposite end of the 
spectrum from Goffman, in that agency is seen as produced through discourse which acts 
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on the body through various disciplinary systems and techniques which emphasise the 
positioning of bodies within spatial relations such as those of the classroom or 
panopticon oriented prison. Here ideas or consciousness are seen as effects of the 
behavioural changes effected by the disciplinary processes. Ironically, Shilling (op. cit., 
p. 79) argues, the emphasis Foucault places on the constructedness of the body leads him 
to treat the body as a 
transhistorical and cross cultural unified phenomenon... the body is always ready to be 
constructed by discourse... the body... is a site which receives meaning from, and is constituted 
by external forces... On the other hand, Foucault's epistemological view of the body means that 
it virtually disappears as a material phenomenon... its existence is permanently deferred by the 
grids of meaning imposed by discourse... Once the body is contained within modem 
disciplinary systems, it is the mind which takes over as the location for discursive power. 
Consequently, the body tends to become an inert mass controlled by discourses centred in the 
mind [which is treated as if abstracted from an active human body]. 
What we can see from this synopsis of the disciplinary effects of discourse on the body is 
a kind of oscillation between cognitivism and behaviourism, through a subjectivity sans 
subject and a world without bodily locations. As Shilling (loc. cit. ) notes, this overlooks 
the possibility that `disciplinary systems of power' might be 
`lived practices' which do not simply mark themselves on people's thoughts, but permeate, 
shape and seek to control their sensuous and sensory experiences. 
In what follows we will investigate, independently of Shilling, how such constructions 
might be possible. It is however, important to note that Foucault himself saw basic, taken 
for granted, `natural' categories as constructions. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
argues for the position that sexuality is socially constructed by discursive practices such 
as psychoanalysis, education or medicine. These discourses act upon the body to generate 
what comes to be regarded as a natural sexuality. Foucault himself, however, seems to 
maintain a residual naturalism of the body and its sensations (Foucault, 1979, p. 168), a 
`something' that precedes discourse. 
As with other perspectives examined, there is a sense that bodies are, even if only 
notionally, as Shilling demonstrates, the base or substructure upon which discourse acts 
to produce ideational effects, certain belief structures. Against this it could be argued that 
the body is always a figure. The aesthetic sense of this is perhaps the obvious one. ' Other 
illuminations of this point would include the categorisations of the body as natural, 
biological, erotic, which are historically specific as the Foucauldian method itself would 
suggest and indicate the world-subject ambiguity discussed earlier. 
6 See also Note 4 above. 
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This `world' character of categories reminds us of Farrell's suggestion that subjectivity 
should be seen principally as coming from the `outside', rather than individual 
consciousness. Therefore, for Foucault to see the body as natural in the sense of 
preceding discourse is to fall prey to his own criticism of `natural' categories. On the 
other hand, Foucault is right to sense that extradiscursive matters have a role, if we are to 
understand that as referring to matters beyond the cognitive sphere. The problem is then 
to show how there can be an outside to discourses and to do this without falling into the 
subject-world dualism highlighted by Shilling. 
Arguably, such a project would involve taking the various discursive formations in 
Foucault as intersubjective rather than purely objectified forms of language practice (a 
`circulation of statements'). Here, meaning is captured in the practice of language, the 
sense of the situation 
- 
where members' sense may differ from and contest the official 
sense 
- 
rather than in attempts to codify or conventionalise the practice. Hence, discursive 
practices of the body could be seen in the manner of action/description noted above 
rather than objectified description. It would then be possible to talk about the body as 
something which is `done', achieved or produced without falling into the cognitivist trap 
as doing/describing straddles the subject-world divide. It also suggests a way out of the 
problem of `labels/discourses-make-us-what-we-are', as we are already substantial in the 
practice of taken for granted meanings of, for example, `the biological', `sexual', 
`natural' and so on. 
An example of how the body is inscribed phenomenologically, ('described/done') is 
given in Garfinkel's (1967) study of Agnes. In brief, Agnes has a sex-change operation 
so that she can have a biological identity appropriate to her already existing sense of 
being a woman. The point here is that Agnes's sense of female embodiment was, 
Garfinkel argues, derived from having to consciously organise the performance of being 
a woman whereas usually the steps involved in this are hidden from the members of 
society and are therefore taken as `determinants and independent objects' (ibid., p. 181-2). 
In other words, the `observably normally sexed person' was the product of these 
`inexorable' invisible processes, that is, an objectification of those processes. 
... 
the commonplace recognition of normal sexuality as a `case of the real thing' consisted of a 
serious, situated and prevailing accomplishment that was produced in concert with others by 
activities whose prevailing and ordinary success itself subjected their product to Merleau- 
Ponty's `prejuge du monde' (loc. cit. ). 
The point is then that the actual (everyday) meanings of `man and `woman' reside in the 
taken for granted semantic networks of the time and place, rather than in medicalised 
conventions as in Foucauldian discourse (although the latter will become sedimented in 
the former in some way). The sense of self subjected to and confirmed in everyday life, 
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as Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity as L'On in Chapter 1 makes clear, 
suggests something substantial, rather than either a Lacanian effect or a Sartrean isolated 
ego. 
It is worth contrasting this position with the more recent and influential position on 
performance advanced by Butler (1996, p. 112). Here the notion of performativity falls 
back into the argument that acts of naming can `bring into being that which they 
name 
... 
performativity as that aspect of discourse that has the capacity to produce what it 
names... this production happens through a certain kind of repetition or recitation. ' 
Now the objectified meanings of those discursive practices may produce self-fulfilling 
processes, but arguably, this is due to the power of some to manipulate the discourse (and 
its Foucauldian potentialities) displacing the ability to cognise intersubjective meaning, 
that sense of what is going on generated in context. In other words, conversants would 
not be able to put a name to their sense of events. Further, they may have a different 
name and sense imposed through the power of institutionally-sanctioned `repetition', etc. 
Friedan (1968, p. 13) makes this point in relation to women's oppression which was, in 
the 1950s, `the problem that has no name'. Hence naming (or its absence, substitution by 
other names) does not produce the kind of closure or circularity Butler intimates but 
rather a kind of disorientation, angst and misnaming (see Merleau-Ponty on sense in 
Chapter 1). ' 
The idea of an intersubjective sense of the world achieved through action in context 
which emerges here perhaps helps to fill out Farrell's (op. cit., p. 29) argument that 
subjectivity might be `of the world' rather than purely in the viewpoint of the individual 
subject. 
Now the distribution of subjectivity characterised in Farrell's (op. cit., pp. 249-52) 
account as either within the individual subject (classic modernity) or `emptied out' 
individual subjectivity (poststructuralism) suggests that the dominant way of locating it is 
via paradigms of individualism. 
In our survey of social constructionism, this conclusion is not only evident from 
Foucauldian-type theories of subjectivity but also in interactionist approaches. Like the 
Foucauldians, interactionists also employ behavioural criteria but assume that social 
order is constructed at a cognitive level. That is, whilst interactionism (Mead, 1970, 
Whilst the power of institutional identities to impose their meanings clearly requires their 
sedimentation within the everyday and, as Hull (1997, p. 24) notes in her comparison of Adorno and 
Butler on identity, indicates their materiality, it does not exhaust identity. For Adorno, this means 
the subject rather than being identical with the claims of discourse may experience a `tangible 
misery'. It is a denial that discourse is itself mediated by what it mediates. 
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pp. 152-64) presupposes a collective idea, the generalised other, a normative standard 
through which behaviour is made sense of, it is deemed to operate through individual 
consciousnesses. 
The problem with this is the asymmetry between the generalised other (idea) and 
individual agency (bodily dimension). That is, there is no body that corresponds to the 
collective idea. Consequently, an account of social construction which starts off with a 
shared symbolism as the embodiment of sociality ends up socially disembodied as this 
symbolism only appears as a product of individual minds. Hence the problem of `other 
minds' (solipsism) is reproduced because individual subjectivity is not seen as configured 
within a social body. There is no mode of being whereby the generalised other can be 
shared amongst social actors. The dimension of the (intersubjective) social body 
(Merleau-Ponty's `situation', for example) is missing. Similarly, in the Foucauldian case, 
discourse operates directly upon individual bodies; that is, individuals are not taken to 
have a social or cultural existence with attendant meanings through which the influence 
of discourse might be mediated. 
As Farrell (op. cit., pp. 249-50) remarks of poststructuralism, there is no middle term 
through which meaning can be distributed (beyond agents' consciousnesses) as a feature 
of the world. The emphasis on an ontology of individual bodies places Foucault within 
the domain of the 19th century utilitarian practices he so assiduously examines. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from examination of the constructionist positions is 
that they lack depth. That is, ideas tend to be collapsed back into individual 
consciousness which in turn rests on a corporeal substructure, a base which alternatively 
bears or produces ideational superstructure, reflections, effects. This reductionism is 
disabling for any attempt at giving an account of the efficacy of meaning and subjectivity 
as practical features of the world. 
Part 2: Alternatives to Conventionalist Accounts of the 
Discursive 
Dummett's Reading of Frege's Theory of Meaning 
Dummett's conception of sense (intersubjective meaning) enables us to flesh out Farrell's 
proposition that thought or discourse is not merely world-as-reflected/constructed-in-the- 
individual-subject but is a part of the world. 
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In Dummett's reading of Frege's theory of meaning, a world-character is elaborated 
within the domain of meaning. That is, meaning is produced by the way natural language 
utterances are constructed out of already existing elements 
- 
phrases or names denoting 
an object. A kind of self-referencing goes on within these natural-discursive structures in 
that they both objectify their subject matter but also relate objective meanings to the 
context of utterance as situated meanings. 
In relating the conventional senses of terms or phrases to a context of utterance a 
different meaning is generated 
- 
the sense of an utterance. Senses are produced in situ and 
therefore belong neither to speaker or listener but rather inhere as a common linguistic 
practice in the context of utterance itself. Hence such meanings are intersubjective. 
Further, for Dummett they are not objectified entities but `objects of apprehension'; that 
is to say, they are determinate entities issuing from the way language use picks out its 
subject matter, the meanings produced by `doing' language, or, arguably, any public 
(symbolic) display of thinking. 
An example of language use as a self-referential process which evokes a sense, in this 
case, an awareness of an ambiguity, can be gleaned from the following joke. 
Q: What do you call a rabbit with no ears? 
A: Anything you like because it can't hear you. ' 
Here the ambiguities which lie within the taken for granted, indexical usages of `call' 
facilitate the joke. In comparison, the conventional meaning narrows this down to one 
logical object 
- 
`call' as in naming. 
In picking something out, conventional meanings (senses) of terms are modified by their 
application or articulation with a context. Hence it is not the linguistic formulation used 
(the significance of a term or name) which gives us the sense of an utterance but the way 
it is employed within a context. In the case of the rabbit joke, the multiple possibilities of 
the context are finely poised and hence an ambiguous state of affairs is denoted. The 
conjunction of these two senses produces the joke utterance sense (around the 
ambiguity). 
We can also take the joke as a metaphor for the way language utterances work in 
Dummett's account of natural language; that is, the process of naming objects is a self- 
I am grateful to my daughter, Katharine, for providing this illustration of the relationship between 
naming and reference. 
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referential process which draws on the taken for granted features of the context to modify 
conventional meanings. 
It is worth examining in more detail what Dummett has to say about sense and its world 
character as it provides a way of making sense of Garfinkel's (op. cit., pp. 3-4) claims 
about the reflexivity (self-referentiality) of natural language use (`recognizable sense.. 
. 
or 
objectivity of accounts [are] features of the socially organized occasions of their use') 
This can be summarised in the following way. The self-referentiality of utterances can be 
seen in the way their descriptive, defining dimension overflows into their utterances-as- 
action trope, where, in the process of picking out an object, shared meaning is generated. 
Hence, whilst this cognitive content provides a mapping effect or framework for 
meaning, the actual meanings of names (terms or phrases) can only be understood via 
their contexts of use. That is to say, the production of meaning is overlaid by the 
significance or cognitive coding effects of the terms used. 
The cognitive content of the individual's utterance, which is also its subjectivity, is 
spread over the joint linguistic activity which identifies or picks out the objects of social 
practices, and as a linguistic context expresses states of affairs in an indexical fashion. In 
so doing, the individual's utterances move beyond a mere subjectivity and take on a 
world character. The sense of an utterance is then the product of a process in which the 
subject articulates the different elements of meaning (conventional-cognitive and 
contextual). Thus it references itself, its subjectivity, in what it does, its linguistically- 
oriented (world-based) activity. 
In other words, the sense of an utterance is given by the mode of relating to an object. 
Here, the cognitive content of the object is referenced in the common linguistic practice 
of picking it out, i. e. the conceptual description belongs both to the concept/name and to 
the utterance through which the object is identified. Dummett puts the matter thus: 
For Frege... The sense of a proper name is the way we arrive at the object, but not conceived as 
a means to a separable end: the apprehension of an object is not an outcome that may be 
detached from the process that led to it. From this standpoint, sense is better understood as the 
manner in which we pick out the object than as the route we take to it. We are never given an 
object, complete in itself; we can think about it, speak of it, or apprehend it only as presented 
to us in some particular way... ' (ibid., p. 132). 
Whilst the self-referentiality of the process of identifying items of discourse is evident 
from what Dummett says here, the situated character of the process is also made 
apparent. However, because some writers, Dummett argues (loc. cit. ), have taken senses 
to be objectified meanings a certain kind of misunderstanding has arisen. For example, if 
we express the fact that we can see a building, then we must see it from a particular 
angle, following Frege's point about the situatedness of senses. Some have therefore 
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concluded from the situatedness of senses that we cannot see buildings, i. e. conceptualise 
the whole. Dummett concludes that here the linguistic formulation, `mode of 
presentation' of a matter is mistaken, detached or substituted for what it apprehends. 
Hence we can say then that in this case a kind of closure occurs in which literality, 
conventions, public codes, OED definitions, etc. are taken for objects denoted in living 
discourse. The self-confirmatory conundrums in variants of social constructionism visited 
earlier in the chapter will serve as significant examples here. 
As Dummett (loc. cit. ) notes, Frege, in one strand of thinking at least, is quite clear about 
the separateness of senses and objects. Indeed, some senses have no objects (references), 
some have more than one and in other cases they have mistaken objects. 
Further, whilst senses are not objects and may exist without and indeed are prior to 
objects/references in the way of being determined by them, for Frege the objectivity of 
senses is without doubt (ibid., p108). They provide the bridge between the `inner world 
of sense-impressions' and the `outer world of perceptible things', that is, they link 
individual subjectivity with the world of public objects (ibid., p. 143. ). For Dummett (op. 
cit., pp. 108-9,114), shared linguistic practice and the senses thereby produced are 
deemed to be the real intersubjective world on which discursive objectifications are 
based. 
As mentioned above, in picking things out, the classifying process often gets in the way 
of what is actually meant, denoted, in a speaker's utterance. Dummett argues this point 
through his distinction between senses and objects (references). How can the distinction 
be made in practice though? How can we break out of the world of senses into that of 
objects? What is to prevent an infinite regress or endless dissimulation/play of 
referentiality in say, the Derridean manner? Dummett's solution is to argue that all 
definitions, when pushed, finally fall back on context, the background or indexical 
features of utterances. In other words, definition finally rests on ostension; `it is thus' 
(ibid., pp. 143-4). Ostensive definitions are themselves not infallible. For example, `this is 
how you fix a bicycle puncture' may be open to disputation. However, the appeal is to 
the already shared implicit criteria of the context of the claim, not to an endless series of 
definitions. 
Hence there are two aspects of referencing in the utterance. Whilst singular terms or 
proper names serve explicitly to pick out, or denote, objects, the background of indexical 
features is also involved. It operates as a mode of indirect reference; it provides a 
semantic context or field within which the object can be picked out. It is Dummett's (op. 
cit., pp. 47-8,360ff) contention that these features, explicit and indirect reference, are tied 
together in the generative act of meaning, that is by the sense of the utterance. Explicit, 
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denotative reference is always anchored in the referentiality of the semantic context. 
Hence, as Garfinkel noted, what gets denoted, objectified is always subject to a prejuge 
day monde. The corollary, as Gramsci (see Chapter 3) pointed out, is that formal 
knowledge is only effective insofar as it is articulated with, becomes a sediment of, 
common sense. 
In this unity of sedimented meanings within the context of an utterance, Dummett's 
semantics differs sharply from semiotic theories of meaning where denotative reference 
is identified with significance, the formal codes used to pick things out, not the meaning 
context. Although connotative meanings give `context' for Barthes, as Hall (1997, p. 42) 
notes, this kind of context is `static' rather than a living historical context. The 
consequence of this, as seen above, is that when radicalised, as in Derrida, meaning is 
dissimulated in search of its actuality in an endless play of difference. 
Ricoeur (1986, pp. 299-302) develops an (in some ways) similar view to Dummett's but 
which relies in the end on Husserlian transcendental reduction, the abstraction of ideal 
meanings from everyday activities which are then taken as the ontologically prior guiding 
(Platonic) framework for the latter. Ricoeur, none the less, like Dummett, identifies two 
sorts of reference, the conceptual-speculative and the metaphorical. However, for 
Ricoeur, these are not tied into a common process of meaning production but rather each 
has its own sense, which produces the kind of problem about getting from the inner world 
of the subject and its conceptualisations to public discourse that we examined above. 
Importantly though, Ricoeur (op. cit., p. 321) also identifies the world of natural or 
`ordinary' language as metaphorical, that is standing for the unspoken, indexical features 
of its context or semantic field. 
Ph enomen olo1ical Socioloi! v as an Alternative to Conventionalism 
It is now worth turning to examine how the phenomenology of language has been 
employed in the domain of sociology, as it may both accent the significance of 
Dummett's work and help to evaluate aspects of sociological phenomenology as an 
alternative to social constructionist theories of the conventionalist or nominalist kind 
mentioned earlier. 
In phenomenological terms, we can draw parallels between the way utterances pick out 
objects and the way social interactions occur between members in the sociology of 
ethnomethodology. In both cases this can go ahead without theoretical grasp of what is 
happening, that is, it works purely on the basis of `unattended' reflexivity, the way the 
background assumptions of natural language index a situation (Benson and Hughes, 
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1983, pp. 102-3). Where processes of identifying, recognising, analysing, locating, do 
come into play they rest loosely on the background assumptions and can involve 
interpreting things according to which assumptions seem relevant at the time. Hence, 
however watertight definitional pronouncements may seem they are always subject to 
modification depending on the context in which they are applied (ibid., p. 109ff). 
This then establishes a distinction between everyday intersubjective structures and 
codifying or knowledge-based theoretical language. Consequently, conventional 
discursive structures 
- 
rules, codes, textbook knowledge, and so on 
- 
are anchored 
semantically in these structures. 
Ethnomethodologists would probably see themselves as a species of constructionism, and 
indeed, are often mentioned in the same breath as Goffinan's conventionalist 
performativism, for example. However, Garfinkel (op. cit., pp. 165,170) distances 
himself from Goffinan's assimilation of performances 
- 
which for the former build on 
making sense of everyday beliefs 
- 
to theatrical performances. Ethnomethodologists 
make the claim that conventional sociology see its theories as reflecting reality `out 
there'. Garfinkel observes (Benson and Hughes, op. cit., p. 103) that there is no `time out' 
and that sociologists' ways of knowing about society are pervaded by a `reflexivity of 
accounting practices'. In other words, the background knowledge of members, including 
sociologists, is a part of the world they describe: their accounts are self-referential. The 
inference that could be drawn from this is that the world is not real, in the sense of having 
depth, open-endedness because its self-referentiality implies a self-fulfilling prophecy 
(ibid., p. 102): we discover only what we have already put there. However, for 
ethnomethodologists, background expectations fit loosely with their codifications (ibid., 
pp. 103,113-115), there is always an element of creative interpretation, so things never 
turn out fully as predicted (See Benson and Hughes' examples of applications of codes, 
op. cit., pp. 102-113). Hence, although there is a circularity around members' activities, it 
is not vicious. 
Furthermore, ethnomethodologists see the background expectations as different in kind 
from abstract conceptual knowledge. Society or conversation is enacted though 
indexicality, 
coding practice, following a rule, formulating a conversation 
- 
as examples of practical 
activities 
- 
all gloss the circumstances of their production and are embedded in these 
circumstances (ibid., p. 124). 
In other words, members' language does not enunciate abstract thought but occurs as a 
practical activity. The duality of everyday language as description/action is an underlying 
107 
theme in phenomenological sociology and this sets it off from idealisations or theoretical 
constructions which attempt to fill the gaps in its accounts (ibid., p. 123). 
However, two problems emerge from the ethnomethodological account of 
communication. One is its incipient cognitivism; self-referentiality generates synonymy 
between speakers, the indexing is always taken up in the way it is meant, hence the self- 
fulfilling nature of interactions and the perpetuation of milieux of social order; 
ethnomethodology consequently ignores social change. This social stasis or 
`functionalist' criticism was also levelled by Heller (1984, pp. xi-xii) against Alfred 
Schutz, the major source of ethnomethodological ideas. 
Secondly, ethnomethodology tends to dissolve the codes which members give an account 
of (apply) into the indexical processes themselves and this leads to the problem of what it 
is that orients the members' accounts of the codes, that is, of what they are acting 
towards. Members seem to be free to construct meaning autonomously from the formal 
structures for which they account. However, there must, logically, be something which 
has a semantic weight there to interpret. The question of the weight of formal structures 
and the power conferred by and through them is rarely evident in ethnomethodological 
studies. 
The advantage of the Frege-Dummett position is by contrast twofold. Firstly, it accepts 
that natural language utterances are not univocal, that more that one object may be 
indicated, or, again, that a sense may have no corresponding objectification and therefore 
conversants are not necessarily talking about exactly the same things, that is producing 
synonymy. Secondly, the Frege-Dummett view recognises that the indexing of objects 
depends for its workability on idealised or abstract language (significance of the 
utterance) as a provider of cognitive materials, structures in the form of codes, 
conventions, etc. through which communicative practices can construct their actual 
objects, as opposed to the `formal objects' indicated by the conventions of terminology 
- 
the dictionary definition, for example. Hence, objects are not equated with conventional 
classifications but the latter can act as a framework against which speakers can achieve 
coherence. 
Consequently, whilst ethnomethodologists point out that much communication is purely 
indexical (has only indirect reference) the Frege-Dummett perspective would argue that 
this only works because the implication of reference is still there to provide coherence 
between conversants. That is, whilst indexical statements do not themselves identify, 
denote objects, the background of taken for granted ideas which is indexed can contain a 
fund of concepts. Hence indexical references can be traced, made explicit through 
examining the unexamined basis of an utterance. Indeed, this element of making sense is 
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recognised in ethnomethodology where such tracing procedures are sometimes known as 
`the documentary method' (Garfinkel. op. cit., p. 76ff). 
Naming and Fetishism: Dummett, Ricoeur and Derrida 
Now the expression of natural language's incomplete terms in explicit, propositional 
form is, for Dummett, only a completion of reference (denotation) in relation to what the 
context requires. That is, propositions do not float free from the context of their 
production; their references/objects can always be pushed back to the level of ostensive 
definition, the shared inexplicit, indexical features of the context. The meaning of a 
statement depends on the senses and incomplete references of the terms and phrases 
which make up the sentential statement. It is also conditional upon the manner of their 
articulation in the utterance and their relation to other propositional-type or complete 
references/conceptual objects picked out in the discursive practices of a culture (ibid., 
p. 461). The everyday, indexical ground cannot therefore be dispensed with, surpassed as 
in Hegel's conception of the development of knowledge (where everything is taken up 
and its truth eliminated by the proposition in the `positive negation' of previous levels of 
consciousness 
- 
see also p. 58 above). 
The work of some 20' century writers suggests, however, that the proposition or formal 
statement does have a kind of autonomy and power over its grounds 
- 
which are in any 
case seen as superseded by it. Weber's work on rationalisation, Foucault's notion of 
discourse as the circulation of statements, the recitation and repetition of Butler's (op. 
cit., p. 112) naming procedures (following Foucault, Austin and Derrida) are key 
examples in the literature, but Dummett (pp. 110,132ff, 459-60) also notes the tendency 
of writers working in epistemology and language, such as Davidson, Kripke and 
McDowell to mistake significance (what are referred to here as `formal objects') for 
sense, and indeed reference. 
The incompleteness of indexical features of utterances and their polyvalence regarding 
determinate meanings 
- 
senses without references 
- 
marks them out as different in kind 
from propositional-type language. In Husserl's terms, they represent an open horizon for 
the construction of similar representations 
- 
whatever is deemed to make sense within the 
context and hence in Schutz's (op. cit., p. 7) appropriation of Husserl, an `open horizon of 
typical familiarity'. 
The question of why there should be a general tendency towards substitution of 
significance or abstract categories for actual meanings can be related back to the 
rationalising and reifying tendencies of the institutional structures of modem bureaucratic 
capitalist societies. Here perhaps both in Adorno's (1973) sense of closed or self-identical 
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subjectivity and Foucault's insistence on the power of institutions to circulate statements, 
or again, the notion of repetition, or Derrida's (1974) usure, the wearing away of 
metaphorical richness 
- 
all signifying the power to displace other meanings 
- 
must surely 
be crucial insights here. 
Perhaps most of the implications here can be captured in Derrida's (Ricoeur, op. cit., 
pp. 285-6) account of worn-away metaphor. The passage of meanings into silence through 
familiarity of usage at the same time objectifies or conventionalises them. They become 
senses with (misplaced) conventional references. 
Hence, the actual meanings then work outside the consciousness of speakers. For 
Derrida, this is a kind of surplus value, an excess of meaning, a sediment or trace whose 
silence renders the conventional meaning fetishistic. In the labour of the production of 
meaning, the metaphorical surplus is denied to the speaker and only becomes visible in 
the autonomous functioning of language. Furthermore, worn-away metaphor is taken for 
pure (abstract) conceptual thought, an idealisation or abstraction from the living 
language, although in reality, it hides that within it. 
Marx's (1974, pp. 76-7) comments on fetishism suggest a form of suturing via the social 
relations of capitalism in which the individual is separated from its products. Whilst 
Derrida prefers a linguistic explanation, the broader account may rest with Marx. 
This examination of conventional meaning has implications for ethnomethodological 
studies for, as we have seen, a great deal of ingenuity is involved in everyday, indexical 
linguistic functioning. However, the codes and conventions of which members give 
accounts, themselves seem to replace the extra-discursive realists' domain of the `out- 
there'. That is, no explanation of the dynamic relationship between propositional 
language and its indexical context is given. 
However, Dummett (op. cit., p. 461) offers some light on this matter when he observes 
that the proper or denotative reference of a statement is determined in accordance with 
the indexical features of the context of an utterance. That is, its object is dependent on the 
way the speaker grasps the references/senses of its constituent parts, that is, the way they 
are articulated within the context 
- 
which establishes therefore via its sedimented 
meanings what sort of truth value it expresses. For example, the articulation of 
conservatism within its discursive tradition produced different meanings in the 1950s and 
`60s from those of the 1980s. In this sense `Everyday life is the measure of all things'. ' 
The emergence of reference from the context of the utterance is then a key element of the 
Guy Debord cited in Osborne (1995, p. 192). 
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Frege-Dummett perspective and one which is overlooked by those who substitute 
significance (codified meaning, conventions) for sense. 1° 
In Ricoeur's (op. cit., p. 299) characterisation of this emergence, the metaphorical 
character of natural language enables speaker's utterances to become a focus of different 
and shifting fields of reference which facilitate the picking out of differing objects. Both 
Kuhn (1970) and Lakatos (1972) have via `paradigm shifts' and `problemshifts' referred 
to processes which resemble this. In Chapter 1, the evolution of the Sony Walkman 
conventionally designated a mobile cassette player with headphones and shared listening 
device but which only made sense in the context of mobile, personal listening was given 
as an example of how users entered and switched semantic fields, generating new 
identities for the Walkman. The semantic networks of its genealogy provided the raw 
materials for metaphorising, actualising ('it's like this') and identifying the Walkman. 
Finally, this picking out-as-doing trope of reference inscribes materiality in 
communicative practice: for Dummett, the world of common linguistic practices must 
ultimately be the real world of making sense, and attempts to ground discursive 
materiality in the physicality of the body rather than in a sense of embodiment will, 
paradoxically, as Garfinkel shows, only serve to dematerialise the body! 
to Dummett's (op. cit., p. 134) point that senses can have more than one reference and that indexical 
accounts facilitate this process illustrates the peculiar nature. of indexicals or contextual meaning. It 
is both determinate in its articulation in different contexts and yet undifferentiated from the point of 
view of theoretical knowledge. The role of cultural studies can be delineated here as picking out the 
`undifferentiated' differentiations occurring and contesting in semantic fields yet articulated in 
everyday language and new cultural meanings emerge. 
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Chapter 7: Space, Time and the Everyday: 
Jameson and Osborne 
This concluding section of the study brings together the key themes elaborated in the 
previous chapters so as to offer an integrated working phenomenological perspective in 
the manner of Frege-Dummett. Firstly, this part of the discussion examines the critical 
relationship between semiotic and phenomenological accounts of communication and 
representation via Jameson's contention that current modes of representation have 
effected an erasure of history. It then goes on to give a contrasting view that 
communication can be seen as a process in which `invisible' historical sediments are 
mobilised as a `past-present' by rearticulating them in the discourses of the `historical 
present'. Here Gramsci's notion of sedimentation and articulation is re-read through 
Dummett's context principle and how it produces reference by re-situating conventional 
or propositional-type meanings. The focus then shifts to the ontogenetic features of the 
everyday as basis and critique of the conventions of Jameson's `cultural dominant'. Here 
the nature of the everyday as at once routine and transgressive in its interruptions of pre- 
existing patterns is investigated through Osborne's work on Benjamin and Lefebvre. 
Finally, this interruptive characteristic is deployed via the suggestion that the open- 
endedness of the re-articulation of historical past-presents goes against both the notion of 
a semiotic closure and that of the Aithusserian synchronic totalisation in that it enables us 
to theorise a history which can always be articulated disruptively into the open horizon of 
the present and therefore the latter is always, in some sense, `up for grabs'. 
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the meaning of space and time and of their 
relative importance. The traditional dominance of time over space has been contested by 
postmodem writers. The significance of spatial metaphors in accounting for the meaning 
of the culture of modem capitalism has displaced a traditional concern with its temporal 
unfolding; indeed, on one account (Fukuyama, 1992) history itself may have come to an 
end. 
Nonetheless, writers like Jameson have expressed an on-going concern about temporality 
through the theme of a mediatised culture which erases historicity. In many ways 
Jameson continues the pessimism of the Frankfurt School, who themselves emphasised 
the distortional and manipulative aspects of popular cultural forms. In his (1991) analysis 
of postmodern culture, space itself provides a figure for grasping a textuality without 
referents or fixed meanings, a surface without depth and a concomitant ideological 
closure within signifying systems. 
On the other hand, Osborne (1995) has focussed on the configurations of temporality and 
the need to see these as both related to experience and as an independent register of 
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historical development. The emancipatory aim to grasp historical trends requires an 
awareness of the openness of the future, but this is only to be achieved by contesting the 
dominant conception of history which through a `politics of time' effects a temporal 
closure. 
In the following account, the concerns about a media-oriented culture which has 
manipulative and distortional effects in contemporary capitalist societies are examined in 
the light of a practice-oriented view which distinguishes the context of utterance and 
reading, the sense of the communication from the conventions or codes through which it 
is expressed. 
Fredric Jameson: The Semiotics of `Late Capitalism" 
Jameson's (1991) analysis of the, `cultural logic of late capitalism' uses Barthes' 
semiotics to argue that texts now reference each other rather than the world; that language 
has been separated from the world. Further, the dominant, denotative meanings have been 
undermined by the play of signs/signifiers. The modernist models of inner/outer, essence 
and appearance, authenticity/inauthenticity give way to a new affectivity which diffuses 
through surfaces rather than depths (ibid., p. 12). However, this transformation is itself a 
historical matter and thus points beyond the text to that which organises it. 
Hence, Jameson wishes to keep some elements of the modernist scheme. These further 
include some sense that denotation still has a function, since for signs: 
we observe that in their moment of intersection a new hierarchy is at once established in which 
one sign becomes something like the material on which the other one works, or in which the 
first sign establishes a content and a center to which the second is annexed for auxiliary and 
subordinate functions... 
although these can change places rapidly and ceaselessly, as witnessed in the 
development of promo video techniques (ibid., p. 87). The seemingly arbitrary 
juxtapostioning of images in promo videos in fact only make sense if we treat them not as 
isolated signs but as a narrative structure, that is as discourse rather than a semiotic event 
standing on its own (ibid., p. 86). 
Now in the first Barthes schema, the semiotics of Mythologies, the literal meaning of a 
sign stands in a connotative relation to other signs. The peculiarity of this relationship is 
that the literal or denotative reference is transformed by this relationship into something 
See discussion of Mandel (1978) in Jameson (1991, xx). 
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other than `objective' language. ' The connotative elements act back on the denotation 
producing a second order meaning in which the denotative sign replaces what it signifies 
as the reality of the text. Barthes describes, through advertisements and other striking 
images, everyday contexts in which this process occurs. This metaphorical mode has also 
been described by Empson (1985, pp. 4-5), who argues that the force of metaphor is 
derived from the way metaphorical contrast or comparisons react on the `topic' or 
cognitive language, producing affective associations, and so in the use of language, the 
cognitive element is never completely separate. 
Barthes' famous example of the process of generating myths is the Paris Match picture 
of the black French soldier saluting the flag. Whilst on the surface this is a picture of a 
soldier demonstrating loyalty, the connotations on which its mythical/metaphorical 
meaning depends include the legitimacy of French colonialism. 
The standpoint from which Barthes (1972) addresses myth is that of demystification, of 
ideological critique. For this reason, the early Barthes (and presumably Jameson, but see 
below) comes in for criticism from, for example, Silverman and Torode (1980, pp. 265-6), 
for taking a position outside the meaning process as the unsituated, absolute, divinized 
commentator. Now whilst the images Barthes analyses for ideological content must be 
expressed propositionally in order to extract invalid truth claims, the fact of the matter is 
that this is seldom the way images are expressed. It has been argued in previous chapters 
that everyday language must be seen in terms of its use rather than as a cryptic 
epistemology. We can only understand it if we can grasp the context of utterance. Here 
understanding involves seeing what the language does, grasping its performative 
meaning. This, to unpack what has been argued above, necessitates distinguishing 
conventional meaning from the reference denoted by the context of the utterance. This 
does not entail any epistemological God's eye view, but to understand in the same way as 
the participants in a conversation understand. Whilst Barthes describes myth as part truth 
and part ideology, the Frege-Dummett perspective focuses on the senses expressed by 
utterances through which contextual meaning can be read or denoted in the topic. 
The significance of this discussion for Jameson, is that whilst he wishes to reject the early 
Barthes's ideology critique as positing a knowable world out-there, an absolute standard 
against which to judge ideology, he also wishes to retain a notion of ideology compatible 
with Barthes' later work on intertextuality in which the out-there functions as a residual 
reminder of the distortional effects of ideology but whose complexity defies orthodox 
2 It is important to distinguish between denotation in Barthes and Dummett, as for the latter 
denotation is facilitated by context rather than conventional usage itself. In terms of linguistic 
closure Dummett therefore has radically different implications. 
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modes of reference. 3 Here Barthes (Barthes, 1975 for example) argues that meaning is not 
oriented towards literality or the referent but, on the contrary, that texts exist in a constant 
play of self-referentiality-registering each others' meanings as connotative frameworks 
for their own. A further twist of this development from Jameson (op. cit., p. 84) is that in, 
for example, video texts such as promo videos, ideology is already reconstructing 
denotation (conventional meaning) through insertion of connotations within the `literal' 
itself. 
Barthes originally assigned `authenticity to the denotative value of the photographic 
image' which is then undermined where `advertising texts take that original denotative 
text as their own new content'. Here existing images work in `the service of some 
heightened play of degraded thoughts and commercial messages' (loc. cit. ). However, it 
is always possible to point to the authentic primary text as a means of demystification. In 
the new circumstances of the intertextual play of terms, images and so on, represented, 
for example, by video text, this is no longer possible as `the ideological signs are already 
deeply embedded in the primary texts'. A further complication is that topic and theme, 
subject and predicate now rapidly interchange in the above mentioned process of 
`distraction'. Here Jameson gives the example of the development of logos from the 
earlier sign, the brand name which starts off as denotator of jeans or shirts, for example. 
Within the context of promo videos, this situation is transformed and the real world as 
referent disappears altogether. The brand name-as-logo becomes a denotator in its own 
right; as `synthesis of advertising image and brand name', even embodying a whole 
advertising tradition (ibid., p. 85). The logo must be possessed for its own sake and can go 
on to reference other subordinate items such as jeans or shirts. Similarly, in the video 
film A1ienNATION (ibid., p. 93) the symbolism of a milk carton with a bullet hole could 
reference an historical event, or, alternatively the historical event (assassination of 
Harvey Milk) could denote the bullet-holed milk carton. ' In the same video Beethoven's 
music is contextualised and degraded by the connotator `classical music', which operates 
like the logo in relation to the brand name. For Jameson this trope represents a kind of 
ideological closure in which the real world referent is effaced. The process of reification 
of the signifier represented in Barthes' notion of myth disjoins the sign from the referent. 
However, at first: 
Such a disjunction does not completely abolish the referent, or the objective world, or reality 
which still continue to entertain a feeble existence on the horizon like a shrunken star.. 
. 
But its 
great distance from the sign now allows the latter to enter a moment of autonomy... This 
autonomy of culture... is the moment of modernism... of a realm of the aesthetic which 
redoubles the world... winning a certain negative or critical power (ibid., p. 96). 
3 The complexity seems to require reference to a globalised space which decentres its objects - but is 
this so very different from orthodox structuralist ideas when applied to globalisation? 
4 Harvey Milk was a gay rights activist in San Francisco. 
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However, the postmodem phase where `reification penetrates the sign itself means that: 
reference and reality disappear altogether... We are left with a pure and random play of 
signifiers... which no longer produces monumental works of the modernist type but ceaselessly 
shuffles the fragments of preexistent texts 
... 
metatexts which collate bits of other texts 
- 
such is 
the logic of postmodernism (ibid., p. 96). 
Semiotics and the Problem of Closure 
As seen above, the two connected linguistic characteristics of closure noted by Jameson 
are a tendency towards self-referentiality and the invasion of the sign by ideological 
connotators. This predicament is reinforced by Jameson's scene-setting of referent versus 
culture, language versus reality, and at another level, global capital as hidden or 
noumenal instigator of cultural changes 
- 
the base-superstructure configuration with a 
vengeance. 
The plausibility of the closure scenario depicted by Jameson will now be examined under 
two of his key categories, those of ideology and semiotics. 
(a) Ideology 
Although Jameson's use of `ideology' differs from the traditional Marxist view in that it 
has given up on reflecting reality, there is still an indecipherable causal relation with late 
capitalism. Moreover, there is also the problem of truth: ideology remains a matter for 
epistemological treatment. 
Now it was argued in Chapter 4 that the base-superstructure model is better replaced by 
the structure in dominance/structure of structures model where the economy functions 
both through itself and through its interconnections with other institutions. Hence the 
broad `surface' of cultural practices become conditions of production and there is no 
noumenal or hidden structuring of, in this case, late twentieth century societies. 
Following from this perspective, ideology is not an abstraction or set of detached 
meanings floating in a platonic realm which reflect, or reflect only enigmatically, 
economic relations but is a practised part of everyday life. Ideology as a field of 
connotations is therefore significant not so much for what it says, but for what it does. In 
the tradition of Gramsci and Althusser ideology creates a subjective content for people, it 
also shapes institutional structures 
- 
`creates the terrain on which men move, struggle, 
acquire consciousness of their position etc. ', in Gramsci's words. 
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It was argued in Chapters 3 and 4 that there is an overlap between this perspective and 
the phenomenological work of writers such as Husserl, Schutz, Garfinkel, Russell and the 
Frege-Dummett position. This is perhaps most usefully elaborated by Dummett (1981). 
For our purposes here the key point, apart from the perception of language as practice, is 
that discourse is functionally differentiated in terms of sense and denotative reference 
although such functions remain interdependent. It is important to note here that the 
denotative in Barthes refers to what Dummett means by `significance', the coding 
procedures of a language. On the other hand, to denote, for Dummett is to pick out 
something as a topic in a discussion, which is grasped via the sense of the interchange, its 
meaning in context. There is here an idea that meaning and language are not statically 
related, or that meaning can be reduced to a language which ignores the contextual 
practices of picking things out. This distinction and deficiency in Barthes translates to 
Jameson's cultural analysis. 
(b) Semiotics 
The crucial distinguishing feature of the Frege-Dummett approach is that meaning occurs 
through language functions rather than purely in them. Language and actions are bound 
together as utterances without a reduction occurring either way. 
Now whilst `objective', conventional meanings as in Barthes' `denotation' might indicate 
a certain linguistic or cultural self-sufficiency, senses, the use of language to pick out a 
topic, point to the openness of natural language utterances to context. Now semiotics 
might suggest a similar contextuality in that meaning is derived from a field of reference 
or connotation, the present to a speaker or reader. The difference is, of course, that the 
sense is expressed through the contextual usage, not the internal semiotic structure of 
meaning. Jakobson's observation (cf. Chapter 4), taken as representative here, that the 
meaning of a term is that of the term which is substituted for it illustrates this contrast 
well enough. 
Semiotics therefore rests largely on synonymy as the measure of the relationship between 
terms whereas for the Frege-Dummett perspective context rather than synonymy is the 
key to the meaning of utterances. 
Symbols, terms, phrases or sentences can have an equivalence in Frege's theory of sense 
and reference. ' Different names or sentences can carry the same meaning or sense and the 
A `name' in Frege-Dummett refers to a phrase, expression or term which picks out an object/topic 
in context. Whether this is described as referent or reference is arguably of secondary importance to 
the reality of the sense linked to the object. Referent and reference arguably merge at the point 
where a speaker grasps the sense of a situation. Therefore physicality, or embodiment, following the 
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same name or sentences can carry different meanings. Hence there is no one-to-one 
relationship between sense and reference in Frege. The logical objects as conventional 
meanings `denoted' by the utterance may be quite different from the sense of the 
utterance 
- 
our appreciation of what it would take to show the truth of the utterance in a 
given context and therefore the actual thing denoted. Hence, while the morning star and 
the evening star denote the same logical object, the senses attached to those names are 
not the same and can only be grasped by reference to the discourses containing those 
terms. 
Similarly, Dummett (op. cit., pp. 340-2,493) argues that attempts at translation of natural 
languages based purely on synonymy will fail because they do not take into account the 
point that the transparency of the internal structure of discourse to conversants depends 
on their grasping the indexical features through which one statement or expression comes 
to imply another. In other words, the unfolding of discourse depends on a logic of 
implication which is not self-evidently available from the words themselves. Rather, 
taking the point made (judgment) in a statement depends on grasping the context of the 
utterance, through which it becomes clear how the parts of the statement are related to 
each other, that is, how they implicate each other. An illustration of how this works can 
be given from the following sentence which represents a case of ambiguity in natural 
language: `Wright kicked the ball, the referee blew his whistle and it went wide. ' Without 
some contextual knowledge of the meaning of `it went wide', for example, it is not clear 
that the latter is the predicate for the name/subject `Wright kicked the ball'. Another case 
is mentioned by Greimas (1983) in Schleifer (1987, pp. 76-7). Here the construction of a 
joke depends on the meaning of `toilette'. The word is introduced into a context as 
`lovely toilettes' where it literally makes no sense as it is already a part of the context 
(indexical features) of the conversation, as its other meaning, `smart occasion' and is 
therefore read as `lovely lavatories'. Consequently, a translation based on synonymy 
would make no sense. The statement only becomes comprehensible once we detect the 
incorrect usage of `toilettes'. This is not however given by the other terms in the 
conversation but by the context (indexicality) in which the conversation occurs. Greimas 
(Schleifer, loc. cit. ) argues in his Structural Semantics that the `sense' of a discourse 
rarely depends on synonymy (although it provides a necessary foil in the same way as 
conventional meaning or significance generally provides an identity against which 
denotation identifies) but on shared or `redundant' meanings given by and constitutive of 
the context. 
argument of Chapter 6, could be seen as having an ideational aspect where the objects of discursive 
practices always appear as inscribed or sedimented within fields of reference. 
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The existence of redundant or taken for granted meanings should alert us to de-reifying 
tendencies in discursive practices where conventional meanings are modified or 
subverted by the indexical features of context. 
Sense and Referent 
It is evident from Jameson's discussion of Barthes' semiotics that he rejects attempts to 
site the stability of meaning in the Saussure-Hjelmsev-early Barthes tradition of 
denotation. Saussure, for example, tied signified and signifier together via the metaphor 
that they were like the opposite sides of a sheet of paper, which if cut from one side 
would have immediate effects for the other. 
Jameson also dismisses the possibility of anchoring meaning in a referent. Whilst the 
problems of correspondence theories of meaning and truth have also been rehearsed in 
Chapter 5, it is however worth examining what Jameson has to say on this subject. He 
observes that: 
at an outer limit, the sense people have of themselves and their own moment of history may 
ultimately have nothing whatsoever to do with its reality: that the existential may be absolutely 
distinct, as some ultimate `false consciousness' from the structural and social significance of a 
collective phenomenon (ibid., pp. 281-2). 
This can be immediately contrasted with the Frege-Dummett perspective where the 
senses of discursive expressions point beyond them and in doing so make ontological 
claims for meaning structures which are seated in everyday communication, that is, in the 
indexical expressions of natural language utterances. Here language is seen as a practice 
where action and description are combined, the doing and describing are two sides of the 
same coin 
- 
an action which describes and a description which is communicatively 
efficacious. It was argued in Chapter 4 that there were important similarities between this 
view and the work on ideology in Gramsci, Althusser and Laclau. That everyday, 
ideological, symbolic systems were important for what they brought about rather than as 
a field of mistaken truth claims. At the same time, this meant that everyday language and 
imagery was tied up with objective, propositional language and that translations could be 
made from one to the other. The notion of articulation in Gramsci was particularly 
suggestive in this respect, indicating a point of intersection between these aspects of 
language which both enlivens objective language and ties it into the everyday. Similarly, 
on the' Frege-Dummett view, the utterance of objective language, the process of 
denotative reference, depends on indexical features given by the context of utterance, 
those elements which are transparent between speakers. Garfinkel's (1967, p. 4) 
observation about the necessarily incomplete nature of any substitution of objective terms 
for indexical features of utterances is apt here. 
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This broad area of agreement about the dependence of cognitive language, knowledge 
statements on everyday contextualisation stands in contrast to Jameson's own position, 
which is itself, arguably, a caricature of the classical Marxist notion of ideology. Marx 
(1974, p. 29) himself allowed for a kernel of knowledge within the shell of ideology. 
The idea that there is no point of connection, no overlapping logic between the structural 
and collective aspects of the world and the mediatised culture whose ubiquity Jameson 
wishes to emphasise, would seem on the face of it to be an idealist separation of the 
world of experience from the world of structures, global economics and so forth. Frege 
(Carl, 1994, pp. 63-6) warns it is a mistake to view our concepts as disembodied entities 
and to take the syntax of communication for its content. The subject-predicate 
formulation suggests that concepts exist in isolation from the factors that condition them. 
He is at pains to point out that in fact concepts always exist in relation to their conditions 
of possibility, the conditions of the utterance of statements in the Frege-Dummett view. 
Frege's point about the organic connection between subject and predicate, the actuality of 
the conceptual or theoretical, helps to demonstrate the power of articulation on a larger 
scale, the ability to enliven an idea by tapping into the historical sense of a 
tradition/project ä la Merleau-Ponty (see Chapter 1). It is perhaps in the light of this 
ontology of meaning that Jameson's (op. cit., pp. 21-5) claims about the waning of 
historical referents/reference should be viewed. 
Jameson entertains the possibility of writing a fiction whose `historical' characters only 
formally represent historical events; that is, a fiction in which the names of historical 
figures are utilised as divorced from their historical resonances. 
Developing the theme more generally, Jameson notes: 
there no longer does seem to be any organic relationship between the American history we 
learn from school books and the lived experience of the current multi-national, high-rise, 
stagflated city of the newspapers and of our own everyday life (ibid., p. 27). 
One argument against this dehistoricisation of symbols is that which follows on from the 
position developed above. This is Gramsci's insistence (cf. Chapter 3) that the historical 
culture is there, locked up and articulated within the `cultural us', and that it does not 
depend on `individuated consciousnesses'. The culture is something that we 
intersubjectively practice, whether or not it reaches the level of our consciousness. 
Furthermore, Jameson's emphasis on ntediatised culture translates to the margins the 
more mundane but pervasive aspects of everyday life such as juridical and political 
structures, educational and familial practices, the ecology of the urban environment and 
the interconnections between all of these things. 
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The Historical Referent: From Jameson to Gramsci 
The concern with a referent, a reality out-there is, as suggested in Chapter 6 and above, a 
misconception of the real, which ignores the contribution of the subjective to the world. 
As Farrell notes of Hegel: 
the logical structure of thought seems to be present... wherever there is any lcind of self- 
unifying or self-determining going on [mind-independent, real processes]. So when the strong 
realist claims that reality articulates itself into units and sorts, even apart from how humans 
think, it seems that Hegel would see such a realist as granting the presence of thought in the 
world, in the very way in which things are determinate (Farrell, 1994, pp. 16-17). 
That is, the world itself is patterned, regular and intelligible; it has a logic of its own. 
If this is taken on board, the effacement of the referent as posed by Jameson, can be seen 
as a pseudo-problem. This is so not because there are no referents but is due rather to 
referents not having the `out-there' quality attributed to them by Jameson and others who 
maintain a simple `subject-object' perspective. 
Again, as Dummett (op. cit., pp. 58-9) argues, Frege's realism consists in regarding senses 
of expressions as having an objective status, indeed a status which determines reference 
(objectification). When we grasp the sense of an expression, we have an appreciation of 
the conditions which would render it true. We understand the way it relates to or 
articulates with other expressions. We can conduct conversations and thus have shared 
understandings (ibid., p. 394) about how to apply truth conditions 
- 
what it would take for 
a claim to be true. Thus, sense determines reference; we pick out aspects of the world 
through our actions and are consequently able to give cognitive accounts of them. 
Articulating the Past 
Now if this is seen in relation to Gramsci's notion of articulation (cf. Chapter 3), then we 
can understand the past precisely in the way it is articulated in the present. Current 
articulations of traditions of thought such as liberalism secure a hegemonic culture by 
drawing on the `inarticulate' context of the tradition to contest the accounts of the 
historical present given by other traditions. 
The reality of the past, as Gramsci indicates, remains a graspable reality not merely 
because it once happened but because it is bound up in present practices and can be 
brought to consciousness through a process of articulation with explicit ideas or theories 
about the past. Hence Jameson's concern with the historical referent `out-there' has led 
him to neglect the referent as continually re-enacted in the culture in its more or less 
conscious articulations with historical presents. 
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The notion of articulation in Gramsci is spelled out by Hall (1986) when he (Hall) 
discusses the nature of political practices. Ideological frameworks take off politically if 
they can become organic, that is, connect with the sedimented past practices of the 
culture effectively. 
For Gramsci, Hall (op. cit., xii-xiii) argues, the locus of such historical sedimentation is 
common sense political thinking which: 
is composed of the historical traces, incomplete borrowings, diluted concepts and prejudices, 
inherited wisdoms and formulations incorporated from a variety of the `great systems' of 
political thought which have sedimented into it. 
Further, 
Logically and philosophically elaborated thought leaves its traces in... everyday common 
sense. Conversely, the pattern of common sense beliefs sometimes achieves a more 
rigorous... philosophical elaboration... He [also] argued that the centre of attention must be 
those ideologies which have influenced the thought and action of the great mass of the 
people... which help to form mass consciousness and provide the ideas commonly in use and 
categories in which apparently spontaneous practical thought generally occurs. Such 
ideologies, he argued had achieved true historical or `organic' influence... political ideas 
`become organic' by being absorbed into the structure of common sense and common 
practice. 
In Dummett's (op. cit., p. 461) case, the meanings of the constituent phrases or terms of 
an utterance constitute a sedimentation of meaning in relation to the present utterance; 
that is, their meanings become organic to the present utterance which both supersedes 
and rearticulates these meanings around a new sense and topic. The senses of the 
constituents are not determined by the whole utterance, its conventional meaning is 
different from the effective meaning which is produced by the way the constituents are 
configured or articulated in the sentential utterance, that is, as `corresponding to its 
structure'. Therefore the whole utterance makes sense by articulating its subordinate 
elements, by rendering them contextual and inarticulate. 
Consequently, articulation as `making sense' involves rendering the senses Of constituent 
phrases consonant with that of the utterance. It makes the past applications of expressions 
or phrases congruent with present applications, demonstrates the connections between 
explicit, propositional-type language and the inarticulate, indexical context of meaning, 
the sedimented meaning that the present utterance comes to define. In turn, the 
sedimented context of the utterance renders the latter obvious, ostensibly true or self- 
evident (ibid., pp. 339-41). 6 For example, in the historical context of Locke's Treatise on 
6 The indexical, taken for granted nature of context entails that self-evidence (making sense) does not 
work like logical relations where formal definitions are employed (Dummett, op. cit., p. 336) and 
therefore does not require synonymy between elements of utterances. Articulation is therefore non- 
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Civil Government, it made sense to define individual freedom both in terms of property 
ownership and of the production of property by one's own agency, and generally within 
the tradition of liberalism the connection between life, liberty and property became self- 
evident. 
The configuration of clusters of meanings to produce self-evident claims is a theme of 
Husserl's work on sedimentation. Whereas Hall notes of Gramsci that cultural meaning 
requires an articulation of the (ideological) elements, Husserl makes a point about the 
reactivation of sediments configured as a combination. The original meaning can only be 
conveyed where all the members of the combination operate as a configuration (Husserl, 
1970, pp. 361-2). If only the individual members are reactivated then `the ontic validity is 
destroyed' (ibid., p. 362). 7 Where the associative connections of significations work 
without self-evidence it is not possible to elaborate effective meaning structures. 
Merleau-Ponty (see Chapter 1) has made a related point about historical projects coming 
to an end state where they no longer connect to the demands of the situation, become 
`non-sense'. 
Hall's (1986a) reading of Thatcherism is pertinent here (cf. Chapter 4). He points out that 
the ideology is intrinsically unstable. It is connotatively problematic in that the unity of 
the combination of ideological elements is dependent on the figure of Thatcher rather 
than being founded in their mutual association. In other words, the ideology does not 
have a thoroughly cohesive structure, there is no cultural resonance which would have 
rendered it generally organic. For example, whilst the figure of Thatcher connotes both 
individual entrepreneurial initiative and family values, the connections between these 
ideological elements are not culturally self-evident. 
The Historical Past as Sediments 
In the discussion of Gramsci and the Frege-Dummett perspective, we have elucidated the 
idea that articulation and its self-evidencing features provide a way of talking about the 
relation of past to present times. It provides a way of understanding Jameson's `cultural 
dominant', which is a dominant discourse in the sense that any elaborated account of 
culture would occur through it and because references to previous times would form a 
sedimented, indexical context or framework to the exposition of current more or less 
reductionist either to elements or whole/meaning convention in contrast to the fixed meaning 
conventions of semiotics or Foucault's prioritisation of discursive elements (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1989, p. 107). 
`Original meaning' is here understood as `past-present' comprehension (see Note 8). 
8 Sedimentation is taken as occurring in cycles where historical presents become past presents. Such 
presents are typified by a specific cultural horizon of expectations which circumscribes what is 
deemed practicable and desirable within the present times or temporality (Heller, 1982, pp. 44). 
Hence sedimentation refers to what is recoupable from that cycle (past present) as a `present-past'. 
123 
conscious cultural conventions such as political programmes, economic theories, 
aesthetics, forms of popular culture, and so on. That is, although the cultures of other 
temporalities may be spoken about, their presence within the current dominant discourse 
is below the horizon of consciousness as its contextual self-evidential features. 
However, in Jameson's approach it was found that cultural signifiers equivalenced each 
other, or `swallowed each other up', semantically. Hence, his predominantly semiotic 
approach suggests the self-referentiality of signifiers which leaves no remainder, no 
sedimented, open horizon of meanings. In this respect one is reminded of the criticism of 
Hegel's idea of negation as an area (of closure) where thought is identical with itself. 
Indeed, this reservation was the substance of the Gadamerian fusion of horizons, as 
Warnke (op. cit., p. 165) argued, in that it represented a `deabsolutised' form of negation, 
within which dialogue and difference/disagreement were still possible. 
The argument had been put in its most devastating form by the young Hegelian, 
Feuerbach, writing in the 1840s. Feuerbach noted that any transcending account of an 
existing argued position must `paradoxically' take note of the reality of that position in 
order to address it and supersede it. However, the reality in the first position, rather than 
being considered as dialogically on-going with the second, is somehow absolutely 
negated, or in Dews's (1986, p. 38) terms becomes `the waste product of identity 
thinking'. Feuerbach (1987, pp. 95-6) went on to argue that the past is never `over' in the 
sense described here, but lives on and co-exists with that which supersedes it. Hence 
Hegel's system `knows only subordination and succession; co-ordination and succession 
are unknown to it'; the fact that stages in change and development form `moments in a 
simultaneous totality of nature' is ignored. 
If this schema is translated into the context of the preceding discussion of articulation 
then we can understand the self-evidential context of the cultural dominant as that which 
situates dominant conventional meanings of a culture and in some sense co-exists with it 
as `present past'. Further, the co-existent past of a culture, as Dummett makes clear in his 
distinction between sense and conventional meaning, has the capacity to subvert the 
objectified, received meanings of the culture. 
Althusser and the Conjunctural Formulation of Historical Moments 
Following on from Feuerbach's suggestion about the possibility of grasping history not 
as a reflection of the discourses of the present but as `simultaneous totality', it is worth 
investigating one celebrated project in this direction. Althusser's (1975,1977) model of 
structural overdetermination was applied to the articulation question, in posing the 
problem of whether it was possible to get an overview of the different rhythms, paces of 
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development and historical times as a conjuncture rather than as disparate and disjunctive 
processes. 
Althusser argued that it was possible to describe historical trends by taking an `essential 
section' or snapshot which showed how all the separate elements were both functionally 
and contradictorily related. However, as Osborne (1992, pp. 82-3) has pointed out, the 
effect of this is to lose the sense of historical dynamism, change, in which one can 
theorise `the break', the moment of systemic rupture which is so central to Aithusser's 
account of overdetermination. That is, totalisation occurs not abstractly but from a 
particular historical situation or standpoint in relation to which all other times are 
understood and culminate as historical movement. 
Arguably, the difficulty here in accounting for discursive-structural relations lies in the 
theoretical underdevelopment of the structuralist paradigm itself. The terms or elements 
of the conjuncture are framed in terms of the binary tropes of opposition/equivalence. 
Hence the problem of how one might relate or articulate temporally differentiated 
discursive structures, which was rehearsed in relation to Jameson, also surfaces here. 
There is a lack of the internally-related functions in naming or signifying and contextual 
indexicality which can account for the sedimentation of the past within the present. 
This stands in contrast to the historical-linguistic reading of articulation outlined above 
which allows for a differentiation of functions. As context, the sedimented meaning is 
qualitatively different in character from the cultural dominant through which it achieves 
conscious expression. This can be seen in Gramsci's concern with rendering political 
programmes organic, connecting them with the relatively stable but open horizon of 
sedimented ideas and practices. 
Further, whilst Althusser's `essential section' suggests the historical investigator has a 
God's-eye view of the conjuncture and hence must stand beyond the historical process 
itself, it is clear that all observers are historically situated and therefore must stand in one 
of the temporalities of the conjuncture. 
If this is the case, then understanding can arguably come from the process of articulation 
of the different temporalities from the standpoint of one of them. This raises the 
possibility of a Gadamerian fusion of horizons or a rearticulation of the elements in the 
Gramscian sense, where a problem can only be addressed by recognising that historical 
change requires that it is addressed and reformulated through a new field of connotations. 
In either case, the outcome is seen as a broadening of understanding, in Gramsci's case 
because new articulations must take account of progressive cycles of sedimentation. 
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The dialogical potentialities of the Gramscian perspective, as developed here, therefore 
seem to offer more scope for historical understanding than the pure synchrony of 
structuralism. The process of articulation as active sedimentation of alternative positions 
within one's own discourse as its programmatically inflected common sense features in 
some ways reflects Hegel's Aufhebung (transcendence) but leaves the semi-autonomous 
or open character of common sense intact, allowing for the possibility voiced by Gramsci 
that hegemony over the sediments can be contested and the everyday mobilised for 
another purpose. 
Capitalism, Modernity and the Significance of Remembering 
Jameson's pessimism for the possibility of remembering the past seems to owe 
something to Benjamin's (1985, p. 35) work on time and commodification. One of the 
central ideas here is that of fashion. Fashion is a constitutive feature of our time- 
consciousness. Styles, forms of sensibility, discourse undergo rapid and periodic change 
which leaves a sense of historical dislocation. Osborne (1995, p. 140) has argued that the 
phenomenon of dislocation has to do with the standardisation of time in the modem 
period. That is, `the present' is punctuated by periodic interruptions as a kind of 
repetition or bureaucratisation of change. Any dislocation is hence itself routinised as 
repetition 
- 
the words `fashion' and `vogue' indicate the serial and routine nature of the 
apprehension of change in modernity. The routinisation of dislocation is also connected 
with the resistance of consciousness to shock, as noted in Simmel and Benjamin. That is, 
the continuity of historical events and processes is suppressed in a distancing adjustment 
through which the individual damps down their immediacy, a kind of abreactiveness to 
the bad side of things. This distancing trope is objectified in the collective 
temporalisation of events, `that was then, this is now'. 
For Benjamin and Osborne, this mechanism can also be seen as a commodification of 
time which places `other' times beyond our grasp. The most concrete expression of this 
tendency for us today is perhaps the heritage industry, but the notion of history as 
heritage was one with which Benjamin was already familiar (loc. cit. ). 
Benjamin argues that time can only be redeemed through a quasi-theological strategy of 
positing a beyond to history from which point time recoalesces into a historically 
intelligible form. This is to be achieved by relating an image which dislocates the 
historical present both to the latter's everydayness and to narrative structures through 
which the continuity of historical processes is expressed. Thus, the everyday is reunited 
with narrative historical understanding (ibid., pp. 143-53). 
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Osborne (op. cit., pp. 189-96) also gives a reading of Lefebvre's (1971,1987,1991) 
account of the everyday which points up the contradictoriness of the everyday and its 
relation to standardised, commodified time. Whilst the everyday, taken for granted mode 
of understanding has no boundaries and is projected into an endless present in the form of 
cycles of repetition or in Heller's (1984) terms `repetitive praxis', this process is affected 
by commodification, as capitalism itself moves in cycles of expanded reproduction, 
repetition or renovation of previous stages. Consequently, phenomenological experience 
of the new in modernity takes the form `more of the same', `we've seen it all before' etc.; 
or, as Osborne cites Heidegger `In everydayness everything is all one and the same, but 
whatever the day may bring is taken as diversification' (ibid., p. 194). Hence, whilst the 
everyday is the site of repetition, these changes or repetitions in the times of capitalism 
conflict with the open horizons of sedimented practice where there are no objectifying 
boundaries. Lefebvre, in fact, relates this contradiction within everydayness to the advent 
of the differentiation of institutions concomitant with modern capitalism which produce 
objectified, specialised forms of knowledge. By contrast, in the premodern period 
thought was more strongly characterised by its indexical features, a transparency in its 
appeals to a traditional authority that, so to speak, `always is', in its positioning within 
endless calendrical cycles. 
It is in order to return at this point to Jameson's `loss of the referent' theme, because it is 
precisely this phenomenology of the everyday that Jameson's work both lacks and 
consciously relegates to the ethnographic sidelines. When he concludes his discussion of 
the near successful attempt of black radicals in Detroit to achieve municipal control he 
observes: 
Most ironic... is the very success of their failure: the representation 
- 
the model of this complex 
spatial dialectic 
- 
triumphantly survives in the form of a film and a book, but in the process of 
becoming an image and a spectacle, the referent seems to have disappeared, as so many people 
from Debord to Baudrillard always warned us it would (ibid., p. 415). 
Two things emerge from this. Firstly, paradoxically, Jameson manages to speak about 
black struggles in Detroit without any qualms over being able to communicate his point. 
Secondly, any readership entering a dialogue with the film or book is a situated 
readership. That is, it brings its own context to the reading. Hence, making sense of the 
discourses of black radicalism is not stymied by abstract ideological meanings (closure) 
but opened up by the kind of dialogue readers generate with texts, discourses. 
Interestingly, and contradictorily, Jameson goes on to suggest that what is referred to, 
that is, referents, have an impact on discourse. He notes: 
successful spatial representation... may be... inscribed in a narrative of defeat, which sometimes, 
even more effectively [than `revolutionary triumph'], causes the whole architectonic of 
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postmodern global space to rise up in ghostly profile behind itself, as some ultimate dialectical 
barrier or invisible limit (loc. cit. ). 
To pursue the phenomenological analysis, Jameson has, in effect, extracted the 
sedimented event and comprehended it through its articulation (as film or book) with the 
historical present-as-postmodernity/globalisation of capital. Further, its very spectacular 
or mythical representation seems to provide the redemptive image, against the grain of 
commodification, through which the event can be recuperated. It is just this kind of 
representation (of an `impossibility') which in Benjamin's terms places an event outside 
the historical process and thereby acts as a means through which the connection between 
the historical present and past can be understood. 
It has been argued that Jameson's neglect of the everyday leads him to describe authentic 
or existential experience as in no way enabling us to grasp the complexities of global 
capitalism. On the contrary, Osborne (1995, pp. 141-2) has argued, the narrativity of 
contemporary life cannot be understood without the kinds of process described above 
where the sedimented images of past presents are capable of interrupting the way the 
present is understood and reconnecting it to historical narrative. 
As with Althusser, the weakness of Jameson is to neglect the situatedness of the 
commentator; the belief that totalisation can only be comprehended from an Olympian 
position rather than that of the situated subject. This point is confirmed by Jameson's 
emphasis on the Althusserian break between ideology and science which notoriously de- 
situates the knowing subject. 
It also runs contrary to Jameson's more sensuous characterisations of cultural 
understanding through architecture 
- 
his description of the Gehry house (ibid., pp. 108- 
29), for example. The melange of motifs in postmodem architecture could be taken as an 
expression of the way the cultural dominant situates itself in relation to past presents and 
their motifs. The building itself becomes a referent here (ibid., p. 119) and serves to 
exemplify the kind of argument advanced in this discussion of Jameson, that is, that the 
building is self-referential, it both denotes itself as the architectural statement and 
expresses a relation to local geography and architectural tradition and its sedimented 
discursive senses. This dialectic is in fact read by Jameson as its own sense or real 
meaning. 
Further, whilst the Gehry house carries connotations of past styles and usages, such as the 
play on the historically situated public-private spaces of buildings, Gehry house is 
predominantly shaped by the connotations of global socio-economic change which 
wrench the building away from its very subsidiary local symbolic charges. This is seen 
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through the way the building subverts traditional notions of space and its usage, through 
for example, its `tumbling cube' feature and use of facades which create a sense of 
uncertainty about the dimensions. (It is not possible to grasp the building via a 
photographic image. ) Jameson concludes that the building primarily connotes highly 
abstract global forces and their spatial relations. 
Now the strange thing about this account of the Gehry house is that the more familiar 
spatial aspects, the facades and connotations of earlier religious buildings, for example, 
are not seen as mediating the more abstract, global message, which, as it were, comes at 
us from out of the blue, although, of course, in Jameson's description itself, this is 
precisely what they do. 
In other words, Jameson's description of the Gehry house actually suggests that far from 
being unmediated, its evocation of spatial complexity or abstractness is framed by the 
background of familiar features which suggest spatial abstraction through their 
arrangement in an unfamiliar (postmodern) configuration. This also suggests that the 
trope of abstractness here does not indicate something irretrievably beyond adequate 
description, but rather is only relative to the familiar, that which we take for granted. 
In sum, Jameson's methodology rejects the duality of reference between the familiar, 
indexical features of statements and their articulation in the statement as the denotation of 
an object, in this case the relations of global capital. The indexical, everyday references 
are made and then dismissed, or in Jameson's (op. cit., p. 119) term `volatilized', leaving 
the building as an impenetrable signifier which nonetheless expresses a material thought. 
One of the least satisfactory aspects of Jameson's account of postmodern experience is 
his description of the retro or nostalgia mode. As Jameson notes, this is not the nostalgia 
of past associations but the wholesale recycling of the past as a series of motifs, graphics, 
styles of film acting, sepia-tinted images, art-deco, etc. However, he goes on to suggest 
(ibid., xvii) that the forms of this `nostalgia' can be separated from their (historical) 
content so that no questions are raised here about a real historical content to this 
experience. The idea of separating style from content raises the same difficulties as 
separating thoughts from their conceptual organisation, and would seem, remembering 
Frege's point about the impossibility of a world in which subjects (conceptual 
frameworks) are separated from their actual appearances, their usages in the world. 
This in turn brings us to Osborne's (op. cit., pp. 194-6) discussion of Lefebvre's work on 
temporal objectification and the everyday. Jameson's description of the nostalgia mode 
corresponds to the objectification of temporalities which Lefebvre identifies with the 
commodification of time. In architecture, Jameson highlights "`historicism"... the random 
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cannibalization of all the styles of the past... and, in general, what Henri Lefebvre has 
called the increasing primacy of the "neo"' (ibid., p. 18). Elsewhere, nostalgia is 
represented by `historicist films... a depersonalised visual curiosity and a "return of the 
repressed" of the twenties and thirties "without affect"' (ibid., xvii). Now whilst this 
counterposes the awakening to connotations of the past to a profound sense of 
distantiation, it could be suggested that the `return of the repressed' is real enough and 
that the articulation or connotation of the historical present with the `sutured' past can 
surely be found in the conditions of urban and economic life, the restructuring of capital, 
the resurgence of market hegemony and inequality which mirrors the `twenties and 
`thirties. A curious omission here is Thatcherism or Reagonomics which `hark back' or 
articulate recent concerns with classical market liberalism. It is not clear why events 
noted in film studies, or more generally, `art language' (ibid., p. 19) qualify as `nostalgia' 
whilst those in political economy do not. Jameson seems to have fallen victim to his own 
critique; as Osborne (1994, p. 3) indicates, for Fukuyama, and Jameson, the past is past 
but the present knows no limits. 
The Politics of Time 
Feuerbach's insistence on the continuing access to the past in its simultaneity with the 
present was aimed at Hegel's closure of the past via Aufhebung. Jameson's perennial 
engagement with the place of the historical past in Postmodernism in some ways 
rehearses that debate. However, whereas for Feuerbach, life could correct abstract 
thought, ideology, in Jameson, abstract ideological signifiers effect historical closure. 
There is a pervasive pessimism that the everyday has lost touch with the (now) global 
realities and cannot dislodge the ideological signifier. 
Against this, as Osborne (op. cit., p. 196) argues, Lefebvre's two-fold dynamic sees the 
cycles of capitalism's restructuring and renovation both producing commodified time and 
as being undermined by the structures through which these repetitions are received. The 
open horizon or continuous present of the everyday both reconnects, articulates the 
historical past with the present and in doing so the repetition punctuates the everyday 
with a sense of the genuinely novel character of the historical present. 
Whilst one aspect of the everyday, its very indexicality, connotes the past, on the other 
side it indexes the genuinely new features of the cultural dominant. In other words, 
`today' it picks out its enormous and spontaneous historical reflexivity, its access to the 
past in the recycling of past styles and its reassembly of these in historicist or other 
discursive forms 
- 
as Jameson' account of postmodernism uniquely indicates. 
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Finally, Osborne (1995, pp. 192-3) argues that Lefebvre's account of the everyday offers 
a new basis for an emancipatory project, in that whilst the notion of alienation in the 
early Marx was criticised as anthropologism, the new position locates emancipatory 
critique in the structures of the world itself. Hence a politics of time is exigent, a 
contestation of the cultural tropes of closure is required which persuades people of `The 
simple possibility that things might proceed otherwise' (Osborne, 1994, p. 3). 
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Chapter 8: Afterword 
The different rhythms experienced in the temporalisation of routine are well enough 
illustrated in Jameson's account of downtown life in contemporary Los Angeles. It is 
then arguable that Jameson's account of late capitalism, despite his claims to the 
contrary, tells us in essence what we need to know about global market forces. His own 
suggestion that this postmodern experience is an unrepresentable state of affairs, may 
owe as much to the semiotics of representation as to any substantive problem. It may just 
be that the elusive topic emerges from a reading of Postmodernism, which ironically, 
contextualises the `effacement of history', as a visible product of this new 
temporalisation. 
At least we can see from the text that the contemporaneity it describes consists in a 
complex conjuncture of rhythmic structures of different temporalities or locales in a new 
articulation under a cultural dominance of an increasingly globalised capital. 
Globalisation itself gives these developments a new everyday tempo such that place is 
destabilised towards space and the consequent hybridisation of place and identity tends to 
undermine the logics of the nation state and the absolutisation of `the other', though the 
interaction with a deabsolutised other is no guarantee of a harmonious intersubjectivity, 
as recent events in the Balkans have testified. On the other hand, we know from Merleau- 
Ponty's ambiguity and Hegel's `master-slave dialectic' that the lord only comes to know 
himself through the bondsman's activity and that this contradictory intersubjectivity is 
also a source of knowledge and power, the sens of the subject through which 
emancipation is possible. ' 
For Merleau-Ponty, the underlying forms of social organisation, of institution and 
situation, remain open as different articulations of the cultural dominant and its temporal 
structure. Now Weberians and discourse theorists have defined the locus of organisation 
as `out there', whether in terms of the operations of the language of discourse or of 
specific institutional factors of bureaucratisation. The work of Schutz, Merleau-Ponty and 
Dummett has, at least by implication, opposed this overconventionalised view of social 
reality as a closed system of classification and objectification. 
Schutz's important achievement, a radical reading of the rationalisation thesis, places the 
latter within an `open horizon of typical familiarity', the routine, everyday structure of 
experience, where hypostatised goals are always open to alternative interpretations, to 
contestation and reclamation of these fetishised institutional forms. 
See Kruks (1990, p. 121) and Silverman (1987, p. 82ff) on the signif icance of ambiguity in Merleau- 
Ponty's work on intersubjectivity; see Hegel (1966) on `Lordship and Bondage', on the ambiguous 
nature of domination over a determinate subject. 
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Dummett's reading of Frege's theory of meaning enables us to locate the routine, 
contextualised nature of our discursive practices in terms of their senses, which connect 
the conventionalised, sedimented meanings of utterances to their present deployment, 
thus realising their existential meaning and reference. The articulation of 
conventionalised language with the present context renders visible its sedimented content 
in such a way as to transfigure its meaning and thereby release a new reference. Here, the 
meaning routines of one type of context (of past utterances) find themselves in 
conjunction with those of another. This interruption of routine as an assimilation to a 
present context (pattern of routines) has a quality of surprise or revelation (despite 
Heidegger's perception of it as merely `diversification'). 
This de-fetishisation of language and release of a new content is perhaps most recently 
illustrated in the interruption of the onward march of neo- and social Darwinist 
discourses through the debates around GM foods. The progression of these teleologies of 
evolutionary closure would have seemed all but inexorable in the recent past, but in 1999, 
the debates about the context of genetically modified foods have opened up the field of 
related issues. This has revealed the links between science and global capital and thus 
challenged the objectivist stance of scientific practitioners. ' The everyday basis of 
scientific discoveries is shown as imbricated within the routines of transnational 
corporations. Hence we can see scientific rationalisation as containing the marks of its 
context of enunciation. As Garfinkel (op. cit., pp. 3-4) notes, the 
impersonality, or objectivity of accounts [is] not independent of the socially organised 
occasions of their use. Members' accounts 
... 
are features of the socially organised occasions of 
their use. 
Here a crisis of science, the moment of referencing the context, its actual topic, against its 
objectivist claims, demonstrates the radical epiphanic power of the everyday. 
See Vidal (1999) for example, on Indian peasants' struggles against dependency on global capital 
via campaigns against self-destructing crops ('terminator seeds') which is part of a more 
generalised creeping dependency for crop propagation. 
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